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PREFACE 
What prompted the topic of this thesis was a brief visit to the 
Big Hole battlefield during a hunting trip in November, 1963. Because 
the area was officially closed to visitors, no Park Service personnel 
were there to explain what had transpired 86 years before. I found a 
pamphlet entitled "Trail Guide," left in a box on one of the small 
buildings, and it explained something about the furious fighting that 
had taken place. It indicated where soldiers and citizen volunteers 
had dug rifle pits, still discernible in the "siege area" where these 
men had retreated after attacking the Nez Perce camp a half mile dis­
tant. The booklet noted that seven soldiers had received the Congres­
sional Medal of Honor for their service there. The largest of several 
monuments in their honor had been transported from New Hampshire in 
1883. 
Then I noticed a small monument, unpolished and fashioned from 
rough stone. Apparently it had been placed there by an unknown donor 
and was never removed. If memoiy serves, the inscription on the bronze 
plaque read, "In memory of the Nez Perce women and children who were 
killed here by U. S. soldiers." 
After completing By self-guided tour and returning home, that 
plaque had me curious about the true, full story of the Nez Perce war. 
The answer was not an easy one to find. Hence, a thesis was born. 
TABLE OF CŒITENTS 
CHAPTER PAGE 
I. HISTORICITT OF THE NK; PEECE NATICN 1 
II. PRE-mR TREATIES AND COUNCILS 22 
Treaty of 23 
Treaty of I863 27 
Treaty of I868 . 32 
III. NEWSPAPER CHARACTERIZATION h2 
17. THE WAR: PHASE ONE 6l 
The Idaho Campaign .... ..... 6l 
Invasion of Montana 72 
V. THE mRs PHASE TWO 87 
Fort Fizzle Affair 87 
Editorial Opinion Shifts ....... 102 
Turning Point of the War 10^ 
71. THE WAR; PHASE THREE 12^ 
Wilderness Escapade 12^ 
The Surrender 1^2 
711. THE NEWSPAPER WAR I63 
Fort Fizzle Reaction I63 
The 7olunteers ..................... 170 
Potts' Reputation 178 
Howard's Reputation ............ . l82 
Swing of Opinion I86 
V 
CHAPTER PAGE 
VIII. GONCLUSICNS 190 
APPENDIX: 198 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 20^ 
LIST CF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1. Howard Overtakes Joseph, Herald Extra, July 29, 1877 . . » . 73 
2. Governor's Proclamation and Fighting on Lo-Lo, Independent 
Bgtra, July 29, 1877 « 96 
3. Escaping Hostiles, Independent Extra, July 29, 1877. 
Indians Pass Gapt. Rawn's Command, Independent Extra, 
July 29, 1877. 
Pass Within Gunshot of Rawn, Herald Extra, July 29, 1877. 
Joseph's Band Escaping, Herald Extra, July 29, 1877 .... 103 
U. Citizen's Meeting, July 29, 1877 107 
5. Proclamation! Call for Three Hundred Volunteers, Herald 
Extra, July 31, 1877 109 
6, Big Hole Battle, Independent Extra, August 9, 1877. 
A Fight with the Hostiles, Herald Extra, August 11, 1877.-
Howard Joined Gibbon, Herald Extra, August 12, 1877 . . . . 117 
7. Big Hole Battle, Further Particulars, Independent Extra, 
August 11, 1877 118 
8. Burning Homes of Beaverhead Settlers, Herald Extra, 
August 13, 1877. 
Savages' Work on Horse Prairie, Herald Extra, August 1^, 
1877 126 
9. Fight of Howard's Advance, Herald Extra, August 21, 1877. 
Nez Perce at Henry's Lake, Herald Extra, August 23, 1877 . . 129 
vil 
FIGURE PAGE 
10, Telegram from Maj. Benham to Gen, Gibbon, Independent 
Extra, August 27, I877 
Massacres in the National Park, Herald Extra, August 27, 
1877 . 135 
11, Helena Party Survivors, Herald Extra, August 28, 1877. 
Gfejyser Party Coming Into Virginia City, Herald Extra, 
August 30, 1877 136 
12, Hostiles* Attack at Mammoth Hot Springs, Herald Extra, 
September 2, 1877. 
Cowan Alive, Independent Extra, September 1877 137 
13, Fight Between Sturgis and the Hostiles, Herald Extra, 
September l5, I877. 
Sturgis Attacks, Independent Extra, September 1^, 1877 . . . Ili5 
111. Another Fight [at Canyon Creek], Herald Extra, September 
17, 1877 IH6 
15. The Indian War, Independent Extra, September 17, 1877. 
Sturgis in Pursuit, Herald Extra, September I8, 1877 .... II47 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORIC HT OF THE NEZ PERCE NATION 
To give perspective and a basis for understanding the events of 
1877, when the Nez Perce nation was brought to full subjugation by the 
U. S. government, it is necessary to establish objectively something 
of the character of these Indians. 
With all due respect to voluminous and enlightening studies 
undertaken in the fields of histoiy and anthropology concerning the Nez 
Perce as a people, it is generally agreed by scholars that little is 
known about the origin and ancient traditions of these somewhat nomadic, 
amorphous tribes. Tribal documentation—save for pictographs—is not 
extant.^ 
Nevertheless, the usual oral tradition involving folklore and 
nyths has been preserved to some degree through ejctensive personal inter-
2 
views. At the same time these efforts rendered limited documentation 
and analysis of the original tongue, a Shahaptian dialect closely related 
to the Umatilla, Wallawalla and Yakima tribes of Oregon and Washington.^ 
The character of the Nez Perce tongue obviously links the nation 
^Herbert J. Spinden, The Nez Perce Indians, American Anthropo­
logical Association, Vol. II, Part 3 (Lancaster, Pa.; The New Era 
Printing Company, 1908), p. 231. 
^Archie Phinney, Nez Perce Texts (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 193h). 
%errill D. Beal, I Will Fight No More Forever (Seattle: Univer­
sity of Washington Press,'"l963), pT ii. 
2 
with Pacific Northwest tribes, as opposed to Indians located to the east 
in Montana. But it should be noted at the outset that Nez Perce envir­
ons were, for the most part, isolated geographically from neighboring 
nations. 
Generally speaking, the area inhabited by the 70 or more tribes 
in the Nez Perce system stretched, in what has been described as a 200-
square-mile belt, across Idaho to the eastern portions of Oregon and 
Washington.^ This belt was bounded to the east by the Bitterroot Mount­
ains, to the west by the Blue Mountains and, for lack of better defini­
tion, lay between latitudes and U7 degrees north.^ 
Regarding the matter of isolation, there appears to have been a 
wide margin of neutral territoiy separating the Nez Perce from their 
traditional enemies, the Shoshoni to the south and the Spokan and Coeur 
d'Alenes to the north. On the other hand, a close association existed 
with friendly Indians, the Umatilla and Paloos, along the western flank 
of the belt.^ 
Nez Perce villages were situated along major waterways in this 
sprawling, majestic countiy. 
The drainages occupied by the so-called non-treaty tribes (that 
half of the Nez Perce which rebelled in 1877)—a compilation of five 
bands, each led by a chief, which split from the Nez Perce nation and 
went on the warpath in 1877—were as follows: White Bird, along the 
^Ibid.. p. 7. 
^Spinden, og. cit., p. 172. 
6lbid., p. 173. 
3 
7 
Salmon Riverj Toohoolhoolzote, between the Salmon and Snake rivers| 
Hush-hush-cute, southwest of the Snake; and Looking Glass, along the 
Middle Fork of the Clearwater. The band led by Chief Joseph, leader 
of these non-treaty tribes, inhabited the Wallowa and Imnaha valleys 
8 
of Oregon. 
Because of an abundance of a variety of fish and the fact that 
large game, plentiful on Montana plains to the east, was sparse in Nez 
Perce environs, much of the econony was concentrated on fairly sophis­
ticated methods of fishing. Tribesmen were adept in utilizing tackle, 
9 
spears, nets, seines and traps. 
Gathering of wild fruits, berries and roots—especially camas, 
a nutritious bulb roasted in pits—was a chore delegated to women and 
children. Agriculture in any form was unknown before the arrival of 
the whites. 
The men hunted surrounding mountains for deer, elk, mountain 
goat, big horn sheep and small game animals. But an understanding of 
later events requires recognition of the fact that the procurement of 
food was for the Nez Perce a difficult and time-consuming task, as 
compared with plains Indians located 200 or 300 miles to the east. 
Each spring a large portion of the Nez Perce nation ventured 
over the traditional route—a well-cut but precipitous horse trail 
7 
The spelling of Indian names is phonetic and, therefore, author­
ities differ markedly. Cyrus Brady, for instance, rendered this name, 
"Too-hul-hul-suit." 
®Beal, loc. cit. 
^Spinden, o£. cit., pp. 208-211. 
^°Ibid., pp. 201-205. 
u 
often called a "road," via Lolo and Lost Trail passes—to hunt buffalo 
in central Montana. This route was the one followed by the Lewis and 
Clark expedition when, in September, l805, the first meeting with the 
Nez Perce was made by white men. This route also was the one followed 
during the fateful summer of 1877 when the non-treaty tribes escaped 
into Montana Territoiy. 
The problem of food for the Nez Perce which, it may be supposed, 
established the traditional route across the Bitterroot Mountains, was 
clearly documented by Capt. William Clark, October 10, l805, in his 
journal: 
Their amusements appear but fiew as their Situation requires 
the utmost exertion to pr(o)cure food they are generally emplcyed 
in that pursute, all the Summer & fall fishing for the Salmon, 
the winter hunting the deer on Snow Shoes in the plains & in the 
Spring cross the mountains to the Missouri to get Buff alow robes 
and meet &c. at which time thqy frequent (ly) meet with their 
enemies & lose their horses & maney of their people.IT-
The mention of horses and warfare by Clark merits comment. 
It is believed that the Nez Perce were unique among Indians in 
12 
that horse breeding was practiced without instiruction from white men. 
One strain which was developed before the arrival of Lewis and Clark 
was the renowned Appaloosa, a remarkable animal characterized usually 
13 
by a spotted rump. Once white settlers introduced cattle, the Nez 
Perce were equally successful in establishing large herds by animal 
husbandry. 
^^Bernard DeVoto (ed.), The Journals of Lewis and Clark (Boston; 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953)> p. 2i;b. 
^^Beal, 0£. cit., p. 10. 
^%ernard DeVoto, The Course of Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 19?2), p. ^07. 
5 
More than is commonly realized, the horse, spread throughout the 
West from Mexico in the early 17th century, played a major role in Nez 
Perce culture. One man is said to have owned 1,500»^^ These animals 
afforded great mobility for a primitive society and, as soldiers later 
learned, the Nez Perce were accomplished equestrians. Not only were 
saddles used, but for combat a war horse was decorated with paint and 
feathers. Such pageantry was regarded as an exceptional honor bestowed 
1^ 
only on warriors. 
An interesting sidelight about horses in the Nez Perce society 
is that race tracks were established throughout the tribal land. Appar­
ently these Indians attached so much importance to adventurous quests 
such as racing and hunting that it created a problem at tribal councils 
for those interested in developing a more unified, domestic life.^^ 
As it turned out, the Nez Perce became increasingly nomadic. 
This has been attributed both to their need to hunt the plains areas 
and the economic affluence gained in selling horses to ranchers and 
the military. By I87O most of the Nez Perce carried modern firearms 
The nomadic life brought a host of problems for the Nez Perce, 
as given in a personal account in 1926 hy Wottolen (Hair Combed Over 
Ejyes), an aging and blind warrior who earned the distinction of becom­
ing tribal historians 
^^eal, loc. cit. 
^^Spinden, og. cit., pp. 229-230. 
^%eal, o£. cit., p. 11. 
Harvey Chalmers II, The Last Stand of the Nez Perce (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1962), p. 19. 
6 
The buffalo was hunted on the head of the Salmon [during 
early times]. The people would go there for meat and hides 
during the summer moons. Next few snows they go a little 
farther east. Following snows they go still farther east, 
and to the north. After a time they reach the Yellowstone 
River. There they hunt, for the buffaloes are many. Finally 
they come to (now) Helena, Montana. There th^ find people. 
This tribe proves an enemy to the Nez Perces. Crows, the 
Cheyennes, the Sioux. All these tribes living in that 
country became enemies of the Nez Perces. 
While the Nez Perce were tranquil in domestic life save for fun-
loving adventures, as warriors they were greatly respected by other 
Indians in the Pacific Northwest, and their reputation in combat was 
surpassed only by that of the Comanches, a southwestern offshoot of the 
Shoshoni. One Nez Perce has been considered the equal of three Black-
foot Indians, a tribe of marauders which clashed frequently with the 
19 
Nez Perce. 
The correct name of the Blackfoot of Montana was, according to 
a more precise interpretation of sign language. Blacklegs. The Nez 
Perce referred to them as "Iskoikenic," meaning "Schemers." Apparently 
Blackleg war parties harassed tribes as distant as ^fyoming and South 
Dakota. Arch enemies of the Nez Perce, save for one small band called 
Small Blankets, the Blacklegs were among the first western Indians to 
20 
obtain firearms from French migrants. 
Nevertheless, it is believed that sorties into Idaho by Invading 
trtbes were repulsed successfully by the Nez Perce. About l805 or l806, 
approximately the time that the Lewis and Clark expedition passed 
7. McWhorter, Hear Me, Hy Chiefs I (Caldwell, Idaho; The 
Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1952), p. 3. 
^^Ibld., p. 2. 
on 
Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
7 
through Nez Perce country, the Nez Perce massacred an Invading party of 
Snake Indians in what has been described as a running battle. The car­
nage was counted at 266 Snakes, comprising half the complement, at the 
site of an Idaho cave. How many Snakes were killed before the band was 
forced to take cover is unknown. Unable to extract the Snakes from the 
cave without sustaining a large nuntoer of casualties, the Nez Perce 
built at the entrance a fire which caused mass suffocation of the in-
21 
vaders. 
Such astute tactics made the Nez Perce dictators over the lands 
they claimed and it is in this light that the treaties imposed on them 
starting in 1855 should be viewed. 
It should be emphasized, however, that no private ownership of 
22 
land existed. The concept of a homeland did, as the nationalistic 
concept existed for the whites. To Indians throughout the United States, 
even after some 200 years of white influence, the notion of land as an 
economic commodity to be bought and sold was alien to their thinking. 
The warrior chief, Tecumseh, expressed the Indian philosophy of nearly 
all nations in answering the demands of white buyers: "Sell the coun­
try? . . . Why not sell the air, the clouds, the great sea?" Not a few 
23 
tribes resisted to the death demands to sell their land. 
The Nez Perce ancient right to sovereignty over the home terri­
tory had been spelled indelibly with blood for centuries and it is to 
^^Ibid., pp. 13-15. 
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., p. 2li5. 
^^Stewart L. Udall, The Quiet Crisis (New York, Chicago, San 
Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 8. 
8 
the everlasting credit of Gov. Isaac I. Stevens of Washington Territory 
in negotiating the first treaty that the right was fully respected. 
Shortly after the war in 1877, Gen. 0. O. Howard, who had pur­
sued the Nez Perce from the first battle to the last, wrote that the 
main tribe, 
the Upper Nez Perces, occupied the Lapwai, from which we have 
seen that Old Joseph was driven in l8ii.7. With these the gov­
ernment has had most to do in times past. With these Governor 
Stevens made his celebrated treaty of 1855, to which Old Joseph 
gave his assentj and well he might assent to this the first 
treaty, for it embraced in its established boundaries all his 
lands, and allowed him and his people to live in the same place, 
and in the same manner, as the Lower Nez Perces had lived for 
generations. Therefore, we are not surprised to find his name 
appended to an instrument which in itself was not inequitable, 
but which was preliminary to the usual course of dispossessing 
the Indians of the property and rights which th^ claimed. 
Within Nez Perce community life, property such as weapons and 
horses was personally owned and traded. 
Nez Perce relations with early settlers often were complicated 
by their love for stealing horses. But Many Wounds, a Nez Perce inter­
preter, explained that for a youthful warrior to gain prominence for 
consideration as a chieftain, he had to have led a minimum of ten suc­
cessful horse-capturing raids. 
The Nez Perce retained prisoners of war as slaves, although 
treatment toward them was kind. Slaves could gain acceptance into the 
tribe and it was not uncommon for female captives to marry their cap­
tors. Children born to prisoners in bondage were regarded as free.^^ 
^^0. 0. Howard, Nez Perce Joseph (Boston: Lee and Shepard Pub­
lishers, l88l), p. 7. 
^^cWhorter, 0£. cit., p. 11. 
^^Spinden, loc. cit. 
9 
The political structure of the tribal unit was founded on admir­
ation for individual prowess and accomplishment. Usually each tribe 
elected two chiefs or, more precisely, two chiefs who filled offices 
of greatest responsibility. The so-called peace chief held his position 
within the village for as long as the majority wished him to govern. A 
war chief, regarded with highest esteem, represented the tribe in the 
27 
council, a national body. While sons often replaced their fathers 
as chieftains, as happened with Chief Joseph in 1872 when Old Joseph 
28 
died, the position was by no means hereditary. 
The council met as circumstances warranted, sometimes in part 
to consider a minor matter between two or three tribes and sometimes in 
whole to debate intertribal concerns. There were, however, intertribal 
councils and village councils which dealt effectively with the majority 
of local issues. 
Unquestionably the national theme was harmonious for the Nez 
Perce. The prime concern of the individual was within the tribal vil­
lage and family ties were cohesive despite the general practice of 
29 
polygyny. 
Tribesmen exercised a wide latitude of personal freedom in action 
and speech. Oratory before a council marked the merit of a potential 
chief as much as his accomplishments in battle. That Chief Joseph was 
so revered by his compatriots—and later by his greatest enemies, the 
^"^Ibid., pp. 2ii2-2it3. 
pQ 
Cyrus Townsend Brady, Northwestern Fights and Fighters (New 
York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1907), p. U. 
^%eal, op. cit., p. 8. 
10 
whites—can be ascribed in large measure to his articulate wisdom, ex­
pressed in almost biblical phraseology. With an introduction by Rt. 
Rev. W. H. Hare, D.D., Bishop of South Dakota, who said that Joseph's 
appeal reminded him of the Hebrew prophets, the story as related by 
this great chief began with the following wordss 
Ify friends, I have been asked to show you nçr heart. I am 
glad to have a chance to do so. I want the white people to 
understand nçy people. Some of you think an Indian is like a 
wild animal. This is a great mistake, I will tell you all 
about our people, and then you can judge whether an Indian 
is a man or not. I believe much trouble and blood would be 
saved if we opened our hearts more. I will tell you in ny 
way how the Indian sees things. The white man has more words 
to tell you how th^ look at him, but it does not require 
many words to speak the truth. What I have to say will come 
from Bçr heart, and I will speak with a straight tongue. Ah-
cum-kin-i-ma-me-hut (the Great Spirit) is looking at me, and 
will hear me.30 
The impassioned, yet penetrating simplicity of many documented 
speeches by this warrior chief stand as empirical evidence of an expres­
sive wisdom that was embodied with the generations of his-people. He 
spoke for many, not just for himself. 
Jurispmdence within the Nez Perce nation amounted to an unwrit­
ten discipline enforced under the authority of each village chief. 
Murder, theft and adultery were regarded as major offenses, punishable 
according to the established code. A rapist, according to circumstances, 
was punished either by enforced marriage or death. Lying was a breach 
of tribal ethic and punishable public scorn and derision. 
The way of Nez Perce life made a lasting impression on the mem­
bers of the Lewis and Clark expedition. Captain Clark made the following 
^%rady, o£. cit., p. L8. 
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., p. 2hk» 
11 
entry in his diaiy, October 17, l805; 
Those people appears to live in a State of comparitive 
happiness: they take greatOer) share (in the) labor of the 
woman, than is common among Savage trices, and I am informed 
(are)content with one wife.32 Those people respect the aged 
with Veneration. I observed an old woman in one of the 
Lodges which I entered, She was entirely blind as I was in­
formed by signs, had liyed more than 100 winters. She occu­
pied the best position in the house, and when She spoke 
great attention was paid to what she Said.^^ 
This sensitivity and respect for the views of the aged, this 
basic trait of character which might best be termed humility, made an 
overwhelming impression on many whites who had to deal directly with 
these Indians. The Nez Perce as a people—too often referred to as 
brutal savages and barbarians by indignant and uninformed writers 
undertaking historical reviews of the conflict shortly after its ter­
mination—received unconditional praise from persons of whom it would 
be least expected. 
Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commander of the troops that finally de­
feated Chief Joseph near the Bear Paw Mountains of Montana Territory, 
wrote that they "were a very bright and energetic body of Indians j 
indeed, the most intelligent that I had ever seen. Exceedingly self 
reliant, each man seemed to be able to do his own thinking, and to be 
purely democratic and independent in his ideas and purposes. 
^^Apparently a large number of Nez Perce males, dominant in the 
paternalistic society common to Indian culture, were content with one 
wife. But some, including Chief Joseph, wed two. For this reason, 
the task undertaken by early missionaries to erase the practice of 
polygyny was by no means easy. 
33 
DeVoto, Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2^3. 
^^Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of 
General Nelson A. Miles (New York: the Werner Co., 1897), p. 279. 
12 
Similarly, Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, wrote: "This 
bloody conflict might have been avoided by a more careful regard for 
the rights of an Indian tribe whose former conduct had been uniformly 
peaceable and friendly. 
Had it not been for the qualities of the Nez Perce, the Lewis and 
Clark expedition might never have survived the difficult traverse of the 
Bitterroots into the vast domain now encompassed by the Selway-Bitterroot 
Wilderness area. The expeditioners found it nearly impossible to dele­
gate time for hunting while following the tortuous trail, a long stretch 
of which ascended heavily forested peaks and ridges. A Sergeant Gass 
proclaimed these "the most terrible mountains I ever beheld," although 
the crossing required only nine days. It should be remembered that 
71 years later Nez Perce men, women and children cariying all their 
personal belongings were to outmarch Gen. 0. 0. Howard's command over 
the same route on the initial leg of the frantic retreat. 
During the nine-day crossing by the Lewis and Clark expedition, 
iron rations in the form of a concentrate soup, a military experiment, 
were issued to the famished travelers. This sustained them until six 
advance hunters killed a stray Nez Perce horse for food. It was this 
hunting party which, on September 20, l805, made the first contact by 
whites with the Nez Perce people. Hospitality was warm and cordial 
despite the language barrier which reduced communication to hand gest-
37 ures.^' 
3%eal, 0£. cit., p. xi. 
3^eVoto, The Course of Empire, p. ^0^. 
37ibid. 
13 
The sudden change in diet, starting with iron rations and then 
shifting to dried salmon, dried berries and camas cakes offered by the 
Nez Perce, resulted in serious cfysentery for nearly every member of the 
white party. Like most. Captain Lewis found it difficult to ride a 
gentle horse. Morale fell to the lowest point during the transcontin­
ental trek and not a few members wished to turn back. 
Some medicines administered, such as "rush pills," "pukes salts," 
and other remedies, helped little. With a tone of embarrassment Cap­
tain Clark noted: "Cap(t.)Lewis and gy selfe eate a supper of roots 
boiled, which filled us so full of wind that we were scercely able to 
Breathe all night." The famed woman guide, Sacajawea, lessened their 
misery with a special salad of herbs. 
Yet the turning point in this crisis was the generous hospitality 
•59 
extended by the Nez Perce. It is curious, therefore, and perhaps 
prophetic of white thinking in later relations with the Nez Perce, that 
Captain Clark made the following entry, October 10, 180^; "They are 
verry Selfish and Stingey of what they have to eate or ware, and they 
expect in return Something for everything give(n) as presents or the 
survices whic they doe let it be however Small, and fail to make those 
returns on their part."^*^ 
DeVoto notes that this unjust stricture in view of the benefac­
tions of Indian friendship offered openly was later reversed and both 
of the expedition commanders came to regard the Nez Perce as the most 
^^Ibid., p. 506, 
39DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2^1. 
^°Ibid., p. 2U8. 
generous and likeable tribe th^ had encountered. On the return of the 
expedition from Fort Clatsop on the Pacific Coast in the spring of I806, 
the Nez Perce gave back not only horses and saddles that had been left 
behind, but also a hidden cache of food and supplies that had been 
buried and washed up by flood waters 
Snow halted several attempts to recross the Bitterroots until 
June U, when the expedition bade a final farewell to their Indian friends. 
The explorers learned to speak a few words of the language, and it was 
tribal legend that a number of Nez Perce girls were left pregnant 
In stature and bearing the Nez Perce were a handsome people, as 
evidenced by numerous descriptions and photographs» Their physiognon^ 
radiated an inner calm beneath the sharply furrowed, weathered features 
reflecting the grim aspects of wilderness existence. 
Captain Clark noted, however, that these Indians 
. . .  a s  a l s o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  f l a t  h e a d s  w h i c h  w e  h a d  p a s s e d  o n  
the Koskoske and Lewis's rivers are subject to sore eyes, and 
many are continually fishing during the Spring Summer & fall, 
& the snows dureing the winter Seasons, in this open countiy 
where the ̂ e has no rest.^3 
While a medical analysis of this and other Nez Perce physical 
debilities would require a separate study, which has been done on certain 
diseases, the major concern for missionaries was the outbreak of smallpox 
and similar infectious maladies which devastated numerous Indian nations 
during the 19th century. Much of this was spread by war parties from 
the upper Missouri to Indians who had not been exposed to the diseases 
^^DeVoto, The Course of Bnpire, p. ^l5. 
^^Ibid., p. 5lli. 
^^DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2^3» 
^^DeVoto, The Course of Empire, p. 306. 
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Smallpox, measles and scarlet fever were common in the wagon 
trains which shuttled westward. The inability of the Indian to acquire 
immunity made him easy prey to full-scale epidemics, as happened in 
more recent times among the Eskimos. The Indian's disregard of camp 
sanitation only worsened the situation. 
Ravages of smallpox and tuberculosis, unquestionably originated 
with white civilization, hit the Nez Perce nation in the i860's in the 
same manner other tribes were struck. Although census estimates vary 
widely, a drastic decline in population followed the epidemics. 
Early settlers who undoubtedly were unfamiliar with the entirety 
of Nez Perce environs gave conflicting census tabulations. This may 
have influenced Isaac I. Stevens, who became governor of Washington 
Territory in 18^3, who set the number at 1,680 in iB^l. Father Cataldo, 
a missionary who lived with the Nez Perce a half century or longer, 
estimated the population peak to be approximately 5,000 in i860. There­
after, the trend was sharply downward and the first official census in 
1893 indicated there were 1,895 Nez Perce people. 
Long before white influence, the Nez Perce developed a technology 
of note. Tribal lodges were huge, extending to some l50 feet. A 12-
month calendar was devised, not only to keep track of time, but to 
record historic events such as battles. Warriors wore armor—as did 
maqy of other tribes—which included a helmet, shield, and tunic fash­
ioned from elk leather. The most remarkable development was the making 
^^Francis Haines, The Nez Perces (Norman; University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1955), p. 9h' 
^^Spinden, o£. cit., pp. 239-liO. ^^Ibid. 
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of bows which were masterpieces of design and craftsmanship. The best 
of these, fashioned from the horns of mountain sheep, required a care­
ful splitting lengthwise, steaming for recurved shape, and then glueing 
and wrapping of deer sinew in a lamination process not dissimilar to 
the finest modem methods. 
It has been stated frequently that the French name given these 
Indians ty trappers is a misnomer. But as early as 1805, Captain Clark 
refer r e d  t o  th e m  a s  "Ch o - p u n - n i s h "  o r  "Pi e r c e d  N o s e "  I n d i a n s . A t  
least part of the Shahaptin stock of the Pacific Northwest did pierce 
the septum of the nose to insert a dentalium shell for ornamentation 
and, if this were widely practiced by the Nez Perce, it happened during 
earlier times.These Indians referred to themselves as Numipu. 
But for all their accomplishment as wari^iors, stock breeders 
and craftsmen, the Nez Perce seemed deeply aware that white civiliza­
tion eventually would become dominant. 
The incursion of settlers within Nez Perce boundaries did not 
occur, however, until February 20, i860, after Elias D. Pierce discov­
ered gold in the Clearwater district flanking the eastern portion of 
tribal land protected by the treaty of 18^5. It should be noted that 
the date of incursion corresponds closely with the smallpox epidemics 
of that decade. This formulated the tragic turning point of what pre­
viously had been considered a golden age of relations with the whites. 
^^Ibid., pp. 211-212. 
^^DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2ij^6. 
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., pp. 171-172. 
^^eal, o£. cit., pp. 18-20. 
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Owing to the treaty signed five years earlier, citizens in Walla 
Walla recognized the enormous danger and favored negotiating a new 
treaty. Meanwhile, Chief Eagle-from-the-Light and Chief Lawyer fumed 
and made open threats on the town of Lewiston, then being built. 
An agreement to let miners dig the Clearwater country was reached 
the following year, but it was inevitable that further demands would 
follow. A second agreement was signed December 31, I86I, to open the 
Salmon River district to the south. 
It is somewhat amusing that the enterprising Nez Perce adjusted 
to their fate in numerous ways, including the construction of toll 
bridges and the running of ferries. 
But as the Indians had sadly anticipated, the thousands of miners 
that swarmed in became settlers. To the credit of the Nez Perce, hos­
tilities were avoided despite several provocations. The whites cut 
timber, cultivated fields and built fences, and pigs overran and des­
troyed the camas crop so dear to the Indians. Meanwhile, it has been 
estimated that the miners eoctracted some $50 million in gold from Nez 
Perce territory. 
That friendship with the whites deteriorated was criminal in 
view of the exhaustive efforts made in earlier years by both sides to 
foster friendly relations. It is apparent that Lewis and Clark seeded 
the theme of national sovereignty which, as far as is known, the Nez 
Perce never challenged.Traditionally their interest centered on 
^^Ibid. ^3ibid. 
^^eclmically the Nez Perce were Spanish Indians, and they might 
well have become British during the border dispute later. The American 
"manifest destiny" was by no means a certainty. 
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the land, the tribal society and a deeply rooted religion. 
While their religion was somewhat mystical, based in part on 
dreams and visions, the tenets were not so divergent from Christian 
principles that argr impossible barriers existed for missionaries. A 
most astounding event, in view of the respect paid to tribal mores, 
occurred during the summer of I83I when four tribesmen traveled from 
Eamiah village on the Clearwater with the specific intention of 
journeying some 2,000 miles to St. Louis in the hope of recruiting a 
Christian missionary and learning something about the great book of 
the white religion. 
On crossing Lolo Pass, one Nez Perce turned back to avoid hin­
dering his partners, but shortly thereafter, three tribesmen from the 
friendly Flathead nation joined the venture. 
Unfortunately, the remainder of the endeavor was one of tragedy. 
Before the delegation reached its destination, October 1, I83I, two 
Indians had died of disease. The people of St. Louis accorded the 
visitors a warm welcome, but it was found nearly impossible to commun­
icate effectively. Captain Clark, then a resident of St. Louis, was 
overjoyed to gather again with the people who had welcomed him 2$ years 
earlier, but he had forgotten what little he had learned of the Nez 
Perce and Flathead languages. The desire of these tribes to enlist a 
missionary was not understood fully. Meanwhile, three more Indians of 
the delegation succumbed to diseases and only one, a Flathead named 
Rabbit-Skin-Leggings, returned to his people to tell of failure. 
^^Haines, o£. cit., p. 57. 
^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid. 
19 
Seen in the larger sense, however, the remarkable quest bore 
fruit that was to nourish the Nez Perce culture on the one hand and, 
strangely, to help destroy it on the other. 
In 1836, two missionaries, Marcus Whitman and Henry Spalding,^® 
and their wives introduced agriculture, technology, education and 
religion in a manner that endeared them to the Nez Perce and neighboring 
tribes to the west. Indeed, the Nez Perce appeared eager to receive 
instruction in Christianity and margr accepted conversion.The impress 
of this influence was understood well by General Howard who penned the 
following account of the tragic end of the work done by the Whitmans: 
When Mr. Spalding, a remarkable Protestant missionary, 
whose name to-day is a household word with the Christians of 
the tribe, came, in I836, to the Nez Perces, Old Joseph and 
his band were induced to cross over to the mouth of the Snake 
and settle for a time near Lapwai, to cultivate a farm there, 
and send their children to Mr. Spalding's school. The sudden 
massacre of Dr. Whitman and his family, by the Cayuses, in 
l8i;7, caused the Spaldings to leave the country in haste. 
Whitman, representing the Presbyterian, Congregational and Dutch 
Reformed churches, and his beautiful wife, Narcissa, had gained the 
deepest admiration of the Indians until circumstances changed their 
^®Paul C. Phillips (ed.), "The Oregon Missions as Shown in the 
Wàlker Letters, 1839-1851," Frontier Omnibus (Missoula: Montana State 
University Press, 1962), p. 101. Phillips spelled this name Spaulding, 
making it obvious there is some confusion. Other authorities drop the 
"u". Which is right is difficult to ascertain, for it is entirely 
possible that Phillips is correct. A monument erected on the Contin­
ental Divide near the Green River reads: "Narcissa Prentiss Whitman. 
Eliza Hart Spalding. First White Women to Cross This Pass July 
1836." In personal letters which Phillips edited, such as correspond­
ence by Dr. Whitman, the "u" is dropped also. Undoubtedly Phillips 
was aware of the problem, having rendered the name two ways in the same 
article. The town in Idaho is spelled Spalding. 
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., pp. 158-261. 
^'^Howard, o£. cit., p. 6. 
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relationship. 
First, the Caynse tribe was poor in comparison with the Nez Perce 
and disease, which the missionary was helpless in controlling, swept 
through the band. Second, Mr. Spalding had blundered diplomatically 
with the Nez Perce, as shall be described shortly. Finally, and most 
important, a vagabond deserted by a passing wagon train for causing 
trouble managed to ignite Cayuse feelings against the Whitmans. This 
individual, Joe Lewis, a half breed from Maine, convinced the tribe that 
Dr. Whitman was poisoning the sick—those dying of measles—to procure 
their land.^^ 
It should be noted also that the Whitmans were less than success­
ful in their ceaseless efforts to instill Christian principles with the 
/ g 
Ceruse. 
Although Dr. Whitman realized danger was imminent, he had little 
expectation, apparently, that two prominent chiefs would enter the 
mission on the pretense of obtaining medicine and then cariy out the 
plot that left the Whitmans massacred and mutilated before the eyes of 
their children. 
Although Spalding faced no such danger with the Nez Perce, he, 
too, had made mistakes which had divided the nation. At the outset, 
Spalding had distributed food, clothing and tools indiscriminately with­
out regard for tribal custom or asking for repayment. He did expect 
^^Erwin N. Thompson, "Narcissa Whitman, " Montana Western Histoiy, 
Vol. XIII, No. L (Autumn, 1963), 15-28. 
^^Haines, o£- cit., p. 101. 
^^Thompson, o£. cit., p. 2lt. 
^^Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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protection, support and acceptance of his doctrine, of course, which 
the Nez Perce would not give in return for an assortment of gifts. 
This shortsightedness hurt Spalding's prestige and, when the 
Whitman massacre occurred, he and his family decided to leave. 
The two missions at Waiilatpu and Lapwai were closed for lli years 
as a result. Many of the Christian Nez Perce retained the faith, how­
ever, and continued the agricultural pursuits taught them. In 1862, 
Spalding and his second wife reopened Lapwai and, consequently, hundreds 
of Nez Perce were baptized. Many accepted Christian names, as in the 
case of Tu-ela-kas who became Joseph^^ and whose son, the renowned chief, 
was to bear the same name. 
Other missionaries of other faiths arrived in the l860's, but 
their efforts to combat disease, the confusion caused by various inter­
pretations of Christianity, and the impact of the mining invasion doomed 
the diplomatic era of golden relations. 
^^Haines, 0£. cit., p. 79. 
^^eal, o£. cit., p. 17. According to the personal recounting 
of the war by Chief Joseph, his name was In-mut-too-yah-lat-lat, mean­
ing Thunder-traveling-over-the-mountains. Joseph claimed that his 
Christian name was first given to his father by Spalding. But many 




PRE-WAR TREATIES AND COUNCILS 
As early as 18^3» seven years before the mining invasion of 
Idaho, there were sufficient settlers in the Northwest to create a new 
territory. Congress approved the splitting of the "Old Oregon Country" 
to form Washington Territory that year. Major Isaac I. Stevens, 3h, of 
the U. S. Army, was appointed governor, a position which included serv­
ing as Secretary of Indian Affairs in that domain.^ 
American policy, even before the Revolutionary War, has been to 
negotiate formal treaties with each Indian nation to avoid or resolve 
land disputes. In l8% many such documents were contracted with tribes 
from coast to coast, including the Walla Walla, Cayuse, Yakima, Flatheads 
and Blackfeet in the Northwest.^ That the federal government should 
negotiate similarly with the Nez Perce nation for the first time in l85^ 
was by no means unusual. Unlike subsequent treaties with that nation in 
1863 and 1868, the initial agreement arose from no great controversy. 
Yet the basic issue—to establish a reservation exclusive of white 
settlement—remained foremost in all Nez Perce treaties. 
When approximately half of the Nez Perce nation revolted in 1877, 
^Helen A. Howard and Dan L. McGrath, War Chief Joseph (Caldwell, 
Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltc., 1958), p. hS-
^Charles J. Kappler (ed.), Indian Affairs Laws and Treaties, 
U. 5. Senate Reports, Vol. II (Washington; Government Printing Office, 
190li), pp. 665-7ii2. 
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newspapermen and government officials, including congressmen and advis­
ers to the President, studied Nez Perce treaties and related events to 
determine the cause of the difficulty. As will become evident in later 
chapters, the government was finally to accept the blame for its failure 
to uphold the obligations which, in the case of the Treaty of I863, were 
forced upon the Indians. 
Treaty of 1855 
On Msçr 23, l855. Governor Stevens and an entourage comprising 
approximately 100 aides and military personnel gathered along a tribu­
tary of the Walla Walla River. There a camp was established to greet 
delegations from the several Indian tribes asked to attend. 
The first to arrive the next day were approximately 2,500 Nez 
Perce. Each of the several tribes was represented by a chief, which 
included Looking Glass (father of the warrior of 1877), Spotted Eagle, 
q 
Old Joseph, James, Red Wolf, Timothy, Eagle-from-the-Light and Latter. 
Then came Cayuse, Yakima, Umatilla and Walla Walla tribesmen, 
for a total of more than 5,000 Indians.^ During the protracted negotia­
tions that followed, the council ground was filled with gaiety from 
outward appearances. Indians danced, courted, gambled on races and spun 
yarns.^ But as the treaty negotiations became heated over details of 
apportioning lands, a plot was inspired by the Cayuse, murderers of the 
Whitmans, to overwhelm the small white delegation by force. When word 
of this reached Nez Perce chiefs—presumably to gain approval—the 
%eal, o£. cit., p. 25. ^Ibid. 
^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. ii9. 
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lodges of that nation were quickly moved into the midst of Stevens' 
camp. This action not only thwarted the Cajruse scheme, but demonstrated 
Nez Perce good will toward the whites which assured tranquillity during 
the remainder of the talks.^ 
Negotiations between the white men and the Nez Perce went reason­
ably well until an outburst by Chief Looking Glass halted the talks with 
Governor Stevens for a short time. This chief, arriving on the scene 
late because of a buffalo hunt, accused his people of selling out tribal 
land for government annuities. Although the position by Looking Glass 
was correct in many ways, the Nez Perce rejected it in separate council 
and negotiations were resumed with the whites. 
Article 1, establishing general boundaries for a ^,000-square-
mile reservation, began with the following declaration which, although 
common to Indian treaties, was to cause serious misunderstandings later: 
"The said Nez Perce tribe of Indians hereby cede, relinquish and conv^ 
to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and to the 
countiy occupied or claimed by them, bounded and described as follows, 
7 
to wit: ..." 
While the intent of such a declaration is clear, a definition of 
such words as "right," "title," and "interest" becomes academic when 
soldiers demand tribes to move homes and belongings, first, from land 
protected by Nez Perce warriors for uncounted centuries and, later, from 
land protected by this treaty. In effect, the government extracted from 
the Nez Perce their title to lands owned, if that word is applicable, 
^eal, loc. cit. 
Tseal, o£. cit., pp. 27-29. 
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on the quid pro quo that this transfer of ownership would entail govern­
mental management, improvement, supervision and protection as stated in 
succeeding articles. 
Article 2, which further delineates boundaries, specifies that no 
white settlement would be allowed on the reservation, except for person­
nel emplc^ed by the Indian Department. 
It stipulates further that any substantial improvement made by 
an Indian—be it cultivation, fencing or construction—would be valued 
accordingly, and equal compensation would be paid to the Indian involved. 
While this and other inclusions designed to aid the financial lot 
of the Indian deserve praise, for the transition to white ways is rarely 
easy, the Nez Perce were alreatfy a relatively rich nation and became 
more so through prosperous trading with miners, settlers and the military. 
Because the treaty was not ratified by Congress until 18^9—a delay later 
deplored by government officials as inexcusable—annuities totaling some 
$200,000, plus promises to spend $60,000 for improvements, did not begin 
to materialize for the Nez Perce until late in i860, five years after 
8 
the treaty was signed. 
This delay abrogated Article 1; wherein the annuities were prof­
fered as follows: 
For the first five years after the ratification of this 
treaty, ten thousand dollars each year, commencing September 
1, 1856J for the next five years, eight thousand dollars each 
year; for the next five years, six thousand each year, and 
for the next five years, four thousand each year./ 
Technically, then, the treaty became inoperative on September 1, 
^Chalmers, og. cit., pp. 2^-25. 
%appler, og. cit., p. 70lt. 
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1856, because the financial commitment of the government was not ful­
filled as agreed. 
The remaining articles of the treaty made provisions for schools, 
a hospital and access for public highways through Nez Perce environs. 
This is not to suggest, however, that white settlers would be tolerated 
without permission of the Indians. Article 10 allows one white, William 
Craig, to retain his land holdings on the reservation in accordance with 
the laws binding the Indians because the latter had expressed the desire 
that he do so.^^ 
As noted in the previous chapter, this treaty incorporated fairly 
the tribal dominion of the Nez Perce in establishing a reservation. A 
general good will between the contracting parties prevailed, with one 
important exception, and when the Stevens delegation departed eastward 
to make similar agreements with Plains Indians, he discharged his mili­
tary escort and was accompanied by a Nez Perce guard. Heading this 
escort were Looking Glass, who temporarily had disrupted the council 
talks, and White Bird, who was to become a persuasive voice in Nez Perce 
12 
affairs during the war 22 years later. 
The one exception to good will was Old Joseph's refusal to join 
the 56 other Nez Perce chiefs and chieftains who signed the Treaty of 
185#. Although he was overwhelmingly outvoted, the position he took in 
refusal, recounted by his son, the great warrior in later years, was to 
have far greater impact on Nez Perce affairs than did the treaty: 
^^The Nation, August 2, 1877 (see Appendix). 
^^appler, o£. cit., p. 705. 
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 27. 
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Mr. Spaulding took hold of nçr father's arm and said, "Come 
and sign the treaty." father pushed him away and said; 
"Why do you ask me to sign away nçr country? It is your busi­
ness to talk to us about spirit matters ..." Governor 
Stevens urged ny father to sign his treaty, but he refused. 
"I will not sign your paper," he said, "you go where you 
please, so do I; you are not a child, I am no child; I can 
think for nyself. No man can think for me. I have no other 
home than this. I will not give it up to any man. Ify people 
would have no home. Take away your paper. I will not touch 
it with Day hand." 
father left the council. Some of the chiefs of the 
other bands of the Nez Perces signed the treaty, and then 
Governor Stevens gave them présents of blankets. % father 
cautioned his people to take no presents, for "after awhile," 
he said, "they will claim that you accepted ps^ for your 
country." Since that time four bands of the Nez Perces have 
received annuities from the United States. îfy father was 
invited to many councils, and they tried hard to make him 
sign away his home. HLs refusal caused a difference among 
the Nez Perces. 
This "difference" which young Joseph mentioned about his father 
and other chiefs became the first major split in Nez Perce unity that 
was to divide the nation into parts, one peaceful and the other at war, 
in 1877. 
Treaty of I863 
Mith the illegal mining invasion of i860, the settlement which 
resulted and the failure of the government to uphold either the finan­
cial or territorial obligations of the Treaty of 18^5, tensions mounted 
swiftly. Mills and buildings promised were not constructed; payments 
were not met; whites who had taken Indian wives abandoned them and their 
children; Southern sympathizers agitated that the federal government was 
about to collapse; and the sale of several thousands of dollars of Nez 
Perce horses for use in the Yakima War, 18^6-58, was not paid by the 
^%rady, o£. cit., pp. 52-^3. 
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government. 
1/fi.lliam Purvine wrote for the Oregon Statesman; 
If open hostilities have not commenced with the Nez Perces, 
it is not because they have not been outraged to that degree 
when "forebearance ceases to be a virtue." In return for the 
continued friendship in time of want, and generous acts of 
hospitality always so readily extended towards the whites by 
the Indians, they now reap an abundant harvest of every species 
of villainy and insult.^5 
On June 21, l862, the Washington Statesman carried an account of 
the murders of three Nez Perce tribesmen by drunken miners.Pleas 
for justice were ignored by the whites and pressure was put on Indian 
agents to negotiate with the government. These attempts failed com­
pletely in l86l and 1862 because Nez Perce leaders were no longer in 
accord about signing papers with the United States. For lack of better 
tenaiinology, the tribes to the south headed ty Old Joseph in the Wallowa 
area are refeired to as "Lower Nez Perce" j those to the north headed by 
Chief Lawyer are called "Upper Nez Perce." The split in unity in 185# 
became a chasm during the long-awaited negotiations of 1863.^^ 
Because the Civil War prevented the government from paying 
annuities in I863, a commission, headed by Calvin H. Hale, then Super­
intendent of Indian Affairs in Washington Territory, was appointed to 
negotiate a new treaty with the Nez Perce. The major dispute, however, 
was not over money, especially among Joseph's tribes which refused to 
"become wards of the government" by accepting annuities. The real issue 
^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 70. 
^^fealem] Oregon Statesman, April 28, 1862. 
Italia Walla] Washington Statesman, June 21, 1862. 
^^Beal, op. cit., p. 30. 
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was land. 
The meeting at Lapwai, May 1^, 1863, was totally unlike the one 
eight years previously when amiable relations and a gay setting tended 
to lessen the heat of debate. The talks were conducted at Fort Lapwai, 
built the previous year, where four companies of the First Oregon 
Cavalry were garrisoned.^® 
The preamble characterizes the Treaty of I863 as "being supple­
mentary and amendatory" to the Treaty of l8?5, indicating that the 
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latter remained in effect. 
Article 1 provided for cession of lands to the government as 
stated in the earlier treaty with the exception that new boundaries 
would be located. Article 2 spelled out the changes, lopping off some 
million acres of the southern portion of the reservation where 
20 
Joseph's tribes were located. 
Moreover, this article allowed individual tribesmen at personal 
discretion to sell allotments of land, determined by survey, to whites. 
This provision trampled tribal ethic of long standing, because land was 
considered community property, as noted in the previous chapter. It 
also guaranteed settlement of reservation lands in violation of Article 
2 of the Treaty of 1855, which stateds 
All which tract shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, 
surveyed and marked out for the exclusive use and benefit of said 
tribe as an Indian reservation; nor shall any white man, except­
ing those in the employment of the Indian Department, be permitted 
to reside upon the said reservation without permission of the 
tribe and the superintendent and agent. . . .21 
^®Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., pp. 70-71, 
l^Kappléif, o£. cit., p« 81i3« 
2%eal, loc. cit. 
ZÏKappler, Og* cit., p. 703* 
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Article I4. of the Treaty of I863 noted that because the government 
had failed to comply "as yet" with the first treaty, a new schedule of 
payments would go into effect. The remainder of the treaty expanded 
somewhat the annuities promised originally, despite the Civil War debt. 
Regardless, the Lower Nez Perce still refused any federal "gifts" 
and what money did reach the reservation by way of improvements was, in 
large measure, embezzled by unscrupulous whites. A report by Superin­
tendent Kendall for the government after an inspection tour in 1862 
stated, in part: 
Not far from sixty thousand dollars have been expended by 
the agent heretofore in charge of this tribe. I regret to say 
the visible results of this liberal expenditure are meagre 
indeed. 
The buildings erected by Mr. Cain for the agency were mere 
shells hardly fit for human habitation. The want of comfort 
displayed can only be accounted for on the ground that the 
agent did not make the reservation his headquarters and conse­
quently felt little if ar%r interest in the matter. 
I sought in vain to find the first foot of land fenced or 
broken (to plough) by him or his employees. The only product 
that I could discover consisted of three tons of oats in the 
straw piled up within a rude uncovered enclosure of rails to 
raise which must have cost the government more than seven 
thousand dollars. Even this property was barely saved from 
the hands of departing employees who claimed it as the result 
of their private labor. 
As I witnessed the withdrawal from this meagre pile of the 
rations for ny horse, I could hardly fail to sigh from the 
thought that every chomp of his jaws devoured at least a 
dollar's worth of government bounty.22 
While this evidence is not conclusive as to the conduct of white 
employees on the reservation, similar evidence was brought to light in 
newspaper articles late in the war when a specific explanation of the 
causes of ill feeling were scrutinized. 
In view of the numerous breaches of faith by the government, it 
22chalmers, og. cit., p. 2U. 
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is no less than amazing that ^2 Upper Nez Perce signed the Treaty of 
1863. Only one Lower Nez Perce, Wap-tas-ta-mana, signed.Old Joseph 
had refused to attend the parley and, after learning the terms set 
forth, roundly denounced Chief La^er for selling out the Wallowa 
country to the south without authorization from Lower Nez Perce tribes. 
Actually, Laisser had fought to preserve as much of the reservation as 
possible and forced white negotiators to compromise their original 
demand to reduce the total area from 5,000 to approximately ^00 square 
miles. Nevertheless, such compromise as finally documented did not 
appease the lower tribes which bore the brunt of this "thief treaty." 
It is generally agreed and should be obvious that the commissioners 
were wrong in concluding a treaty for the Nez Perce nation with only 
half the tribes. Old Joseph's reaction was vehement. He not only tore 
his copy of the treaty to shreds, but he destroyed his long-treasured 
New Testament. Consequently, his bands turned to a Dreamer cult for 
religious solace, based on the teachings of Smohalla. This individual 
was subject to catalepsy, and his thinking—sometimes likened to Freud 
—centered on the meaning of dreams. Although he was a persuasive 
orator who rose to prominence at a time of great confusion for the 
Nez Perce, General Howard who met him said: "He is a large-headed, 
hump-shouldered, odd little wizard of an Indian, and exhibits a strange 
mixture of timidity and daring, of superstition and intelligence." 
7. McWhorter, Yellow Wolf : His Own Stoiy (Caldwell, Idaho: 
The C ax ton Printers, Ltd., 19U0), p. 3^ 
2%rac^, op. cit., p. 53-
^%eal, o£. cit., pp. 30-31. 
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Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., pp. 81-82. 
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Others have described Smohalla as an "Indian Moses," a somewhat ques­
tionable comparison, because of his promise that "an Indian would rise 
up to drive out every white person and would raise to life all the 
dead Indians.Belief in an after life was prevalent among the 
Indians and, while the Dreamer cult did not expand beyond the North­
west, it gained numerous converts throughout the region. Apparently 
PR 
this religion is still extant and is practiced by many Indians. 
The Upper Nez Perce continued as Christian. 
Treaty of 1868 
Generally regarded by scholars as unimportant, this treaty— 
actually an amendment of the Treaty of I863—was a prelude to the con­
fusion which was to ensue during the l870's. 
Article 1 reiterates the policy of moving the Lower Nez Perce 
to the new reserve, "provided, however, that in case there should not 
be a sufficient quantity of suitable land . . ., then those residing 
outside, or as many thereof as allotments cannot be provided for, may 
29 
remain upon the lands now occupied and improved by them. . . ," 
This stipulation suggests two things. First, the government 
had not yet enforced the provision of Article 2 of the Treaty of I863 
which required the Lower Nez Perce to abandon the Wallowa country and 
move northward to the new reserve, usually referred to as the "Lapwai 
Reservation," within one year. Second, and of greater significance, 
the government recognized the fact that a mass relocation to the Lapwai 
^7Ibid. ^^Ibid. 
^^Kappler, 0£. cit., p. 102b. 
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Reservation would be impractical, because there would not be sufficient 
land for every male over 21 years of age to be allotted 20 acres. 
The intent of land distribution to individual tribesmen was to domes­
ticate these Indians, to end their nomadic habits of hunting, to make 
them farmers and ranchers. Evidence of this is apparent in the treaties 
of 1855 and I863 where monetary reward was promised to individuals who 
built fences, cultivated fields, erected buildings or, in any similar 
manner, improved the land apportioned them. 
Despite this altruism, the treaty policy as documented in the 
U. S. Senate Reports is a contradictory one, as already shown, and 
matters were only made worse in the l870's when two conflicting execu­
tive orders were issued by President Grant in an obvious attempt to 
rectify the matter. The first, issued June I6, 1873, was inspired by 
a report made the previous month by the Commission on Indian Affairs 
which concluded: "If any respect is to be paid to the laws and customs 
of the Indians, then the treaty of I863 is not binding upon this band. 
If so, then Wallowa Valley is still part of the Nez Perce reservation. 
If this is the case, the Government is in equity bound to pay white 
settlers for their improvements and for the trouble, inconvenience and 
expense of removing from there. 
The presidential order of 1873 intended to put this recommenda­
tion into force, requiring that white settlers, who had violated 
federal treaty obligations by their presence on Nez Perce lands, move 
off at government expense. This might have been a great victory for 
30lbid. 
3^Avant Courier (Bozeman, MontanaJ, August 23, 1877. 
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the Lower Nez Perce in particular, the Nez Perce nation in general, had 
the executive order been carried out. It might have resolved the basic 
issue which led to the uprising of 1877• Unfortunately, Congress re­
fused the pleas of the Secretary of the Interior to allocate an estimated 
$67,860 necessary to pay the settlers.While this msgr seem an exorbi­
tant sum to settle a matter for a distant nation of Indians—especially 
when viewed in terms of the value of the dollar in those times—it 
would have been a small cost when compared to the federal expenditure 
of $931,329 for the military campaign of 1877.^^ This latter figure 
does not include expenses incurred by the various state militias or 
take into account damage to property. 
Because the measure failed in Congress, an executive order was 
issued June 10, 1875, rescinding it; thus, the one hope of the Lower 
Nez Perce—to annul the land provisions of the Treaty of I863—died.^^ 
Meanwhile, the government was having difficulty changing the 
nomadic habits of the Nez Perce. Toung Joseph, who had become chief 
of the lower tribes upon his father's death in I87I, expressed his 
sentiments to Agent John B. Monteith who, on April 28, l87b, wrote to 
Edward P. Smith, commissioner of Indian Affairss "For a year past I 
f ' 
have tried to prevail upon Joseph to cease his homadic habits and settle 
down in the Wallowa Valley, . . . His answers invariably have been, 'Ify 
father made the tracks for me to go in, and I intend to walk them.'"^^ 
3^The Nation, August 2, 1877 (see Appendix). 
^%eal, o£. cit., p. 2^7. ^^The Nation, loc. cit. 
^^Eugene B. Chaffee (ed.), "Nez Perce War Letters to Governor 
Mason Bray man," State Historical Society of Idaho Reports, 1929-1936 
(Boise, 1930), p. 38. 
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This explains that the Nez Perce were not cooperative with the govern­
ment during the period of amnesty of the presidential order of 1873 
when it was thought that the land provisions of the Treaty of 1855 were 
reinstated. Had Joseph moved all his people into the Wallowa district 
which he claimed as tribal domain, it may be speculated that the second 
executive order which ended the period of amnesty might not have been 
issued. As evidence, a considerable controversy arose over what 
Joseph's attitude was toward all treaties, including that of 1855. 
Gov. L. F. Grover of Oregon, who strongly opposed the initial presi­
dential order which revoked the land stipulations of the Treaty of 
1863, made an issue of Joseph's failure of cooperation to move all his 
bands to Wallowa. Despite a rebuttal by Henry C. Wood, assistant 
adjutant general to the commander of the Department of the Pacific, to 
this assertion on the grounds that all the treaties negotiated with 
the Nez Perce were unfair, pressures increased against the Indians of 
Joseph's tribes who were then commonly called "non-treaty Nez Perce."^6 
Joseph appealed to Agent Monteith to present his case to the 
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President, but this was denied. The problem for the government from 
1875-77 was moving the non-treaty Nez Perce to the Lapwai Reservation 
against their will without bloodshed. Major Wood, named a commissioner, 
continued to plead the cause of the Nez Perce without avail and, in 
January, I877, the Department of the Interior issued orders to Agent 
Monteith to effect this move, by force if necessary.^® The execution 
3%oward and McGrath, o£. cit., pp. 90-92. 
^^Beal, og. cit., p. 35. 
^^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 105. 
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of these orders fell on Gen. 0. 0„ Howard, a famed Civil War commander, 
who had met in council with the Nez Perce more as a diplomat than a 
soldier during two years of talks. Pressure was put on him by news­
papers to take decisive action immediately. An editorial in the Walla 
Walla Statesman proclaimed: We have a right to demand that no half way 
measure be adopted by the officer in command. Send out a large force 
at first, and not in small details, and let the question be settled 
forever.Similarly, an editorial in the Portland (Oregon) Daily 
Qregonian expressed the opinions 
The case of Joseph is in many respects similar to that of 
Captain Jack, out of which the Modoc massacre arose. . . . The 
government should act with promptness and energy. . » . 
Temporizing will only make matters worse. Having determined 
upon a policy to be pursued toward this defiant band, the way 
to prevent its number from increasing [un]till it becomes 
formidable is to break its power at once. 
On January 13, 1877, Gen. William Sherman ordered Howard's com­
mand to occupy the Wallowa country, and a series of talks was conducted 
between the various commissioners and the chiefs of the Lower Nez Perce 
tribes.What has been described as "the final council" was begun on 
May 3 of that year. One of the best accounts of that session, related 
by Yellow Wolf who was 21 at the time, but discredited by Chief Lawyer 
of the Upper Nez Perce who blamed Joseph for the war, was as follows: 
At Lapwai Howard asked Joseph if he had anything to say. 
Joseph answered: "I will hear what you have to tell the chiefs, 
^%eal, o£. cit., pp. 251i-255. Howard served in six major 
battles during the Civil War and achieved the rank of major general. 
^'^Walla Walla Statesman j^Walla Walla, Washington^, March 2k,  1877. 
^^Daily Qregonian [Portland, OregonJ, February 28, 1877. 
^%eal, op. cit., pp. 39-UO. 
37 
Ity brother [oilokotj and I came to listen. Tou must not hurry. 
White Bird and Toohoolhoolzote will be here tomorrow." But 
General Howard would not wait. He talked short. Said the 
Indians would have to do as ordered. Agent Monteith read a 
paper and said we had to go on a small reservation. 
Ollokot made a short talk. He wanted to wait for the Salmon 
River chiefs before anything was done. 
General Howard now said, "If you do not come on the reserva­
tion, Bçr soldiers will put you there." 
This hurt the Indians.^3 
Shortly thereafter. General Howard and Toohoolhoolzote broke into 
an argument which, more than arching else, was a show of diplomatic 
force on both sides. Yellow Wolf recalled this by quoting General 
Howard's impassioned rejoinders "I am the man to tell you what you 
mast do! Tou will come on the reservation within time I tell you (^0 
. If not, soldiers will put you there or shoot you down."^^ 
The general then commanded his men forcibly to escort Toohool­
hoolzote to the guardhouse. 
In a newspaper interview after the war at Bismarck, N. D., Chief 
Joseph said simply; "Howard, in our councils, talked harsh; said we 
mast move. His language pierced uy heart as a knife. 
The result of the ultimatum by Howard was successful in that the 
Nez Perce chiefs agreed to move as ordered. The elderly chief, Toohool­
hoolzote, was released from the guardhouse. Howard justified this action 
later by saying: "I^y conduct was summary, it is true, but I knew that 
it was hopeless to get the Indians to agree to anything so long as th^ 
could keep this old Dreamer on the land and defy the agents of the 
^%cWhorter, og. cit., pp. 37-38-
^Ibid. 
^^Avant Courier ^ozeman, MontansJ, December 13, 1877. The inter­
view in Bismarck, N.D., was conducted on November 22, 1877, and reprinted 
in the Avant Courier. 
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government. . . 
Thus, the Nez Perce gave in to the threat of force, a strong 
testimonial that they did not desire hostilities with the whites. The 
relocation of Joseph's people was begun as agreed, but circumstances 
arose that prevented its completion. Chief Joseph pleaded with the 
general for more than 30 days to make the move because his stock was 
scattered and the waters of the Snake River, which would have to be 
forded, were at flood stage. General Howard refused, saying; "If you 
let the time run over one day, the soldiers will be there to drive you 
on to the reservation, and all your cattle and horses outside of the 
reservation at that time will fall into the hands of the white men."^^ 
In addition to abandoning much of their stock, the Nez Perce lost 
considerable possessions during the difficult river crossing, in order 
to comply with the ultimatum. A rendezvous was planned at the camp­
ground called Tepahlewam at the head of Rocky Gary on so the tribes 
could rest and organize for the trek to Lapwai. But this stopover 
duidng the journey was often described as a "fatal pause" because it 
provided an opportunity for tribesmen, angered deeply, to vent their 
feelings collectively. Six leading chiefs—Joseph, Ollokot, White Bird, 
Toohoolhoolzote, Looking Glass and Hahtalekin—agreed, however, that a 
war with the United States would be senseless, and no evidence suggests 
that special preparations for fighting were made, as was charged later 
by newspapers.^® Joseph's wife was expecting a child that month, which 
^%eal, 0£. cit., p. h2.  
^^Brady, o£. cit., p. 60. 
^^Ghalmers, og. cit., p. $2. 
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only added to his concerns, Joseph and his brother, Ollokot, left the 
camp, recrossed the Salmon River nearby, and butchered cattle in prepar­
ation for the journey. 
While the two chiefs were away, a horse ridden by two young 
braves stepped on camas bulbs that a woman had been gathering. Her 
husband, Hs^oon Moxmcoc, insulted them, saying; "See what you do! 
Playing brave, you ride over HQr woman's hard-worked food! If you so 
brave, why you not go kill the white man who killed your father. Eagle 
This inflamed young Wahlitits. He enlisted the help of two 
cousins and, at dagrbreak of June 13, 1877, headed for white settlements 
along the Salmon River. The raiding party returned to the camp the 
following day with the news of having killed four whites. Reaction 
was varied. White Bird and the elders advised against such demonstra­
tions on the grounds that war had to be averted. Wahlitits retort was: 
"Why do you sit here like women? The war has begun already.When 
Joseph learned about what happened, he was shocked and rode to camp 
immediately. But he was too late to stop l6 braves and Yellow Bull, 
a chieftain, who joined the renegades for a second foray of slaughter. 
Although the exact count is uncertain, more than a dozen settlers were 
murdered by these Indians who obtained whiskey at a store owned by 
Samuel Benedict. 
The first newspaper account of the murder by a Nez Perce Indian 
^%cWhorter, Hear Me, ̂  Chief si, p. 190. 
Robe?»' 
Brady, og. cit., p. 62. 
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. ii7. 
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appeared three weeks later, as followss 
The Nez Perces give the following version of the cause of 
the Idaho outbreak; One of the head men of the Nez Perces 
had long held back the turbulent spirits who were clamorous 
for war. He was at a trading post for the purpose of buying 
a gun, which the trader refused to sell him, saying that he 
was a bad Indian. The Indian said, pointing to the sun, 
"Before the sun goes down I will make you sell me a gun." 
The trader replied, "Before the sun goes down I will put you 
out of this store;" and he advanced toward him as if to put 
his threat into execution. As he was advancing the Indian 
shot him in the head, and his partner, hearing the disturb­
ance and coming up, was also shot dead. The Indians then 
went to the rear of the store and clubbed the trader's wife 
to death* On the way to their camp th^ killed four other 
persons." 
How and from whom this account was obtained was not explained, 
but the inaccuracies in it are numerous and it conflicts with the 
eccplanations given by the Nez Perce chiefs after the war, as already 
cited. Apparently the source tried to justi:^ the various murders by 
explaining that the entire affair began over an argument at Benedict's 
store. Much to his credit, Joseph, who was not involved in the affair 
in any way, said in 1879: 
I would have given own life if I could have undone the 
killing of white men by my people. . . . When ny young men 
began the killing ay heart was hurt. Although I did not 
justify them, I remembered all the insults I had endured, and 
ny blood was on fire. Still I would have taken ny people to 
the buffalo countly without fighting, if possible. I could 
see no other way to avoid war. We moved over to White Bird 
Creek, sixteen miles away, and there encamped, intending to 
collect our stock before leaving; but the soldiers attacked 
us and the first battle was fought.^3 
The shameful murders by the Nez Perce were the result of broken 
Treaties, white invasion, murder, conflicting executive policy, and a 
^^Avant Courier, July 12, l877. 
^̂ Beal, o£. cit., p. 1:9. 
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dozen other grievances. The massacre was also the sole justification 
for a senseless war which was, for the most part, fought in Montana by 
whites who had little interest in Nez Perce affairs. 
CHAPTER III 
NEWSPAPER CHARACTERIZATION 
The outbreak of hostilities with the Nez Perce in 1877 attracted 
immediate national attention. The New York Tribune, for instance, 
published prominent, front-page accounts each day between June l8 and 
2U, as the first reports of hostilities were telegraphed from the 
West. 
The alann among Idaho settlers was by no means localized, and 
a series of questions needed answers. How serious was the outbreak? 
Which tribes were involved? Was a general uprising of several Indian 
tribes imminent? What forces were available to control and suppress 
the fighting? What damage to life and property had resulted? 
As important as each of the questions was, there remained one 
basic question which, as shall be seen, required months to answer fully; 
what caused the outbreak? 
Journalistic opinion ran rampant with this question. Some papers 
cursed the Indians ; others the governmentj still others, both. 
The problem of immediate concern throughout the war was obtain­
ing factual information concerning the various events unfolding some­
where in the wilderness of two territories. Most qrewitnesses— 
settlers, volunteers, soldiers—were not trained, unbiased observers. 
Indeed, the journalists of the frontier were little better in margr 
instances because some editors lacked professional training and because 
k3 
most editors were caught up in the passions surrounding them.^ 
The most accurate information originated from various officers 
after battlefield situations had been assessed carefully. But their 
reports did not reach telegraph stations until long after fighting had 
ceased in the particular battles described. This meant that before 
and during the development of a military clash, editors had to do con­
siderable guesswork, piecing together information as it came in, to 
give the public some idea of what had happened. 
Editors struggled constantly for fresh news from argr quarter at 
such times and, when it came from creditable sources, their gratitude 
was unbounded. The Weekly Missoulian, its Missoula offices approxi­
mately 1?0 miles from the scene of the Big Hole battle, began a report 
of that important conflicts "We are indebted to Mr. Eugene Lent, a 
former compositor in this office, and a gentleman of unquestioned 
braveiy, coolness, intelligence and veracity, who left Gen. Gibbon's 
entrenched camp with official dispatches, on Saturday the 11th., for 
2 
the following account of the Big Hole fight, ..." 
The problem of accuracy was compounded by the problem of relaying 
the information from point to point over great distances. The following 
news story published on the front page of the New York Tribune, the 
first account by that paper about the Nez Perce outbreak, indicates 
clearly the complexity of routing the dispatch: 
^Robert t». Housman, "Early Montana Territorial Journalism as a 
Reflection of the American Frontier in the New Northwest" (unpublished 
doctorate dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia, 193h), pp. 
12-21. 
^Weekly Missoulian [Missoula, Montana], August 17, 1877. 
hi; 
An Uprising in Oregon 
San Francisco, June 17—A dispatch from Portland [^e.J says s 
A dispatch received from Lieut, Wlkenson, now at Walluia[sicJ, 
conveys the startling news of an uprising of Indians, and, 
states that th^ were murdering the whites at Mt. Idahoe [sic], 
which is situated 60 miles from Lewiston.3 
The remainder of this account by Lt. VBlkenson is sketchy at best 
and the editors apparently inserted at the end that "it is, however, 
thought the reports have been exaggerated." 
Not only did the uprising not occur in Oregon as the headline 
indicated, but the next day, June 19, 1877, the Tribune relayed the news 
that *?oung [Chief] Joseph and his squaw were killed during the fight at 
Cottonwood Creek [idahc] The account explained that this news reached 
Lewiston by stage, suggesting that it was the fault of the observer and 
not the press. Joseph was not killed. 
While the telegraph should be regarded as the life line for both 
the military and the newspapers in 1877, it was a mixed blessing for 
the latter in the technical sense. Hugh McQuaid, part owner of the 
Helena Independent during the Nez Perce conflict, recalled 2h years 
afterward that "there was only the government telegraph line in the 
territory then, and it was not open for the use of civilians at all 
times. The military was using it almost continuously and it was only 
by good luck that our correspondents could get something on the wires, 
and then they had to condense."^ 
Nevertheless, important news telegraphed from the various stations 
%ew York Tribune, June l8, 1877-
^New York Tribune, June 19, 1877. 
^Helena jMontan^ Independent, undated. 
in Idaho and Montana could be published the next day in San Francisco 
or New York. Moreover, these urban centers, particularly New York, 
received and sent numerous dispatches to Washington, D. C., with great 
speed. This gave newspapers such as the New York Tribune a decided 
advantage over the press on the frontier because it received both the 
news of the war and the reaction by the government to that news within 
a matter of hours. 
By w^ of contrast. The New North-West of Deer Lodge, Montana, 
and the Weekly Missoulian were but 80 miles apart and it required two 
days by stage to convey local news. More horses and drivers were added 
toward the end of June, 1877, however, so that this "line" could be 
spanned in a single day.^ Because of this system between frontier towns 
it is not surprising that the first news of the Nez Perce uprising was 
not published in Missoula until June 29, eleven days after it appeared 
in New York. Part of this can be attributed to the fact that the 
Missoulian was a weekly at the time. The wire report from San Francisco 
however, reached the telegraph station at Helena on June 19 and was 
published by the Helena Weekly Herald on June 21. The Deer Lodge paper 
ran the story the next day, June 22. Apparently the stage from Helena 
to Missoula, a distance of 112 miles, required at least three days 
travel time over mountainous terrain, or else the story also would have 
appeared in the Missoula issue of June 22. 
This time lag over comparatively short distances meant that 
frontier towns in general and pioneer editors in particular were, for 
all practical purposes, isolated from the necessary flow of information 
^he New North—West [Deer Lodge, Montana!, June 18, 1877. 
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so vital to a military campaign. The problems this created can easily 
be imagined. One noteworthy example among many of this informational 
Tacuum for frontier editors was reflected in an editorial brief run in 
the Mlssoulian on August 10, 1877, noting that no word had been received 
from Colonel Gibbon about making contact with the Indians. It was ex­
plained that the forms of the paper had been kept open to the last 
possible minute in hopes that some news of the pursuit by the soldiers 
might be published. Actually by the time of publication, the Big Hole 
battle was concluded. The Indians were again on their way southward 
and Colonel Gibbon's command was attending the wounded and burying the 
dead. 
The editor of the Missoulian, Ghauncey Barbour, noted in his 
comments of August 10 that "if anything important arrives it will be 
issued in an extra." So far as is known, the Nez Perce conflict was 
the first time during 13 years of Montana journalism that extras were 
g 
used extensively. These appeared as leaflets, not entire pages, usually 
carrying but one story. Both daily and weekly editors resorted to this 
practice and no small importance was attached to them. As shall be ex­
plored in depth in a later chapter, the extra published in Missoula on 
July 28, 1877, and reprinted the following day in other towns as distant 
as Helena—a remarkable feat because the stage normally required three 
days of travel time—helped create a long and bitter newspaper war which, 
7Weekly Missoulian, August 10, I877. 
librarians at the Historical Society of Montana ascertained that 
the first extra in territorial history appeared July I8, I86?, in the 
Montana Post of Virginia City. It was titled "Highway Robbery and 
riurder11" Although larger than leaflets published during the Nez Perce 
war, it is not believed that these extras were used to any extent until 
1877. 
strangely enough, reversed much of the strong sentiment expressed 
editorially against the Nez Perce. Reason would suggest that the Nez 
Perce threat, imagined or otherwise, to communities and ranches through­
out Montana Territory would above all else weld journalistic opinion 
into common accord. The matter was by no means that simple, particularly 
after editors such as Barbour had opportunity to witness the conduct and 
understand on a first-hand basis the hopes of the Nez Perce of avoiding 
a fight. 
An impartial review of the frontier editors themselves is ex­
tremely difficult, for these were not impartial men. Nor was the 
frontier existence a simple, happy-go-lucky experience as it is too 
often regarded by many today who ponder the complexities of co-existence 
with other nations. Missoula, for instance, was literally surrounded 
by the Flathead tribe which, as noted earlier, had a long history of 
amiable relations with the Nez Perce. This relatively isolated commun­
ity with a population of hhl, according to the census in 1877, had a 
defensive force of 135 soldiers and volunteers capable of being mustered 
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at Fort Missoula which was still under construction. When it became 
apparent that the town was almost in the direct path of the Nez Perce 
retreat, the editor of the Missoulian could be expected to react with 
alarm. This situation was extremely atypical in the normal cycle of 
frontier events, certainly, and it is important not to characterize 
various individuals in the hours of crisis only. 
Although the limitations of this study make research into Idaho 
9A. E. Rothermich (ed.), "Early Days at Fort Missoula," Frontier 
Omnibus (Missoula: Montana State University Press, 1962), p. 390. 
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journalism superficial, the editor of the Lewiston Teller, Alonzo Leland, 
deserves mention. 
Idaho Territory during the i860's endured growing pains similar 
to those that pervaded the formation of government in Montana about the 
same time. Corruption, graft and theft befell such young communities 
as Lewiston at a time when the Nez Perce problems with treaties were 
growing.% I876, Alonzo Leland unleashed criticism against these 
Indians with unabating vehemence, and he continued this policy through 
1878 and into 1879.^^ 
Once hostilities had erupted in June of 1877, Leland not only 
assailed the Indians with the pen, but took to the field with volunteers. 
Daring the second foray of the war, which amounted to an extremely con­
fused skirmish and resulted in a court martial over the question of 
12 
bravery, Leland was wounded. 
Two weeks later, in an extra, Leland rebuked a comment by Joseph 
that he was "not to blame in this war, that he was forced into it" by 
stating: "he did not speak for the rest of the hostiles. 
Because of the proximity of Lewiston to Lapwai where final nego­
tiations were conducted between the government and the Indians before 
the outbreak, an intensive study of Leland's role would be enlightening. 
One scholar wrote; "Leland had the outstanding quality of a real 
^^Nancy N. T. Donner, "History of Journalism in Idaho Territory, 
1862-1890" (unpublished Master's thesis, Montana State University, 
Missoula, 1963), p. 82. 
^^Ibid., p. 110. 
1 2 
Seal, 0£. cit., p. 69. 
^%ewiston jidahoj Teller, extra, July I6, 1877. 
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campaigner—he dramatized his position. In his own vay, he practiced 
sensationalism; he helped to build his own war."^^ 
Many of the antiquated hand presses used by pioneer journalists 
in Montana in the i860's and l870's had been carted in pieces over the 
Bitterroot Mountains from Idaho. In fact, most Montana editors depended 
on western sources for supplies.During 1877, all the major Montana 
papers were located in the western half of the Territory. 
Among the most respected editors in Montana Territory was James 
H. Mills, who started his career as editor of the first pioneer paper, 
the Montana Post. He became part owner and editor of the New North-West 
in Deer Lodge in 1877. Mills served as Secretaiy of Montana for five 
years and helped to improve the educational system during later years 
In 1876, Mills and his partner, Hariy 0. Kessler, on the New 
North-West, gambled on the anticipated prosperity of Butte placer 
claims known since I86L and established the first paper in that com­
munity, the Butte Miner. This venture had recondite, pecuniary motives 
—as opposed to any particular interest in the community of Butte—and 
Mills sold out eventually to the copper magnates, William Clark and 
Marcus Daly.^^ 
During the Nez Perce campaign. Mills was something of a magnate 
in his own right, as a result of his journalistic and political prestige. 
l^Donner, o£. cit., p. 9it. 
^^Housman, 0£. cit., p. 32. 
^^Tom Stout (ed.), Montana; Its Story and Biography, Vol. I 
(Chicago and New York; The American Historical Society, 1921), p. U97. 
^^Housman, o£. cit., p. ihS. 
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Gov. B. F. Potts appointed the editor Adjutant General of the Montana 
Militia for the specific purpose of resisting the Indians.It may be 
assumed immediately that such appointment would compromise Mills' sup­
posedly impartial position as a newspaper editor and that he would become 
a stooge of political influence. The following letter Mills to the 
governor, July 12, 1877, indicates not only an embarrassment about pub­
lishing the news of the military appointment, but also an egotism in 
suggesting to the governor how to run the affairs of state: 
Deer Lodge, Montana 
Your favor of the 11th covering order appointing me Adjutant 
General of the M M is to hand. Thank you. It would be a trifle 
of a joke if it were published now but occasion may arise when 
there will be necessity for it and work to do—I had to scold a 
bit today (in the newspaper] about the shape in which the Terri­
tories are in cases of the kind now threatening us. If you were 
given discretionary authority it might save trouble with telegraph 
lines down and no authority to act and incur a dollar of expense 
in fighting for the United States. ... It seems to me your 
standing with the President and Sherman would procure your re­
quest favorable consideration. ... I think you had better order 
UO stand [riflesj to Philipsburg, hO to New Chicago Company, and 
20 to Bear Mouth, send the form of bond required from Companies, 
if it is your duty to go into these details and order that the 
secretary (MillsJ shall determine their acceptance and I will 
see they are good bonds.^9 
Because Mills was the secretary of Montana, this and other letters 
he wrote to the governor give the impression the editor was in Washington, 
not Deer Lodge. Especially touchy was his intimation that Potts was in 
the favor of the President, because in April and May of 1877 there was 
a powerful move under w^ to impeach the governor on charges of malad­
ministration. Mills was very much a part of the scandal which erupted 
^^Paul G. Phillips (ed.). The Battle of the Big Hole, Sources of 
of Northwest History, No. 8 (Missoula; State University of Montana, 1929), 
p. ii. 
^^Ibld., p. 7. 
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among Republican factions and the issue became so controversial that 
the case was taken to Washington for presidential consideration. The 
following excerpt from an editorial in the New North-West explains the 
the situation in part: 
Among these [letters given to the PresidentJ is the sworn 
disposition of I. R. Alden, clerk of the Supreme Court of 
Montana, charging Potts with withholding fees collected and 
long due to D. W. Middleton, clerk of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. There is also a letter of Potts' copied 
from the records of the Department of Justice stultifying 
Potts' endorsement of James H. Mills for Secretary of Montana, 
whose appointment was recently made, but afterwards withdrawn 
by the Resident. In this letter Potts characterizes Mills as 
a mudslinger at the administration and as abusing the Attorney-
General roundly. Potts further remarks: "I think it bad enough 
to be abused by our political enemies, but when men who live by 
the favor of the administration abuse us, they should be com­
pelled to draw their sustenance from some other quarter." It 
is believed that Governor Potts will be suspended or notified 
that his resignation would be accepted.20 
This denouncement of an editor by a governor in grave difficulty 
would have lacked impact, probably, had Mills been solely on a newspaper 
payroll. îïïLs remarks to the governor's charge in the remainder of the 
editorial were conciliatory because of his own precarious position. 
As it turned out, on May 19, 1877, the President cleared the 
charges preferred against Potts and, at the same time, reinstated Mills 
21 
as secretary. This was by no means the anticipated outcome, evidenced 
in the editorial of May 1|., and the outbreak of hostilities with the Nez 
Perce less than a month later was to be a proving ground for the repu­
tations of both men. As shall be seen, the governor faced a personal 
crisis during the Fort Fizzle affair near Missoula when the Nez Perce 
"invaded" Montana Territory. Mills' reputation as an editor was to be 
^%ew North-West) May It, 1877. 
^^New North-West, May 25, 1877. 
52 
tested by the outcome of the same affair when a newspaper war emipted 
over the conduct of white defenders. 
An example of the feeling that ran against both Mills and Governor 
Potts, who were considered the directors of territorial policy during 
the Nez Perce war, appeared in an editorial in the Bozeman Times, a paper 
edited by E. S. Wilkinson, who did a remarkable job at remaining reason­
ably objective in the majority of his viewpoints toward controversial 
matters that embroiled other journals: 
ADJUTANT GENERAL MILLS 
This high-toned and factorum to the Governor, no longer 
condescends to his course and action in person. He finds 
admiring contemporaries in other parts of the Territory to 
defend him from justifiable attack from others. The editor 
of the ^Helena} Independent, acknowledges the superiority of 
Gapt. Mills and proclaims himself a voluntary striker for 
that sublime minon of Governor Potts. That is all right. 
It is fitting that the small should bow down to the great 
and do them homage and service. Of course the article men­
tioned must be copied by the Madisonian, the other admirer 
of the Territorial Government, composed of Potts and Mills. 
Now, since the two organs of the two hundred and fifty pounds 
averdupois of bone and muscle and the thimble full of brains 
that runs our government have come to the rescue [meaning 
the editors]!, we would advise Gapt. Mills to stand aloof from 
the contest, wrap his dignity in his cloak, say nothing, and 
leave it to his voluntary henchmen to do his work!22 
The reasons for this personal criticism will become evident in 
the review of the Fort Fizzle affair when the tide of editorial opinion 
against the Nez Perce ebbed and began a turbulent flow in the opposite 
direction. 
Chauncey Barbour was a close associate and friend of Mills. 
Although the Missoula editor had not gained the recognition in Montana 
affairs that the latter had, he was to play an outstanding role in the 
^^Bozeman ^Montana} Times, October 26, 1877. 
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Nez Perce war because of his proximity to historic events in that cam­
paign . 
That the two editors knew each other well and depended on one 
another for small favors is apparent in the following letter written 
July 6, 1877, by Barbour to Mills: 
Missoula, M.T. 
Dear Sirs I wish you would send me another qyster can of ink 
by the cart Thursday. ... I do not know how we stand on our 
ink trades; maybe you do. . . 
All is quiet along the Bitter Root. The people were under 
a panic when you were here, but a reaction set in and many of 
the people are laughing at their scare. We are, perhaps, in 
as great danger yet as we ever were. The danger is that the 
Nez Perces may come or be driven into this country, and it is 
almost a sure thing that a large number of our Indians jjlat-
headsjwill join them in such case. . . . 
Ify last paper was very unsatisfactory to me, and roust have 
been to outsiders who were looking for a statement of the 
feeling among our people, their alarm and grounds for alarm 
and their movements in this emergency. 
Fraternally yours, 
- (Chauncey Barbour) 
P.S. Printers drunk. 
This casual, very humble approach—observant and articulate--
characterizes Barbour's writing, both in personal correspondence and 
his journal. In his invaluable history written in 1885, Leeson said 
of Barbour, who still resided in Missoula at the time: "Chauncey 
Barbour, the former editor of the paper, is said to be one of the 
closest observers and best editorial writers in the territory. 
The Mssoulian, which had started only seven years before the 
Nez Perce outbreak as the Missoulian and Cedar Creek Pioneer, was 
25 
relatively unknown compared with the Helena and Deer Lodge papers. 
23Quoted in the Poplar {Montana} Standard, March 20, 19^1. 
^^M. A. Leeson (ed.),History of Montana, 1739-1885 (Chicago: 
Warner, Beers & Company, l885j, pp.33^-336. 
^^Ibid. 
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This was to change when the Fort Fizzle affair cast that paper in the 
limelight. Barbour's editorials started the newspaper war, or were the 
basis for it, and in a letter to Governor Potts, he wrote; 
Was glad to receive your kind and friendly letter. I felt 
myself in the most trying position in the last issue of ny 
paper, I ever was in in qy life. There was so much of unreason 
and vituperation that I felt it B^y duty to stand against the 
current if it swamped me. And it is gratifying to me today to 
say that I have compelled a sober, second thought, and that 
scores of good men have taken me by the hand and thanked me 
for what they are pleased to term the able manner in which I 
have performed an intelligent duty.26 
Ironically, Barbour's major contender in this newspaper fracas 
was his old friend. Mills. Because Mills and Governor Potts were close 
allies throughout the war, as noted, it may seem strange that both these 
contending editors were in the good graces of the governor. This will 
be clarified when the stand that Barbour took is ejcamined closely. 
Governor Potts became very much involved in the newspaper war, but with 
another paper, the Helena Daily Herald. 
Founded in 1866 by Col. James L, Fisk who had led a historic 
expedition to Montana, the Herald became the first daily in the Terri­
tory the following year.^? Colonel Fisk became interested in mining 
ventures and sold out to his brothers, Daniel ¥., Andrew J. and Robert 
E. The latter headed editorial policy, evidenced by the fact that only 
his name appeared on the masthead during the Nez Perce war. Not only 
was the Herald the largest paper in Montana—served by four steam presses 
and special machinery for folding papers—it also had the service of the 
^^Phillips, 0£. cit., p. lli. 
^^Leeson, cit., pp. 327-328. The only other daily in Montana 
Territory at the %me of the Nez Perce war was the Helena Independent. 
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telegraph at hand. 
"The Daily Herald was started August 1 ,  I867, and reached a 
circulation of over liOO within the first month," said Judge Cornelius 
Hedges of the Montana Supreme Court who was also an associate editor 
of that paper. "Few cities of 25,000 inhabitants can boast of as com­
plete a printing establishment as the Herald now possesses, . . 
The Herald, like its competitor, the Helena Independent, issued 
a weekly edition which, for the most part, was similar editorially. 
Editorials run in the daily editions often were reprinted in the 
weeklies. 
R. E. Fisk, who served as chairman of the Territorial Republican 
Committee of Montana, was the power behind the move to impeach Governor 
Potts. He journeyed to Washington in May, 1877, when the case went 
before a presidential hearing. When the editor learned personally from 
President Hayes that Potts had been exonerated, he composed a letter to 
the President reiterating the charges and demanding reconsideration of 
29 
the case. 
Throughout the Nez Perce campaign, Fisk criticized Governor 
Potts relentlessly. When Gen. William T. Sherman visited Helena during 
the week of August 22, 1877, Governor Potts was so distraught about the 
editorial policy of that paper that he managed by means not explained 
to censor the Herald.This incident will be reviewed in detail later. 
^%ontributions to the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. II 
(Helena: Independent Publishing Company, 190%), p. 113. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, May 22, 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 22, 1877• 
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but it serves to point out one festering newspaper condition during the 
Nez Perce war. 
Of the eight Montana newspapers reviewed for this study, three 
editors—Mills, Barbour and Fisk—stand out for the divergent roles 
they played in the events of 1877. As a rule, editors of other Montana 
papers aligned themselves for or against the stands these individuals 
took. 
Thomas A. Sutherland, editor of the Portland (Oregon] Standard 
and the only accredited news correspondent for metropolitan dailies 
personally to report the Nez Perce war, deserves mention. fflLs illumin­
ating dispatches of three battles and other occurrences were rushed by 
courier to the nearest telegraph station for transmission to the New 
York Herald and the San Francisco Chronicle. 
A controversy greater than the one of the Fort Fizzle affair 
broke out early in the campaign and lasted long after the termination 
of the war regarding General Howard's conduct as a military leader. 
The following news account, explaining Sutherland's activities and his 
attitude toward the general, appeared in the Missoulian, August 10, 
1877: 
Thos. A. Sutherland . . . made us a pleasant call Wednesday. 
He has been campaigning with Gen. Howard from the opening of 
the war, and came with them over the Lo Lo trail. Mr. Sutherland 
speaks highly of the General as a soldier and gentleman, and the 
reason why the Indians have not been crushed before this are not 
Gen. Howard's fault.32 
Oliver Knight, Following The Indian Wars (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, I960), pp. 2%-29^ 
32weekly Missoulian, August 10, 1877. 
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At no time did Sutherland criticize Howard, as Montana editors 
were wont to do, but he did express considerable consternation over the 
conduct of civilian Indian fighters who, as will be seen, were ordered 
to organize by Governor Potts and Secretary Mills against the wishes of 
the militaiy.^^ 
The only other correspondents who had any connection with the Nez 
Perce campaign were Jerome B. Stillson of the New York Herald, Charles 
S. Diehl of the Chicago Times, and John F. Finerty of the Chicago Times. 
While each gained a national reputation for his coverage of the Sioux 
War led by Chief Sitting Bull, their only coverage of the Nez Perce war 
occurred when Gen. Nelson Miles fought the terminating battle with Chief 
Joseph near the Bear Paw Mountains.^^ Diehl and Stillson, who were 
involved with the Nez Perce for less than a week, then ventured north 
into Canada where they interviewed Sitting Bull for one of the most 
famous press dispatches in the history of Indian warfare. 
There is little doubt that the events of the Sioux conflagration, 
such as the Custer massacre, June 25, I876, had considerable bearing on 
the general attitudes of Montanans toward the Nez Perce uprising. In 
an editorial, R. E. Fisk displayed something akin to a persecution 
complex over this matter by writing: 
Not only the Indians that naturally belong to Montana are 
restive and threatening, but there seems to be a tendency to 
djrive all the hostiles of every tribe from all quarters of the 
compass into Montana. The Sioux are on our east, the Bloods 
and Piegaxis on our north, the Nez Perces to the west, and there 
^^Knight, loc. cit. 
^^John F. Finerty, War-Path and Bivouac (Normans University of 
Oklahoma Press, I96I), pp. 226-235. 
^^Knight, o£. cit., p. 297. 
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are rumors of fears of the Bannacks to the south. It almost 
looks as if by general consent of all but ourselves, Montana 
has been selected as the final battlefield id.th all the untamed 
savages on the continent.36 
The Sioux events brought out another point which was to become 
evident during the Nez Perce crisis—the speed displayed by the Indians 
in transmitting information. In a letter to Frank H. ¥oo(fy, Chaunc^ 
Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, remarked: "The Custer massacre 
occurred June 25, and the news reached here July 3j but the Indians 
[presumably the FlatheadsJ knew of it before the telegraph had brought 
37 
the news." Similar remarks about Indian communications were made by 
such military personnel as Capt. Charles C, Rawn, commander of Fort 
Missoula, concerning the Nez Perce, in a letter dated August 2, 1877, 
to Col. John Gibbon.Barbour wrote also to Governor Potts, June 29 ,  
1877, stating that, 
. . .  a  g r e a t  m a n y  r u m o r s  ( a r e )  f l o a t i n g  i n  t h e  a i r ,  m a q y  o f  
which are born of terrified imaginations; but it is certain 
that our Indians [Flatheadsj are fully advised of all that is 
transpiring across the Coeur d'Alene mountains, and we are 
completely in the dark. . . .39 
Indeed, Montana newspapers had no great advantage in gathering 
and broadcasting information which originated at distant and remote 
battlefields. Nez Perce intelligence was remarkable, but not infallible. 
When it failed—as happened before the Big Hole and Bear Paw fights— 
those Indians suffered immeasureably, as will be seen. 
3^Helena Daily Herald, August I6, 1877. 
37Leeson, og. cit., p. 868. 
^®Rothermich, o£. cit., p. 389. 
39phillip8, 0£. cit., p. I4. 
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The Montana press, in its own right, was remarkable in many ways 
when compared with contemporaiy newspapers. All had a similar format, 
whether weeklies or dailies. Each appeared as a four-page folio resemb­
ling somewhat current issues of the London Times, if that paper were of 
comparable size. Although a number of ads usually were run on the front 
page, the Montana papers were conservative typo graphically. Few head­
lines of ai^ size were used, except for stories of extreme importance. 
And then these headlines rarely, if ever, were larger than 2l|-point 
type. 
A literary approach was characteristic of all the papers studied, 
evidenced by the fact that front-page stories were devoted to topics 
such as poetry, features on foreign lands, human interest, and the latest 
fashions. Important local and national news usually was run on the 
second page, space permitting, with the editorials. In many instances, 
the editorials and news were interspersed on the page in such manner 
that it is difficult to determine which is which. Editors were not 
above rewriting or condensing news accounts and adding personal opinion, 
as will become evident. 
Typographical errors appeared rather infrequently, on the whole, 
which is noteworthy in editorials especially. On occasion an editorial 
or editorials would fill nearly the eight columns of a page. These 
were written in a scholarly fashion, often employing French or Latin 
phrases to emphasize a point. 
Housman, in his study of pioneer journalism in Montana, noted 
that this intellectual approach can be attributed to the influence of 
men like Dana, Greeley and Bennett. Although the "Golden Age of 
60 
Journalism" was waning in the late l870's, the mannerisms and articula­
tion of that era were deeply ingrained in the thinking of Montana 
editors.Included with this was the concept of "personal journalism"j 
something in which these individuals reveled, sometimes to the point 
of ruining the reputations of military personnel, government officials 
and each others. 
^"^Housman, o£. cit., p. 10. 
CHAPTER I? 
THE MR: PHASE ONE 
The Idaho Campaign 
News of the first series of Nez Perce murders committed by 
Wahlititis and his two cousins on June 13, 1877, reached Fort Lapwai 
the next day. By 8:00 p.m., June lii. General Howard sent out two 
companies of cavalry, comprising 99 soldiers commanded by Capt. David 
Perry. ̂ 
The contingent rode through the night over muddy trails and 
halted at Qrangeville, about 70 miles southeast of Lapwai, to rest 
after an almost continuous 2It-hour ride. Incensed citizens of that 
community urged Perry for immediate, decisive action, but when the 
troops departed the next evening, only 11 volunteers joined the march, 
2 
bringing the total force to 110 men. 
At daybreak on June 17, the mounted contingent descended to the 
creek running through White Bird canyon, a tributary of the Salmon 
River, about l6 miles south of Mt. Idaho and Grangeville, where Joseph, 
Ollokot and White Bird had camped. According to Alvin Josephy, Joseph 
may have had as many as 1^0 warriors, half of whom may have been too 
drunk on stolen whiskey to participage in the fighting that was to 




ensue. No reference to drtinkeness can be found elsewhere, and it is 
generally agreed by scholars that Joseph had approximately 60 warriors, 
as he claimed, to engage in the fighting.^ Looking Glass and other 
chiefs had separated from Joseph's bands, and were headed for the 
Clearwater River at the time. As will be seen, the deployment of 
Joseph's and White Bird's braves, their accuracy in fire, and the 
conduct of the battle suggests that all were very sober. 
Meanwhile, Joseph's wife, Ta-ma-al-we-non-ny, was expecting her 
child any moment.^ And the Nez Perce were fully aware that the troops 
had arrived, for during the night a soldier had struck a match to 
light his pipe and an Indian scout had spotted it.^ Joseph's anxiety 
at dawn that day was by no means small. 
Although it is not recorded in military records, a truce party 
of six Indians led by Wettiwetti advanced toward the soldiers with a 
white flag and shouted, "What do you people want?This Indian party 
had been sent by Chief Joseph to learn General Howard's intentions, 
for there remained some hope that the military force came to demand 
that the tribesmen responsible for the murders be turned over for trial. 
But as the Indian delegation neared, a U. S. scout named Arthur Chapman 
3Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Patriot Chiefs (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1961), p. 236. This account of the battle at White Bird canyon 
states that Joseph's child was born before the battle, which is not 
correct. 
^Bracfy, 0£. cit., p. 6ii. 
^Chester Anders Fee, Chief Joseph (New York: Wilson-Erickson, 
Incorporated, 1936), p. $2 .  
^Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. lUO. 
^Beal, loc. cit. 
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fired twice. Unhurt, the six Indians returned the fire and killed the 
trumpeter, John Jones.^ Thus began the war. 
A sentry named Mox-Mox, who had been posted on a ridge above the 
Nez Perce camp, brought word of what had happened to Joseph. Ollokot 
suggested immediately a plan that would have been suicidal—to move 
westward and ford the Salmon River. 
Joseph is said to have refused, claiming that the soldiers' 
horses would scatter at the sound of firearms. He ordered White Bird 
to deploy along the southern ridge of the canyon. Joseph's warriors 
were posted behind rocks and logs along the center and northern portions 
of the carQTon. This formed a "C" shape defense approximately four miles 
east of the camp.^ 
Captain Perry, having made no assessment of the strength or 
whereabouts of the Nez Perce, moved down the widening canyon from the 
east in columns of fours. Lt. W. R. Parnell, who was in charge of 
approximately half of Perry's men, recounted after the battle that "it 
was bad judgment and certainly not tactical to put the entire command 
on the line, leaving no reserves whatever in either troop, and, to 
increase the danger of such a fatal error, the men were in the saddles 
in an exposed position, while the Indians were on foot . . . taking 
„10 cover." 
In the confusion which followed. Perry's entire column rode 
headlong into what should have been an obvious trap. Ironically, that 
O 
Chalmers, og. cit., p. 62. 
%ee, 0£. cit., p. 130. 
^"^Bracfy, 0£. cit., p. 102. 
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same morning, General Howard penned a note to Perry at Lapwai warning 
about such a situation. 
When the firing broke out, the soldiers were flanked on both 
sides by well-positioned Indians. A dozen soldiers fell, wounded or 
dead. And, as Joseph had predicted, many who returned the fire were 
thrown from their horses as the animals reared. Panic and a disorderly 
12 
retreat were the result. 
Perry, meanwhile, found himself nearly helpless in issuing battle 
commands because the trumpeter was dead. By running among his men and 
shouting commands above the din of fighting, he tried vainly to regroup. 
Joseph, having routed the soldiers and volunteers from their 
position, sensed victoiy, but realized he had not beaten them. His 
was still the inferior force in numbers and equipment, for although 
the majority of Indians had modern firearms, a few had to fight with 
, ll 
bows. 
As the troops scattered toward higher ground, making a renewed 
fight probable, Joseph ordered a herd of Indian ponies, a few of which 
were ridden by warriors, through the center and to the rear of Perry's 
wavering lines. This tactic eocposed the military force to an effective 
and deadly fire from all sides.The soldiers retreated in two widely 
separated columns through the surrounding mountains, pursued by the Nez 
llpee, 0£. cit., p. lltO. 
1 p 
Chalmers, og. cit., pp. 63-61;. 
13 
Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 1^8. 
^%eal, o£. cit., p. 58. 
^^Bracfy, 0£. cit., pp. 102-10̂ . 
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Perce until they reached safety at Mt. Idaho. Thirty-three soldiers— 
one-third of the original force—had been killed, and a large number 
wounded. Reports of the Nez Perce loss varies, but it is agreed that 
no Indians were killed and as many as four were wounded.Actually the 
Nez Perce found that one life had been added to their tribe during the 
battle. While rifles were cracking, Joseph's wife gave birth to a 
daughter. 
Although the Nez Perce had gained a decisive victory in the 
initial onslaught. Chief Joseph realized he was in no position to engage 
General Howard and he began the retreat. Five days after the battle at 
White Bird cargron. General Howard had assembled eight companies compris­
ing I4.OO regulars and 100 volunteers. His battalion left Fort Lapwai on 
June 22, flanked ty two Gatling guns—the forerunner of the machine gun 
1 ft 
—and trailed by a howitzer. This heavy equipment proved to be a 
hindrance in mountain travel, and when Joseph learned that Howard was 
encumbered by a cannon, the retreat was directed over some of the most 
difficult terrain in Idaho—Lolo pass, the old buffalo trail, which had 
tested the endurance of the Lewis and Clark expedition 72 years earlier. 
Meanwhile, Captain Perry was criticized severely by newspapers 
for his conduct during the battle. Newspapers, such as the New York 
Herald, claimed that Lieutenant Parnell, who was awarded a commendation 
^^ewiston Teller, June 23, 1877. This paper reported that four 
Nez Perce were wounded. The Indians claimed only two casualties. 
^^Fee, 0£. cit., p. 137. 
^^Ibid., p. ikO. 
^%cWhorter, Yellow Wolf: His Own Story, p. 17. 
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for bravery in the retreat, saved the soldiers from annihilation. 
Parnell denounced the Herald and its correspondent in no uncertain 
20 
terms. When the war was ended. Captain Perry, then a colonel, 
demanded a Court of Inquiry to review charges made against him by the 
21 
press. This was done, and he was cleared. 
The initial dispatches which were sent throughout the nation 
June 19 and have been cited already, 
alarm. But the New York Tribune ran 
by the San Francisco Chronicle on 
created a feeling of considerable 
a remarkable story two days later after a consultation with the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs in Washington. It reported, in part: 
CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK 
Treaty Obligations Violated White Settlers 
Joseph's Aversion to Reservation Limits 
HLstoiy of Negotiations 
Washington: June 20—Reports and correspondence on file in the 
Indian Bureau threw abundant light upon the cause of the Indian 
War in Idaho. It is the old story of aggression by the whites 
on lands which the savages believed to be by right their hunting 
grounds. . . .22 
The article explains in some detail the numerous and sordid 
violations of trust by whites, particularly regarding the treaties, but 
the editorial published the same day took an opposite viewpoint: 
Short, unhesitating, decisive war against the Indians who 
havQ.taken to the war-path in Idaho will be kindness to their 
race by discouraging such outbreaks in the future. The farce 
of making treaty obligations with these savages as if they 
were a foreign nation, has borne its natural fruit. It gives 
as usual the pretext to the Indians for beginning the conflict, 
and the delays which enable them to concentrate their forces. 
2%rady, 0£. cit., p. 110. 
^^Ibid., p. 121. 
Op 
New York Tribune, June 21, 1877. 
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But when frontier towns are revaged and settlers are murdered, 
all question as to which side violates treaties is out of 
order. 3 
G. ¥. McCrary, secretary of war, issued a concurring statement, 
printed the following day, June 22, in the Tribune, stating: "The Indians 
estimate the power of the Government by the number of soldiers they see 
in the country they inhabit; and believing they can master three or four 
warriors to the United States one, th^ are emboldened to begin hostil­
ities."^^ 
Beyond any question, this was not the cause for the Nez Perce 
outbreak. When General Howard had resorted to a show of force during 
the final council hy incarcerating Toohoolhoolzote and serving a 30-day 
ultimatum to move to the Lapwai Reservation, the Nez Perce had no choice 
but to back down. 
Meanwhile, the tide of opinion swelled against the Nez Perce as 
other minor battles were fought in central Idaho. In a news account, 
the Helena Daily Herald noted that nine companies of infantry left 
Atlanta, Georgia, for Idaho on July 13, 1877. Some 100 men also 
were mobilized in San Francisco. Another news report in the Herald 
the same d^ indicated that President Hayes would call out the militia 
because "the available military is inadequate to suppress the savages. 
This never happened, as will be seen, and it was against the policy of 
the administration to organize militia. When Gov. Mason M. Brayman of 
^^New York Tribune, June 22, 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July lli, 1877. None of these troops 
reached the destination because of a national railroad strike. 
^^IbiXl. 
Idaho learned of the White Bird cation defeat, he wired the War Depart­
ment for authority to organize militia. Secretary McCrary denied his 
request, but Brayman decided to arm Idaho citizens anyhow. The only 
citizens who received weapons lived in cities such as Boise, well removed 
from Nez Perce danger. This policy rankled Alonzo Leland, editor of the 
Lewiston Teller, who expressed the hope that General Howard would drive 
27 
the hostiles to Boise where war supplies were being kept. ' 
The Avant Courier of Bozeman, Montana, made the unusual suggestion 
that Governor Brayman arm 20,000 "friendly" Indians-—the Paiute, Bannock 
and Shoshoni—to quell the Nez Perce.Perhaps it was fortunate for 
Idaho that this policy was not adopted, for no Indian tribe had proved 
itself more friendly to the government than the Nez Perce. Moreover, 
such an idea was contrary to Secretary McCraiy's policy, noted in the 
New York Tribune editorial, which stated that armed Indians in superior 
numbers were dangerous Indians. 
While this was happening, Joseph had moved northward and westward 
along a circuitous route some ^0 miles through valleys and across rivers. 
HLs bands passed along Cottonwood Creek, about l5 miles north of Orange-
ville, before swinging northeastward to the Lo Lo trail. General Howard's 
command, which had a shorter distance to march, stopped for a day at 
Cottonwood Creek to await word from scouts about the whereabouts of the 
Nez Perce. The Lewiston Teller accused General Howard of halting to 
preach and distribute Bibles, because it happened to be a Sunday.^9 
^Tseal, o£. cit., p. 62. 
^^Avant Courier, June 28, 1877. 
^^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 1^7. 
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General Howard marched southward toward White Bird canyon in 
search of the Indians, and on reaching the mouth of the creek on June 
28, 1877, was attacked by a small band of Nez Perce snipers who fired 
from the west bank of the Salmon River. Considerable effort was required 
to get horses, mules and unwieldy equipment to the opposite shore. As 
it happened, none of the Nez Perce was caught and General Howard failed 
to realize that the sniping episode was a ruse by Joseph to gain time.^^ 
Howard learned from scouts that Chief Looking Glass still was 
camped on the Clearwater River, so he detached two companies commanded 
31 
by Capt. Stephen Whipple to make a surprise attack with Gatling guns. 
On arrival at the Nez Perce camp at daybreak, July 1, the troops 
deployed and a scout was sent forward to request a parl^. He returned 
with word that Looking Glass did not want to become involved with the 
war and that the soldiers should leave his people in peace. The scout 
was sent out a second time, but on the way he shot and wounded an Indian. 
Rifle fire burst from the hillside where the soldiers waited, killing 
a woman, her child and another youth.Although several Indians were 
wounded, the Nez Perce made good their escape and rode to join Joseph's 
bands. The village was plundered and burned by Whipple's men. Like 
Joseph, at no time did Looking Glass desire war, and he did everything 
possible to prevent it. But the Lewiston Teller printed a different 
versions 
3°Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
3lBeal, o£. cit., p. 67. 
^^Ibid. 
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Baird reports that the Clearwater Indians under Lookingglass 
had turned loose and plundered George Dempster's place between 
the Middle and South forks of Clearwater and driven off all the 
stock of the settlers. . . . This confirms JChiefJ Jim Lather's 
statement made in Indian Council yesterday at Lapwai as to the 
purposes of Lookingglass and his forty men. Baird says these 
Indians told two Chinamen near them on Clearwater that they had 
declared war against the whites and would commence their raids 
upon the inhabitants within two days. When this news reached 
Mt. Idaho a force of 20 volunteers started immediately for the 
Clearwater. No news from them when Baird left. General Howard 
was notified and said that he would send a detachment of regulars 
to scour the country in that direction this morning.33 
While the facts of this account are erroneous, the report obviously 
stirred the people of Lewiston to action and, in turn, may have been the 
reason Howard sent Whipple's detachment to engage Looking Glass. Had 
the fallacious report by Baird not been published and had the people 
of Lewiston left military affairs to the military, it is possible Look­
ing Glass would have been by-passed and General Howard would have had 
to contend only with Joseph to gain victory. As it was, all the Lower 
Nez Perce tribes unified in the war against the government when the 
"sneak" attack on Looking Glass became known. When the next battle 
broke out on the Clearwater River, July 11, Joseph claimed that his 
fighting force swelled from 70 to 2^0 warriors. 
Just prior to the Clearwater battle, three minor engagements 
occurred as Chief Joseph maneuvered to divert Colonel Whipple's command 
which had pursued Chief Looking Glass northward to Cottonwood Creek. 
Joseph succeeded in covering the retreat of Looking Glass and, in the 
only decisive skirmish of the three fights, killed one officer and ten 
^^Lewiston Teller, June 27, 1877. 
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 2k^. 
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cavaliymen. One Indian was killed. 
In this skirmish, and in the one that followed at "Misery Hill," 
volunteers—including Alonzo Leland, editor of the Lewiston Teller, who 
who was wounded—became disgruntled over the conduct and attitude of 
the military. The Nez Perce had effectively harassed and demoralized 
the whites. Leland and other citizen volunteers retired from the 
36 
field in anger. 
General Howard, meanwhile, moved his main force from the Salmon 
River and joined Colonel Whipple. Outnumbering Joseph's warriors two 
to one, Howard marched swiftly eastward along the Clearwater River and, 
to his surprise, reached the Nez Perce camp near the junction of the 
south and middle forks on July 10. Without being discovered by the 
Indians, breastworks were established near the river. At dawn the next 
morning, howitzer shells burst into the Nez Perce camp and the Indians 
deployed hastily. The warfare was fiercej Joseph's men charged repeat­
edly and nearly turned the right flank of the soldiers. Howard, however, 
maintained excellent discipline—reminiscent of his action at Gettysburg 
in the Civil War—and brought the full potential of his command to bear 
•V7 
as Joseph led the several assaults to point-blank range.^ 
When darkness fell, the soldiers, cut off from the river by 
Indians, spent a night without water. Several Nez Perce braves— 
discouraged by the effectiveness of Gatling guns—defected before the 
^^Paul I. Wellman, The Indian Wars of the West (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 195h)> p. 173. 
3%eal, og. cit., pp. 70-71. 
^^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 17li. 
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battle was renewed the morning of July 12.38 
The Indians failed in subsequent attempts to turn the flanks of 
the soldiers. They were on the defensive for most of the day and, unable 
to cope with the superior firepower of the soldiers, withdrew from the 
field slowly. Although General Howard had failed to capture the Indian 
camp, which might have been possible during the opening surprise attack, 
the victory was his. Approximately 23 Indians were killed, UO wounded, 
and i^O taken prisoner. Howard listed his casualties as 13 killed and 
27 wounded—two of whom died later. 
Invasion of Montana 
General Howard did not follow up the Indian retreat as they 
crossed the Clearwater in skinboats and established another camp on 
July 13. This policy of lagging behind throughout the campaign gave 
rise to the name "General Day After Tomorrow" among the Nez Perce. But 
Joseph facilitated the delay of the soldiers the next day by halting 
Howard's column with a truce party. It was midaftemoon before the 
general realized he was being tricked. Nevertheless, when the command 
had marched north about 20 miles and was about to enter the western end 
of Lolo trail. General Howard camped his men at the village of Kamiah 
for two weeks to rest, await reinforcements and supplies, and to organ­
ize. This delay was to intensify the press criticisms of Howard 
^^eal, 0£. cit., p. Th* 
3%cWhorter, 0£. cit., p. 323. Heated dispute arose over the 
number of Indian casualties in this battle after the war when the Nez 
Perce set the figures at four killed and six wounded. Howard's claim 
of taking I4O prisoners during the battle was not true. This group 
surrendered to him later. 
^%eal, o£. cit., pp. 77-78. 
FIGURE 1 
Herald Extra. 
mONDAY. JUI^Y 16, 1877. 
Howard Overtakes Joseph and 
a Bloody Fight Ensues. 
Two Officers and 11 Soldiers 
Killed and 24 Wounded. 
Thirteen Indians Killed and a 
Large Number Wounded. 
The Hostiles Dispersed and the 
Troops Pursuing. 
Fight between General Howard's command, 
400 men, and Hostiles under Joseph, 300 
strong, discovered in Deep Greek Canyon, 
mouth of Cottonwood, on South side of 
Clearwater, took place on the 13th inst. The 
Indions lost 13 killed and a large number 
wounded. The military lost Capt. Bancroft 
and Lieut. Williams, and 11 enlisted men 
killed and 24 wounded. * 
The hostiles were finally flanked, and they 
broke and fled, making for the Snake river 
country. 
The Indian camp and much plunder fell 
into the hands of the soldiers. 
The fighting is represented as most de­
termined on both sides. 
Howard is following the fleeing savages 
and expects soon to capture or kill them all. 
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because Joseph's people had reached Montana, 1^0 miles east, before the 
general left Kamiah on July 30. 
The press criticism of General Howard predated the Clearwater 
battle and it seemed to become louder with eveiy move he made or failed 
to make. The Missoulian reprinted from the San Francisco Bulletin an 
editorial which stated, in part: 
We find it stated in the Oregon papers that two months ago 
Gen. Howard had Chief Joseph entirely in his power, could have 
held him and forced him to go upon the reservation. Instead of 
this the General permitted him to roam around the country on 
the pretext of gathering up his stock, when in fact he was 
preparing to take the war-path. . . . This Indian trouble 
should operate as another lesson in teaching the authorities 
to discard the temporizing policy. . . . There are within the 
radius of 200 miles from the scene of the outbreak at least 
52,000 Indians.W 
Obviously this assessment about the beginning of the Nez Perce 
fighting was incorrect, but the initial criticism of General Howard and 
the government concerned the failure of negotiations conducted with the 
Nez Perce. Apparently the editors did not understand wty the negotia­
tions had failed so often. This is demonstrated in Chauncey Barbour's 
editorial in the same issue of the Missoulian when he wrote: "There 
is a great deal of sickly sentimentality abroad about the difficulty 
of changing an Indian's nature and habits.Barbour put the blame 
on the government for the "temporizing policy" and stated that this was 
the cause of the outbreak. He added that "no good can ever come to the 
Indian so long as the authorities treat him as a freeman and put no 
abridgment upon his liberty." 
^^Weekly Missoulian, July 13, I877. 
^^Ibid. 
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This editorial was to start a chain reaction of Montana newspaper 
controversy which became intensive when the Nez Perce outmaneuvered and 
outsmarted volunteer defenders. James H. Mills made the following 
observations about this editorial after the newspaper war had festered 
for four weeks: 
In the Missoulian of July 13th, in the leading editorial 
entitled "The Temporizing Policy," appeared the following 
infamous utterance: IVhen an Indian agent sees that the money 
and blankets provided by the government are dissipated in 
gambling or are bartered for whiskey and gewgaws and trinkets, 
he is worse than an infidel if he does not see to it that this 
money and property goes where it will do the most good—in his 
own pocket." 
The New North-West, having some friendship for the Missoulian 
and its editor, but regarding the above as dishonest, disreput­
able and atrocious and trusting it was written by one "simple 
and unschooled" and which Mr. Barbour would take the first 
opportunity to repudiate, denounced it. No retraction was 
made. It is such infernal scounderelism as advocated in that 
paragraph that instigates and is responsible for nine-tenths 
of the atrocities on the frontier and which has drenched the 
American settlements in blood while our more honest Canadian 
neighbors lived in peace with the Indians. 
Two important points were made in this rebuttal concerning the 
early phase of the war in Montana. First, Mills indicated the influence 
newspaper opinion had at the time, especially when incorrect. Second, 
the "temporizing policy" which had been indelibly affixed to General 
Howard's name had been carried to extremes. But this was to be only 
the beginning of the press controversy over the general's actions. 
While the Nez Perce were making the arduous passage through the 
Bitterroots, editorial opinion in Montana papers swelled to flood stage 
against them. R. E. Fisk wrote for the Helena Daily Herald; "It is 
deplorable to have grasshoppers from the East and Indians from the 
^%ew North-West, September 7 ,  1877. 
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West raiding us at the same time."^^ But three days later, on July 27, 
Fisk predicted that the Nez Perce would "arrive in condition to need 
hospital care rather than meditating new campaigns. 
The Missoulian took a different view, however, when townspeople 
questioned the need for defenses. Barbour wrote: 
Some of our good friends here are skeptical as to the need 
of protection in Missoula county. Although living on the 
frontier some of them entertain the Eastern notion that there 
is such a thing as good Indians, and friendly Indians, and 
Indians who keep faith with the whites. They forget that most 
of our Indian wars have been with just such Indians and that 
Indians are more dangerous in war the more they have been 
brought in contact with the whites. 
During the various battles in central Idaho, Montanans were not 
particularly concerned about the fighting being carried to their terri­
tory because it was believed General Howard would suppress the Nez Perce 
there. The New North-West during this period went so far as to praise 
these "piny sic ally fine Indians" who. Mills wrote, "are well-to-do, dress 
better and have better stock than any other Indians that come into our 
country and barring the times when disreputable white men furnished them 
whiskey, they have never made any serious trouble in traveling through 
Montana."^7 
These remarks were to be quickly forgotten by Mills later when, 
as an editor and Secretary and Adjutant General, he was instrumental 
in initiating the defense policies of Montana. The first change in his 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July 2k ,  1877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July 27, 1877. 
^^Weekly Missoulian, July 29, 1877. This article appeared as a 
news stoiy, not an editorial, under the headline "Missoula Post." 
^"^New North-West, June 22, 1877. 
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viewpoint about the war was directed not so much at the Nez Perce, but 
at the conduct of the militaiy. Two weeks after the above-mentioned 
editorial, he wrote: 
The later news from Idaho is not indicative of an efficient 
campaign against the Indians. General Howard has been severely 
censured by the press as an incompetent commander and he has 
certainly done nothing so far to leave any other impression» 
He moves his six hundred or eight hundred men with all the 
laborious slowness of an army corps, camps over against a 
hundred or two Indians, sends stilty dispatches about trapping 
them and capturing great caches and meantime lets the handful 
of Indians walk around him and drive his "trap" into rifle 
pits.GG 
Mills was referring here to the Clearwater battle, and he went 
on to criticize Captain Perry's "cowardly" action in the three minor 
skirmishes just before that battle. And he no longer depicted the Nez 
Perce as "good, friendly Indians" who for years had traveled the buffalo 
trail through western Montana without incident. He wrote that "murder, 
destruction and outrage are depopulating fair valleys and covering the 
frontiers with the bones of those sacrificed to savages. 
The next day, July lU, a press dispatch which had been routed 
through Portland, Oregon, and San Francisco was published in the Helena 
Daily Herald confirming the fears that the Nez Perce had escaped and 
were on their way to Montana.But to confuse matters, Fisk denied 
this report in an editorial the same day by stating: 
We are not fully prepared to believe that the hostile Indians 
are now fleeing from the troops on the west side of the mountains 
and making their way towards the Bitterroot Vall^. They have 
thus far been victorious in nearly every encounter with the 
militaiy, and seem to be even more active and smart than the 
soldiers in concealing their whereabouts, routes of retreat, and 
direction of attack. 
^%ew North-West, June 22, 1877. ^^Ibid. 
^°Helena Daily Herald, July lU, 1877. ^^Ibid. 
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On August 2, 1877, the Bozenian Times ran the following editorial 
four days after the Fort Fizzle affair had ended and the Nez Perce had 
started down Bitterroot Valley in western Montana: 
GCNTRADICTORÏ 
It is difficult to reconcile the contradictory reports 
concerning the Nez Perces Indians, from Missoula and Idaho. 
Each claim that Joseph is in their vicinity. We publish all 
the accounts just received as they came, and if our readers 
can understand them, all right. We cannot. They are worse 
jumbled up than Bogert's report of the whereabouts of Sitting 
Bull. . . .52 
The major concern throughout this important period of opinion 
formation by Montanans who anxiously awaited definite news of Chief 
Joseph's whereabouts and disposition was self protection, which is 
certainly understandable. Yet, surprisingly, newspaper opinion was 
not solidified on this by any means. Fisk, who was nearest the tele­
graph in the Territory and had good access to news from Idaho and New 
York, wrote an editorial on July lit for the Helena Daily Herald stating 
that the Nez Perce "would be foolish to leave the sanctuary of the 
mountains and attempt to cross the open plains of Montana where all 
the troops at Forts Shaw and Ellis would surround them on every side." 
Mills, editor of the New North-West, did not support this view­
point and, as Secretary of the Territory, he officially Issued a report 
to newspapers throughout the nation than an invasion of Bitterroot 
Valley was anticipated and people were preparing. He termed the situa­
tion "very grave" and "very serious.The Butte Miner, largely owned 
^^Bozeman Times, August 2, 1877. 
^^Helena Dally Herald, July ih, 1877. 
^^New York Tribune, June 30, 1877. 
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by Mills, concurred with the secretary and stated that when the Indians 
were confronted with a defensive force, the only way to conduct peace 
negotiations would be to disarm the Nez Perce and force them "to put 
their women and children under the protection of the whites, to serve 
as hostages . . • to keep them on their good behavior» 
The Missoulian, however, reprinted as a news story an editorial 
by the Benton Record of Fort Benton, Montana, stating: "The Benton 
Record does not like the Peace Policy» It says: 'The pious hypocrites 
who have so long fattened at public expense are still permitted to carry 
on this system of plunder to the disgrace of the nation and against the 
protests of an outraged people»'" 
Chauncey Barbour's appraisal in the lead editorial of the Mis-
soulian the same d^ was as follows: 
IS THERE DANGER? 
Because we doubt an Indian's peaceful intention or his truth 
is no reason why we should become the aggressor. A collision, 
if it comes, will come in its own good time, and it should not 
find us in a state of unreadiness from our indulging in the 
fatal delusion that an Indian is truthful, and peaceably inclined 
and altogether lovely.57 
The importance of these views in assessing the imminent danger, 
whatever it could be, was the general agreement by editors that a mili­
tary force, undefined as to whether it should include militia, be ready 
for any eventualities» 
Apparently the people were not as alarmed as the editors were, 
^^Butte Miner, July 2U, 1877. 
^^eekly Missoulian, July 20, 1877» President Grant had been 
responsible for the "peace policy" during the l870's, according to Dr. 
Verne Dusenberry, anthropologist, Montana State University. 
^7Ibid. 
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even in Missoula where the "danger" was greatest. The Missoulian ran 
an editorial titled "Apathçr Among Settlers," stating thats 
o . o from gloomy apprehensions two weeks ago, there has been 
a reaction to a state of apathy that may not be well for us. 
. . , Our danger lies in telegraph communications being 
interrupted when we need it. In such case the Indians would 
be on us before we cound concentrate our forces.^" 
A report from Washington was published in the Helena Daily Herald 
the next day, however, stating that the Cabinet had convened to consider 
the Nez Perce outbreak. The news account concluded; "This latest out­
break is considered as serious as any of late years. The government 
59 
will use every resource to give a final stroke to the Indian troubles." 
What was meant ty "every resource" was to become highly controversial 
during the Fort Fizzle affair. 
The second major consideration—the first being the matter of 
defense—by editors in Montana was an assessment of the causes of the 
outbreak. 
Without question, the series of murders perpetrated by Nez Perce 
braves in Idaho was the recurring reason, and perhaps a very understand­
able one, throughout the war in Montana Territory. But the pioneer 
editors realized that such a massacre by formerly friendly Indians did 
not occur because it was simply decided to kill whites. The facts of 
the outbreak were not immediately available, of course, and the first 
reactions were shock and dismay, as evidenced in the Missoulian; 
As a tribe they have been noted for their friendship for 
the whites, , . . Considering the intelligence of this tribe, 
the accumulations of property they have made, and the habits 
^^eekly Missoulian, July 13, 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July lit, 1877. 
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of civilization they have taken on, if the question had been 
asked one month ago, "What Indians are most likely to make war 
on the whites?" the Nez Perces would have been the last named 
of all the Indians bordering on either side of the Coeur d'Alene 
mountains. The fact of an uprising of these Indians is suffi­
cient to shake our confidence in the friendliness of any Indians. 
But having asserted this, Barbour still had not explained either the 
causes of the war or the reasons his faith in former friends had been 
shaken, so in another editorial in the same issue he struck on some 
imaginative ideas which, to his credit, he was to repudiate later. 
First, in unusually eloquent terms, he dwelled on the normal, human 
love for land. He cited the Briton's love for his "tight little isle," 
the German's pride in the Fatherland, and the Frenchmen's glow of enthu­
siasm at the mention of belle France. "But," wrote Barbour, "with 
the Indian this sentiment becomes a passion," He then continued; 
Another peculiarity of the Indian mind is that it fails to 
discriminate as to the causes of things or to place responsi­
bility where it belongs. If some lawless white kills an Indian, 
the fault is not imputed to the offender, but to the white race; 
and if an Indian is slain for some wrongful act of his, the , 
Indian mind fails to consider the justifiability of the act, 
Barbour and the other editors were not aware of the fact that 
approximately 22 Nez Perce had been murdered by white settlers—usually 
dur i n g  d r u n k e n  s p r e e s — i n  t h e  y e a r s  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  o u t b r e a k . F l e a s  t o  
the government for justice were ignored, as already noted. Were this 
history realized--as it should have been because Idaho, Oregon and 
Washington papers had access to much of this information, both in office 
files and from the non-warring Nez Perce, the Indians' sense of justice 
^^Weekly Missoulian, July 6, 1877• 
^^Ibid. 
^^Beal, op. cit., p. hi' 
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would not have questioned. Tribal jurisprudence among the Nez Perce 
from times antedating the Revolutionary ¥ar and before had a remarkable 
resemblance to that of western culture. 
The following week when the Nez Perce were still approximately 
100 miles from Missoula, Barbour modified his stand somewhat on the 
same topic by stating that "there are bad white men in every community." 
He reiterated the charge that "the Indian is no respecter of persons-
he visits his vengeance upon the just and the unjust alike." But he 
ended the editorial by stating that "such [unjustj men [white or Indiari 
should receive the first cold lead that opens an Indian war."^^ 
The next Friday, July 20, the New North-¥est quoted from the San 
Francisco Examiner one of the first journalistic analyses of the causes 
of the war; 
THE INDIAN MOHAMMED 
"Smohala the Dreamer" the Prophet IiThom the 
Bloody Nez Perces Follow. 
The original cause of the dispute with the Nez Perces may 
be said to date from the treaty ... in June 1857• At that 
time Governor Stevens refused to recognize the hereditary chief 
of the Nez Perces, and practically elevated Lawyer, a cunning 
and tractable Indian, to the chieftainship. 
Thus far, this assessment is correct except for two facts. The 
treaty referred to was in l8$^, and the time Chief Lawyer of the Upper 
Nez Perce received preferential consideration by Governor Stevens was 
in the signing of the Treaty of I863, as noted in Chapter II. Without 
further explanation about any of the treaties, the account contended 
^3^eekly Missoulian, July 13, 1877° 
^'^New North-West, July 20, 187?. 
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that : 
• . » it is a most inspiring hope or idea to the average savage 
that he shall yet see the day when he can glut his never-dying 
revenge upon the white man, exterminate the race, and again 
redeem himself and his people the lands from which the whites 
have driven them. 
To thoroughly indoctrinate his believers, Smohala impresses 
upon them certain cardinal duties<> They must be "wild Indians," 
th^ must not practice any of the arts of civilization, but live 
as their fathers lived before the coming of the whites. They 
must not tolerate the approach of the white man, hold no inter­
course with him, accept no favor from him, enter his house, or 
deal with him except for fire-arms, powder and lead, . . » It 
is to this exclusively savage doctrine young Joseph has committed 
himself. ... He has a haughty scorn of white men, and despises 
those of his own race who will consent to be at peace and submit 
to them. With him are the allied renegades, or "wild Indians" 
of the various other tribes of that broad region, and no doubt 
there are nearly a thousand of them all. . « . They have been 
for years preparing for war, and the country is entirely favor­
able to their hostile purposes. 5 
Although this may have been an editorial in the Examiner, it was 
printed in the New North-West as a news story. The effects it had can 
be easily imagined. Other Montana papers ran the same story as it cir­
culated, and headlines on other news stories appeared in condemning 
phrases, such as: "The Idaho Savages," "Red Murderers," and "Escaping 
Hostiles." This account tended to confirm the fears expressed earlier 
in the Missoulian that there might be a general uprising among Flatheads, 
Pen d'Oreille and Kutenais tribes to the north with whom Nez Perce had 
intermarried. 
The first "scare" that Missoula experienced came approximately 
July 20 when a dispatch reached there from San Francisco, advising; 
In this emergency [Nez Perce about to arrive in Bitterroot 
Valley] there is no need of leaving homes, or any foolishness 
on the matter. We have military organizations with arms in 
^^Ibid. 
^"^Weekly Missoulian, June 29, 1877. 
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their hands. Let videttes be posted on the Lo Lo trail, to 
give settlers timely warning of approaching danger, after 
which there will be plenty of time to fort up.°7 
When the Nez Perce hordes did not materialize as expected, the 
people of Missoula drew a sigh of relief. Then the "apathy" set in 
which Barbour warned against. Also, other papers in the Territory 
became confused, as already noted, especially after the following 
editorial comment in the Helena Daily Independents 
The Indian Scare 
We have the pleasure of announcing to the reader that Joseph 
has decided not to come to Montana to hunt buffaloj he has con­
cluded to remain in Idaho and find Gen. Howard, if possible, 
who has been slandering him by circulating the report that he 
had run away. 
When the Nez Perce crossed the border into Montana Territory four 
or five d^s later, the question of what to do had not been answered for 
or by Montanans. The government had taken no positive stand; what 
troops were available remained at Fort Shaw lh9 miles northeast of Missôula 
or as distant as the scene of the Clearwater battle had been from 
Missoula. No territorial policy had been established yet as to whether 
Montanans should "declare war," establish defense measures, or do noth­
ing. Governor Potts was in a predicament despite the fact that Chief 
Joseph was considered to have had astonishing success in the campaign 
against the government. Contradictory advice came to Potts from govern­
mental and military organizations and in personal correspondence and 
newspaper accounts from editors. 
At this critical moment, Montana newspapers played a decisive 
role in the affairs and outcome of the Nez Perce campaign. 
Weekly Missoulian, July 20, 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Independent, July 22, 1877° 
CHAPTER 7 
THE WAR; PHASE TWO 
Fort Fizzle Affair 
Militarily the Fort Fizzle affair was not of great importance, 
for no battle was fought» Strategically, however, the events during 
those final days of 877. were the, prelude to what micht be 
considered the most significant engagement of the war, the Big Hole 
battle of August 10-11, 1877.^ 
The first definite news concerning the intended route being 
taken by the non-treaty Nez Perce reached Capt. Charles C. Rawn, com­
mander of Fort Missoula, on July 22» A half breed named Tom Hill, who 
had been held and released by the Nez Perce, overtook Rawn's scouts 
returning to Missoula over Lolo Pass after an attempt to locate the 
2 
Indians. 
Captain Rawn telegraphed the news to his superiors and, on July 
2^, rode out with 30 troops to erect defensive fortifications on the 
east side of the pass. Eight miles west of Bitterroot Valley and the 
confluence of Lolo Creek with the Bitterroot River in Montana, Rawn's 
men erected log breastworks, piled three high, and dug trenches at the 
^Scholars do not categorize the Nez Perce campaign into segments, 
such as "Phases" in the chapter headings, as is done in this study. 
Until the Big Hole battle, the Indians had not been hurt seriously. As 
will be seen, the damage to life and property in the Big Hole conflict 
was to be the turning point. 
2 
Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 19ii. 
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narrowest point of Lolo canyon. From this position, the captain rea­
soned that riflemen could command the valley and both opposing slopes 
which were steep and lightly timbered.^ 
The Nez Perce, meanwhile, moved down Lolo Creek and camped near 
hot springs two miles above Rawn's blockade of the trail. Lewis and 
Clark dubbed these springs "Traveler's Rest," and it was an appropriate 
name so far as the Nez Perce were concerned. Wounded were bathed and 
Mountains. Many horses had been crippled or lost in the crossing--
several of which were mercifully shot later by General Howard's men— 
but it has been estimated that the Nez Perce herd still exceeded 
3,000.^ 
The following day, July 27, a meeting was arranged with Captain 
Rawn about half way between the two encampments. In a report to the 
Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Dakota, on September 30, l877. 
Captain Rawn recounted this first council as follows s 
On the 27th of July, I had a talk with Chiefs Joseph, White 
Bird and Looking Glass, who proposed if allowed to pass unmol­
ested, to march peaceably thru the Bitter-root valley, but I 
I refused to allow them to pass unless they complied with itgr 
stipulations as to the surrender of their arms. For the 
purpose of gaining time for General Howard's forces to get 
up, and for General Gibbon to arrive from Ft. Shaw, I appointed 
a meeting for the 28th. . . .5 
This delay suited the chiefs who knew that General Howard presented 
no immediate threat (he had not departed from Kamiah Village in central 
Idaho). It would provide time for their people to rest and the best 
^Rothermich, _op. cit., p. 390. 
^Beal, op. cit., pp. 87-88. 
^Rothermich, loc. cit. 
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escape. This latter matter was uncertain for three major reasons. 
First, while it may seem contradictory to much of what has been 
said, unity among the Nez Perce had weakened and undercurrents of 
demoralization had set in. Some of this can be attributed to weeks 
of fighting and running. But scholars agree that Chief Joseph himself 
was heartsick, and for good reason. His wife and child had to be left 
behind in Idaho. He already had lost the one thing he was fighting 
for—his homeland. According to Seal, lj.0 of his people had defected 
along the Lolo trail| these were the same kO that Howard claimed he 
had captured in the Clearwater battle. Also, a band led by Chief Red 
Heart that was returning from a buffalo hunt refused to join its flee­
ing brothers.^ Moreover, the Nez Perce chiefs did not agree about a 
destination in Montana Territory. Joseph had deferred when this 
matter was discussed earlier at a camp called Weippe on Lolo Trail. 
Looking Glass, whose bands represented the majority, suggested strongly 
that they head for "Old Woman's Country" along the Yellowstone River 
basin in Crow country of Montana, The two chiefs argued and Joseph is 
7 
reported to have said: "This is your fight, not mine." None of the 
chiefs wanted a fight, for little could be gained. 
The second reason for uncertainty in policy matters was the 
disposition of Montanans, both Indian and white. The Flathead Indians, 
long close allies of the Nez Perce, sent word that th^ refused to join 
the conflict against the whites and would resist any attempt to traverse 
their country. The basic reason for this was that Chief Chariot of the 
%eal, 0£. cit., pp, 78-80. 
7lbid. 
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Flatheads wished to do everything possible to maintain good relations 
with the whites, despite treaty difficulties similar to those of the 
Nez Perce.® 
Chauncey Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, had attempted to 
contact Chief Chariot unsuccessfully on June 29 and, subsequently, wrote 
several letters to Governor Potts informing him that a general uprising 
was imminent. On July l5, he wrote; 
. . . there are restless young men from all tribes, lured by 
the prospect of plunder, who are operating with the Nez Perces» 
I have reliable information that some Flatheads passed over 
into the Nez Perces country this spring. . . » There are some 
of our people who are trying to persuade themselves that the 
Flatheads and Pen d'Oreilles will not war on the whites—that 
the Catholic religion has the effect of making an Indian lamb 
like. There are some who affect to believe that Charles will 
not lie.9 
Despite a denial of a general uprising by Gen. Philip Sheridan, 
who had been kept informed on this matter by General Howard, Barbour 
continued to instill fears about the Flatheads. After an incident among 
those Indians involving the shooting by whites of a subchief named 
Adolph, Barbour made an editorial statement, reprinted in the New York 
newspapers, that "the Flatheads assembled and expressed their determin-
11 ation to come down and clean out Missoula." He credited Chariot and 
and Father D'Astie, a Catholic missionary, for having prevented such 
^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 195» Chariot, chief of the 
Flatheads, refused in 1872 to sign a treaty that would force his bands 
to move onto the reservation south of Flathead Lake, James A, Garfield, 
commissioner of Indian affairs and later president, forged Chariot's 
signature to the treaty. Garfield admitted this later. 
^Phillips, o£. cit., pp. 8-9. 
Weekly Missoulian, June 29, 1877. 
Weekly Missoulian, July 13, 1877. 
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a plan. Yet his letter two days later to Governor Potts discredited 
both Chariot and the Catholics, as noted. 
Surprising as it may appear, the Nez Perce continually refused 
help at this time from disaffected Indians from other tribes. Accept­
ance of such help would damage chances of reaching a peaceful settlement 
with the whites over their major concern—the homelands. The chiefs 
believed nothing should be done to aggravate the whites and everything 
1 2 
possible done to renew their friendship of long standing. 
This raised the third major concern regarding the matter of un­
certainty in policy. How could the Nez Perce best avoid a conflict with 
Captain Rawn without being trapped? The answer would come only through 
careful negotiations. 
Before reviewing these, it is important to understand the think­
ing on both sides, for this was the golden opportunity for calling off 
the fighting. 
Because of Joseph's general demoralization at this time and 
because Chief Looking Glass had been forthright in formulating a general 
goal for the flight, the latter was regarded the chief by the Nez Perce. 
Joseph was indisputably the war chief—the difference explained in 
Chapter I. Moreover, Looking Glass was the logical leader at this 
point, because he was known personally by settlers in the Bitterroot 
Valley, having stayed at several ranches there while traveling to and 
from buffalo country. Indeed, Mrs. Eliza Derry, a practical nurse, had 
administered first aid to his bands at her homestead on numerous occa-
13 
sionso Looking Glass was, therefore, the chief chosen to negotiate 
^^Howard and McGrath, ££. cit., p. 20L. ^^Ibid., pp. 338-339. 
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•with Captain Rawn» He and the Nez Perce in general regarded the whites 
of Idaho and those of Montana as separate» With Idaho people th^ had 
been in constant turmoil for years, and with Montanans, who were 100 
miles distant J they had been extremely friendly. As Yellow Wolf put 
its "Montana people are not our enemies. The war we leave here in 
Idaho."lb 
The people of Montana Territory were equally confused on this 
issue, and were to become more so as events unfolded. The immediate 
reaction, however, was one of great fear. Except for an extra issued 
on July 28 crying "Help! Help12" for volunteers, the Missoulian did not 
publish that week. The following week, the editor explained: "When the 
news came in last week of Indians on Lo Lo, it would have been a diffi­
cult task to hold the compositors of this office as it is now for the 
Governor to strip the county of arms. Hence no paper that week."^^ 
As a precautionary measure, the women and children of Missoula 
and surrounding areas were crowded inside Higgins and Worden's store 
in Missoula. One unidentified woman made such a hasty buggr ride from 
an outlying ranch that it was not until she joined the others that she 
realized her bonnet, decorated with ribbons, was on backward. 
Owing to the fact that the combined tribes of the Flathead, Pen 
d'Oreilles and Kutenais had a total population of 1,970 people; the Nez 
Perce, 7^0 (including women and children who were capable of handling 
firearms); and Missoula fewer than 500, it is not surprising that the 
latter had cause for fear, especially if the newspaper editorials were 
^%lcWhorter, Yellow Wolfs His Own Story, p. 112. 
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877. 
^^Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. 196. 
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accurate regarding a general uprising. Governor Potts relayed these 
fears to Washington, as evidenced in a somewhat erroneous editorial in 
the Cincinnati Weekly Stars 
Reproduced message to Governor "Pettiss" ([PottsJ from Post­
master Dickenson of Missoulas 
Th^ [the Nez Perce] will come into the head of the valley 
and clean it out, and if the Flatheads don't join them th^ 
will clean them out too. The Flatheads have driven all their 
horses out of the valley and their squaws and children are 
going up to Lot [LOIOJ Fork. A Nezperces chief told Major 
Ifhal^r that the Nezperces were going to clean out Bitter Root 
Valley, and that the Flatheads would join them. . . .^-7 
This editorial serves to show that Governor Potts relied heavily 
on the opinions of the people in Missoula in keeping the government in­
formed, despite the fact that no reliable information had been obtained 
from the Flatheads» 
On July 13, Governor Potts sent a telegram to President Hayes 
requesting authority to form a militia of ^00 volunteers to meet the 
Nez Perce when they entered Montana Territory. Secretary McCrary sent 
back a hazy reply stating that General Sheridan, then in Chicago, was 
carefully watching the situation. Both he and Gen. Alfred Terry, com­
mander of the Department of Dakota Territory which included Montana, 
deemed such a move unnecessary.^® 
To confuse matters, the Helena Daily Herald ran a news story 
with an erroneous headline: 
THE HOSTILES 
Available Military Inadequate to 
Suppress the Savages 
l^Cincinnati [ohio] Weekly Star, July 5, 1877° 
^^Beal, o£, cit., p. 96. 
9h 
The President Will Call Out the Militia 
New York, July 13-—The Tribune's Washington special says: . . . 
If the case continues to look as serious as at present it is 
not improbable that the President may call upon the States to 
furnish militia for the suppression of the war.^^ 
As can be readily seen, the difference between "will" call out 
out the militia in the headline, and "may" call out the militia in the 
last sentence of the story, is an important difference. Contrary to 
the news account, the position taken by the government in refusing 
authorization to Governor Potts to organize militia was that the mili-
taiy forces in Idaho and Montana were sufficient to suppress the Nez 
Perce. 
Gen. Irwin McDowell, with headquarters in San Francisco, sent a 
telegram, which was reprinted in the Helena Weekly Independent, to 
Governor Potts asking what aid could be given by Montana militia in 
20 
arresting or detaining the Indians. The governor replied that he 
had no authorization to form militia and that all Montanans could do 
21 
in the emergency was to defend their homes and property. 
Three days before the governor sent that telegram. Secretary 
Mills, editor of the New North-West, sent a letter to Charles S. Warren 
of Butte stating that if a company of men were organized, an adequate 
supply of breech-loading rifles would be issued to them. In effect, 
on July 20, the editor, without authorization, countermanded the 
orders issued by the Secretary of War and received by the governor 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July II4, 1877. 
^^Helena Weekly Independent, July 26, I877. 
^^Beal, op. cit., p. 96. 
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one week earlier» The Butte company, headed by Maj. William A. Clark, 
who later became the copper magnate, was ordered by Mills on July 30 
to proceed quickly to the Big Hole River where a battle was antici-
. , 22 
pated. 
Meanwhile, the governor, having no idea that Mills had authorized 
the formation of a volunteer company, went to Missoula. Captain Rawn 
assured the governor that militia would be of great benefit to the small 
force of regulars then at the fortifications on Loloo The governor 
acquiesced, and on July 26 issued a call for volunteers. But a strange 
thing happened which is rarely mentioned by scholars. 
When a special stage carrying the proclamation reached Bear 
Mouth, it appeared that the message must have been placed in the express 
box. To have this box opened, it was necessary to return to Deer Lodge. 
But when opened there, no proclamation was found. VJhile the facts are 
by no means clear, the volunteers were called—not by the governor's 
proclamation—but by a note from Mills.Why the proclamation was 
missing is uncertain. How Mills got the information to write his note 
is uncertain, also. But it may be suggested that the governor's 
proclamation would have been embarrassing to Mills in Butte where, 
without authorization, he authorized formation of a comparer of militia. 
The governor issued a second proclamation on July 31 and, on the 
same day, wired Major Clark to organize a company of militia. Clark's 
men, acting on Mills' orders, already were on their way toward Big Hole 
Leeson, 0£, cit., p. 137» 
^^Ibid., p. 138. In a telegram to Ben. R. Dittes, July 26, I877, 
Mills stated that the governor's proclamation was verbal. This is 
possible, but very unlikely in view of the evidence. 
FIGURE 2 
jrulj 20—7 •'eloek A. M. 
A PROCLAMATION. 
Potts Galls for Volunteers 
PROCLAM rION: 
lu THR FIKLIX JMiftPOUl A. | 
JUI.Y '>(> 1H77 \ 
Whsubaa, Motiiuua rerritt>ry is invaded 
Inutile Indian# from Idalu» aa<1 there 
and thiirebei^^tod thuu fifty United Sta es 
anldiera to oppose said Indians, hy virtue 
of the aiithfiritjr vested in me aa Governor 
and ComOiander-iD-Chief of the militia. I 
Mmmamd that the organized volunteer 
mititiaof Missoula and Deer Lodge coun­
ties to lorthwith lo the Com mander-
m-OWW ^ Miséouta for temporary duty 
(Wted Stales forces now serving 
(he Indians in Western Montana, 
^aid oumpanies will l>e armed and equip 
aed for service in the Held. The under 
I âgned is without authunty to bind the 
United States or the Territory of Montana 
or supplies furnished volunteer companies 
vhUe serving in the fields but will use 
Very effort tn his power to secure pay 
aent lor supplies, etc., from the Territory 
•r the United States. Officers will be de 
ignated to receive and receipt tor supplies 
^rniahed. 
Witness my hand. 
B. P POTTS, 
Governor and Com in Chief M. M 
' .ttest : 
JA8. fl. MNJUS, Sec'y and Adit.-Gen. 
FIQHTINeONLO-LO. 
The Indians Below Rawn's 
Position. 




Missoula, M. T. July 28—4 p. The 
Irwlinns this al tern mm threw a frii^ bekw 
Capt. Hawn's position on the W trail 
and I fenr a severe battle will bo the msulL 
The Derr Ijodge company has gone to open 
conmiimication witb Capt. RaWtt. Tb# 
Philipsburg company of 16 arnvad at Lo-
Lo to dny Wc need Mp aipil It 
come soon or it will be too fate. 8e#d 
er^body ^that cnii be armed. No 
intormation from Qibb^Ni. Th# in 
dtans appear to be determined to force 
their way to the buffalo eo#ntry against 
all opposition. The situatS<Mei is vfsrf critic 
cal and those movinir thi# way mnst lotik 
out for Indians on the road for they may 
break our lines. A proclamation was 
sued Suly 26th, 1877, calling out all of t#e 
organized companies in Deer Lodg^àftd 
Missoula counties. 
[Signed.] B. F. POTTS, . 
Another letter from Potts says the FIi^ 
heads are co-operating with Rawn and 
Charlos has already sent a number of wai^ 
nors to RaWn^s camp. 
Dbbr Lodge, M. T. July 29, 7 a. m. 
Capt. Clark^s Company from Butte wit# 
69 men, are just leaving for the front. 
Another Company of the same number are 
expected by ten o'plock. 
The Deer Lodge reserves left last 
ing at Revto, numbering 25 men. 
The excitement is intense. 
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and had to be called back to Butte for the march to Missoula which the 
governor had requested» Obviously Potts had no idea of what had trans­
pired between Mills and Clark, and by calling the company back, it missed 
an opportunity to participate in the battle that occurred at Big Hole.^^ 
Clark's command—comprising 35 men, two doctors and four wagons—reached 
the Big Hole basin two days after the battle had ended. 
The second proclamation, abrogating orders from the government 
not to call out militia, met with enthusiastic response throughout the 
Territory and may be regarded as a declaration of war against the Nez 
Perce Montana, Reprinted by most, if not all, the newspapers in the 
Territory, the document was as follows: 
There are now in the Bitter Root valley certain Nez Perce 
Indians who have perpetrated theft, murder and outrage upon the 
citizens of Idaho» Although ordered from Gen. Sheridan's 
headquarters to be treated as hostiles, they were permitted to 
escape from Lo Lo Pass and encamp in the Bitter Root valley. 
These hostiles will soon attempt to pass through other portions 
of Montana. 
Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me, I hereby 
call for 300 Montana volunteers to organize at once under gen­
eral order No. U, issued herewith and to report for duty at 
Deer Lodge forthwith. 
The governor's statement makes it clear that the second proclam­
ation of July 31 came after the Fort Fizzle affair had ended. Whatever 
became of the first proclamation of July 26 is a matter of conjecture, 
perhaps, but if Mills had any part in destroying it and substituting 
a letter in its place, as some evidence suggests, he did a great favor 
for the Nez Perce. The organization of volunteers during the Fort 
Fizzle affair was confused and disorderly at best, partly because there 
25ibid., p. 135. 
^^Avant Courler, August 9, I877. 
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was no certain word from Potts that th^ were needed. Some small com­
mands did reach Missoula before the Nez Perce departed, but they were 
too late to help Captain Rawn's inferior force, which was unreliable 
and mutinous at the critical moment when the Indians advanced. Volun­
teers from the Bitterroot Valley and Missoula—totaling some 100 men, 
or more than half of Rawn's command—departed "without leave" when th^ 
learned of the Nez Perce pledge for peace in the final negotiations. 
27 
Rawn posted rear guards to prevent further desertions. 
The negotiations held with the Nez Perce between the two encamp­
ments on July 28, 1877> were, for both sides, of momentous significance 
in determining the course of the war. Governor Potts and Captain Rawn 
met with Chief Looking Glass and his interpreter, Delaware Jim, The 
only first-hand report extant by any of the negotiators about what 
happened was a brief summary written by Rawn two months later when his 
actions were being reviewed by the general staff at the Department of 
Dakota headquarters. Rawn wrote: 
The meeting was had accordingly, but I submitted to him the 
same conditions as before, to wit: that if they wished to enter 
the vall^r, th^ must disarm and dismount, surrendering all 
stock. Looking Glass said that he would talk to his people 
and would tell me what they said at 9:00 AM the next day. Dis­
trusting him, I would not agree to that hour but proposed 12'M. 
We separated without agreement. Nothing satisfactoiy having 
resulted from the conference, I returned to the breastworks 
expecting to be attacked. 
In the meantime that portion of the volunteers, some 100 or 
more, representing Bitter-root valley, hearing that the Nez 
Perces promised to pass peaceably through it, determined that 
no act of hostility on their part should provoke the Indians to 
a contrary measure, and without leave, left in squads of from 
one to a dozen.^ 
Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. 200. 
^^othermich, 0£. cit., p. 390. 
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It is very strange that Rawn made no mention of the fact that 
the governor was in attendance; according to Seal a number of questions 
were never answered by Rawn or Potts. What terms did the Nez Perce 
make? Did Rawn agree to let the Indians pass without a fight? What 
was the governor's attitude, remembering that he had issued the first 
29 
call for militia two days previously? 
Possibly the best answers, rarely cited, were given by Chauncey 
Barbour in several editorials run in the next issue of the Missoulian, 
August 3, 1877• Regarding the negotiations, he wrote; 
The only intelligent conclusion that can be reached is that 
the Nez Perces, tired of fighting with Gen. Howard, has come 
here for the purpose of surrendering. They know that th^ 
must make their peace with the government sometime, before 
they can resume their old habits of going to and fro through 
this country on their annual hunting expeditions. They camped 
on the Lo Lo three days on an open flat with their women, 
children and horses about them» They would not have fought 
in such position, but would have surrendered if attacked. 
They continually expressed their friendship for the whites 
of this section, and their desire for peace. They proffered 
to surrender their ammunition. One of them came in and offered 
to surrender eight lodges. Th^ marched through an open coun­
try Saturday and camped that night with all that was dear to 
them on an open plain. . . .30 
Speaking again about the negotiations on July 28 in another 
editorial the same day, Barbour wrote: 
The council was held, and Looking Glass proffered to surren­
der all the ammunition of the camp as a guarantee that the 
Indians intended to go through the country peaceably. IVhen 
told that nothing but an unconditional surrender would be 
accepted, he asked for another meeting at nine o'clock the 
next day to give him time to consult with the other chiefs. 
Capt. Rawn told him that any further communication he desired 
to make must be made under a flag of truce at the fortified 
campo^l 
29Beal, _op, cit., p. 100, 
3^eekly Missoulian, August 3 ,  1877. ^^Tbid. 
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This last sentence strongly suggests that Captain Rawn refused 
to come to terms "with the Nez Perce offer to surrender ammunition and, 
as General Howard had done just before the outbreak of hostilities in 
Idaho, served an ultimatum which might be paraphrased: "We are at 
total war; any further negotiations you wish to conduct will be useless. 
If you come to our fortified camp tomorrow, it can be only to surrender 
unconditionally." Chances were that Captain Rawn was in no position to 
make such an ultimatum because his force was smaller than the Nez Perce. 
At this time the volunteers deserted, and circumstantial evidence 
indicates Governor Potts was not in accord with Rawn and did nothing to 
halt the volunteers which he had called at the captain's request. In­
stead, Potts retired to the rear—for which he was censured severely by 
other papers later—because "he saw that the volunteers were under an 
experienced officer and taking their orders from him, and felt that he 
could be of more service in the rear forwarding reinforcements and 
32 
directing a flank movement as soon as a sufficient force should arrive." 
This explanation, undoubtedly given to Barbour by the governor, 
was superficial at best in view of the desertions. Apparently Potts 
wished to avoid open controversy with Captain Rawn, but at the same 
time wished to avoid a fight with the Nez Perce that would have endan­
gered ranches in the Bitterroot Vall^. This reasoning was to become 
Potts' one defense—and a valid one—in the press controversy which 
erupted over the conduct of the whites at Fort Fizzle. 
When dawn broke on July 29 and Captain Rawn awaited word from 
the Nez Perce, "anticipating their surrender," what happened was 
^^Ibid. 
101 
•unexpected» At 10 a.m. the Indians moved to within a half mile of 
Rawn's position, ascended the north slope, circumvented the bewildered 
soldiers, and then descended to the Lolo trail again approximately a 
half mile behind the breastworks. The tactic was one of considerable 
daring, for Nez Perce women and children were exposed. 
At 11:30 a.m., approximately one hour after the passage of the 
Nez Perce, Captain Rawn detailed mounted troops to follow up the 
escape and arrest any stragglers. According to Barbour's chronicle 
of this, when three of these troops caught up with the Nez Perce rear 
guard. Chief Looking Glass "waved his hat, and came up and exchanged 
friendly greetings. 
At 12:1$ p.m., according to the same account by Barbour, Captain 
Rawn retired from the breastworks—already dubbed "Fort Fizzle" by 
volunteers—in skirmish deployment. He sent Lt. ¥. J. Stephens of the 
Missoula volunteers and $0 men to pursue the Indians while he returned 
to Missoula, Stephens' force came to the Nez Perce camp being con­
structed for the night and found that his men were welcomed. Barbour 
wrote; "Looking Glass came forward to meet them, and renewed his 
friendly protestations. The greater part of the force with Stephens 
were from Bitter Root and were disposed to let Mr. Looking Glass and 
his people go in peace, Lieut. Stephens returned to town. 
Contrary to Barbour's claims that the Nez Perce would have 
surrendered if attacked, Rawn's men would have been annihilated had 
they fired at the Indians. Indeed, Governor Potts—interviewed by a 
correspondent from the Avant Courier when he was returning to Deer Lodge 
^^Ibid. 3^Ibid. 
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—praised Rawn for this decision because the outcome would have been 
disastrous both to the defenders and nearly settlements. The governor 
reiterated his position taken before calling for militia that his 
obligation was to protect Montanans, not defeat Joseph. 
Unfortunately for the governor, he had to endure a major portion 
of the criticism that arose later in the newspaper war over the Fort 
Fizzle affair when, in fact, the entire policy—from the calling out 
of volunteers to the passage of the Indians—was determined by Captain 
Rawn. Rawn's personal conduct during the critical moments was less 
than admirable militarily. VJhen a volunteer, W, B. Harlan, informed 
the captain that the Nez Perce were going around, he rebuked him by 
saying there were too many "God Almightys" around camp.^^ 
Editorial Opinion Shifts 
Until this time, few complimentary words were used by editors 
to describe the Indian participants of the war. As already noted, 
opinion was at "flood stage" against the Nez Perce, Two articles, 
published at approximately the same time in distant communities, mark 
the historical moment that the tide shifted. 
The first article, published in the Nation on August 2, 1877, 
explained in detail and gave to the public for the first time a full, 
37 
accurate account of the causes for the war. Titled "Responsibility 
for the Idaho War," it was published by many Montana newspapers two or 
^^Avant Courier, August 9, 1877. 
^^Beal, op. cit., p. 100. 
^^The Nation, August 2, 1077, pp. 69-70. 
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Herald Extra. 
HEIigBTA, SITUrPAY, JUIiY 29. 
ESCAPE OF THE HOSTILES. 
THEY PASS WITHIN GUN­
SHOT OP RAWN. 
DBEB LODGE, July 29.—A courier from | 
Missoula arrived at 11:30 a. m. A letter from 
Governor Potts says that Joseph and his 
band passed Capt. Rawn'g entrenchment 
yesterday late in the afternoon and 
although they passed within gunshot 
Not a gun was ûred at them. A letter from 
Knowles and Dixon says : The Indians are 
going out by way of the head of Bitter Root 
and Big Hole. They are about 400 strong, 
well armed but probably short of ammuni­
tion. Co. A and Co. B from Butte were 
ordered back to Deer Lodge. Sec. Mills 
says—will have 300 men in Big Hole vallley i 
by noon to-morrow. ^ 
Volunteers are now leaving the town by 
all kinds of conveyances for Big Hole Basin. 
Herald Extra, 
HETOSTA» SATURPAY, AUORCT LLFH. 
A Fight with the Hostiles. 
Several Killed and Wounded 
on Both Sides. 
Qeu. Oibbon*8 command overtook 
fought the Stz Perces in the Big ijole. ' 
Several of the command, officers and men, 
are killed and wounded, and a number Qt the j 
Indiana killed. ( 
Gen. Gibbon telegraphs for a surgeoor to b6 I 
sent tQ him. 
Herald Extra. 
EEEMWA, SUNDAY, JTUIiY 29. 
Joseph's Band Escaping by 
way of Henry's Lake. 
DBBR LODGE, July 29.—A letter from old 
j Beaverhead Station says : Thirty or forty 
I lodges of Indians are camped forty miles \ 
south of that place, on the road from Frank-
' lin to Montana. ' 
There we abcmt 125 Indians and are riding j 
large American horses. It is supposed to bé | 
the advande guard of Joseph's band escaping 
by Henry's Lake. 
ndependent Extra 
THE INDIANS PASS CAPT. 
RAWN'S COMMAND. 
The Indians Going Out by the 
Head ot the Bitter Root 
DBSK LODGE, July 29. 
A Coarier from Missoula arrived at 11:30 
j with a letter from Gov Potts. It sayf 
I Joseph and his band passed Capt Rawn s 
entrenchment yesterday late in the after­
noon, and although they passed within 
gunshot not a gun was fired at them. A 
letter from Knowles nnd Dixon says the 
i Indians are going out by the head of the 
Bitter Root and the Big Hole. They 
A'>out 400 strong, well armed but pn b 
ably short of ammunition. 
Company A and Co. B, from But$e, were 
ordered back %o Deer Lodge, 
Secretary Mills says he will have 800 
men in the Big Hole Valley by noon to­
morrow* Volunteers are now leaving the 
town by all kinds of conveyances for Big 
Hole bridge basm. 
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three weeks later.^8 (The text of this article appears in the Appendix). 
The second article, published in the Missoulian the day after the 
aforesaid article appeared in New York, was a personal tribute by Barbour 
who at last had a first-hand understanding of Nez Perce character in the 
face of great difficulty. It was as followss 
The movement of the Nez Perce last Saturday was one of the 
most brilliant strategically of modern warfare. It was, of 
all others, the move that nobody expected them to make. Its 
audacity was stunning. It will ever stand as a monument to 
the bravery of that people that they moved, with their horses 
and women and little ones, through an open country that was 
swarming with armed men.39 
But this was not all Chauncey Barbour, who only a few days before 
had criticized the character of the Nez Perce mind, had to say that day 
in his editorial columns. It should be noted again that the tide of 
editorial opinion was just beginning to shift concerning the Nez Perce. 
Meanwhile, a storm was gathering swiftly over the sea of troubles that 
the young Territory was already experiencing with the Fort Fizzle affair. 
Barbour wrote: 
"S" writes for the Independent concerning the Indian escape 
last Saturday a remarkable article, which only shows how ridi­
culous a man can make himself by writing about something he 
knows nothing about. He states that the Indians stampeded 
square over Rawn's rifle pits; that the Indians were turned 
by the Deer Lodge company—32 men—and that th^ broke south. 
. . . ¥e wish to detract nothing from the bravery of the Deer 
Lodge Company, but will state that it was nearly two o'clock 
when they reached the lower Bitter Root bridge, and that the 
main body of Indians had crossed . . . nearly two hours before; 
that the Deer Lodgers saw no Indians except those who were 
posted on the bluffs to guard the retreat; that they did not 
break at the sight of the thirty-two men, but proceeded veiy 
leisurely . . . moving only twenty miles in the next four days, 
so that they might overtake them if there was any disposition 
to do so. Bless you unsophisticated soul, Addison; you are 
too easily imposed upon.^O 
^^Avant Courier, August 23, l877. 
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 3> 1877. ^'^Ibid. 
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With this, the newspaper war was beginning to thunder about the 
Fort Fizzle confusion, certainly, but this was only the beginning. To 
recollect, already in question was the reputation of General Howard. 
Moreover, as noted in Chapter III, the reputation of Governor Potts 
had been assailed by editors, and was to be again. The full fuiy of 
the storm was not felt until after the Big Hole battle, so it will be 
reviewed then. 
The Turning Point of the War 
As the Nez Perce moved southward through Bitterroot Valley, 
trading xfith anxious settlers but causing no harm as promised, the 
people of Deer Lodge, 80 miles east of Missoula, fled to the peniten­
tiary and locked themselves inside.On July 31, 1877, Chauncey 
Barbour wrote a letter to the governor stating that word had reached 
him that "75 bucks were raiding Stevensville . . . Although this 
report was untrue and Barbour was just passing along what he heard, 
the editor expanded his comments to the governor concerning the lack 
of military leadership. He wrotes 
I hear from Indian sources that th^ intend to go down to 
the Big Hole by Twin Bridges. I am glad you are going to give 
them a game. There is the best place to strike them. You 
don't want any military, or any one to hold your men chafing 
and tell them to "wait," "wait" until the hostiles are gone. 
Take command yourself, and don't let good men be humiliated 
by imbeciles or cowards.^3 
Strangely, the governor was confronted again with the question 
of whether to use militia as a defensive force for the protection of 
lives and property or to engage offensively in an attempt to accomplish 
Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 203. 
^^Phillips, ££. cit., p. 12. ^3xbid. 
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what the military had not done--crush the Nez Perce. 
On July 2% the reaction to news accounts about the Fort Fizzle 
affair prompted the citizens of Helena to call a "war meeting" at 
International Hall. According to a report of this meeting in the 
Helena Daily Herald, the participants reviewed what had happened in 
Lolo Canyon, dismissed Rawn's actions hy concluding that he believed 
they were "friendly Indians, or the Captain would not have allowed 
them to pass without bringing on a fight right there," and decided to 
raise a company of cavalry, one of artillery and one of "mounted 
infantry. 
What the difference between cavalry and "mounted infantry" might 
be was not explained, but according to the news article, signed by five 
prominent citizens, a committee was appointed to solicit funds for this 
venture. The problem of paying for a militia campaign was one of the 
major considerations facing the governor. Because General Sheridan 
and the Secretary of War had refused authorization for organizing a 
militia, the Territory could expect no financial help from the govern­
ment. the time the governor returned to Helena from Missoula, the 
militia movement was already strong there, in Butte, and, as noted, 
in Deer Lodge. Then a curious editorial blunder occurred which may 
have aided the public cry for offensive action in the war. 
Gen. William T, Sherman, the immediate superior of General Howard, 
arrived in Bozeman, Montana, and sent a telegram to Governor Potts. 
The general refused to sanction the call for volunteers, but he praised 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877» See Figure for the 





the "readiness of citizens" and added that he thought the cost of local 
operations—presumably in Missoula—would be paid eventually Con-
gresso^^ The Helena Daily Independent interpreted this telegram to 
mean there was little or no question about receiving federal funds for 
militia. The story appeared, in part, as follows: 
UNCLE SAM TO THE RESCUE 
The dispatch from General Sherman to Governor Potts, which 
we publish, in another place, indicates that the General Govern­
ment will pay the damages and save the Territory from an enormous 
expenseo . . » The spirit of General Sherman's dispatch confirms 
this, and shows that he fully appreciated the necessity, and was 
willing, as far as he could, to provide for the emergency. 
On July 30, the Helena Daily Herald debunked the military by 
writings "How easy an Indian force, whether seeking pillage or only 
escape, could pass around, through., and by our untrained troops. So 
far as infantry goes, except to defend the larger towns or some forti­
fied position, they are as useless as boys with popguns. Even mounted 
and well-armed soldiers need skillful leadership to be of any. account. 
On the following'day, July 31, Governor Potts made his second 
appeal for volunteers. Apparently he had made no decision about how 
the militia would be used—offensively or defensively. The predicament 
was explained in an extra published by the New North-West on August 3> 
which stated, in parts 
The circumstances of the past week have prevented a regular 
issue of the New North-West this day. . . . Under the call for 
300 volunteers by the Governor's Proclamation, three Butte 
companies, 1^0 or I60 strong, remained in camp until Thursday 
b^Helena Daily Herald, August h} 1877. 
^̂ Helena Daily Independent, August Ii, I877. 
Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877. 
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morning. A company of 30 or liO men were in readiness to move 
in an hour from Deer Lodge. Philipsburg, Cable, New Chicago, 
Bear, Bear Mouth, Yreka, Pioneer and Yamhill had fully 7? men 
reacfy for instant service, and tenders of companies of ^0 men 
each were telegraphed from Helena and Pony on condition of 
being armed. The request of Governor Potts, Delegate £MartinJ 
Maginnis and Judge Knowles to the War Department for authority 
to organize and move this force to co-operate with the U. S. 
troops was, however, answered adversely. . . 
Two telegrams, dated August 1 and 2, were quoted in full, stating 
that the President, the Secretary of War and General Sheridan agreed 
that "it will not be necessary for the Governor to call out 300 volun­
teers to intercept the Indians." 
In view of the pressure on the governor from Montanans and the 
newspapers to take positive action, and the directives by the militaiy 
and the government not to, it would appear he was in an inexorable 
dilemma. But what may have stirred Governor Potts to decide to use 
volunteers for offensive warfare was a letter written by Col. John 
Gibbon who had left Fort Shaw on July 28 with a small force of regulars. 
On arrival in Missoula, August 2, he enlisted a command totaling ll|6 
men, including 3h Missoula volunteers.He wrote to the governor as 
follows; 
As soon as I can get ttçr command here, probably day after 
tomorrow, I propose to move up the Bitterroot after the Nez 
Perces & fight them if they will stand. It is all important 
that the passes behind them leading into the Big Hole basin 
be occupied at once, and as I learn from Capt. Rawn that you 
are moving some companies of militia in that direction I have 
to request that you will give instructions to have such passes 
occupied as soon as possible. Please give instructions also 
to have no negotiations whatever with the Indians, and the men 
should have no hesitancy in shooting down any armed Indian they 
meet not known to belong to one of the peaceful tribes. 
^^New North-west, August 3^ 1877° 
^%oward and McGrath, og. cit., p. 206. 
^^Phillips, 0£. cit., pp. 13-li|. 
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This directive to "shoot and ask questions later" may be regarded 
as the death warrant of many Nez Perce, including women and children, at 
the Big Hole, for until Colonel Gibbon arrived there no blood had been 
spilled on Montana soil. The assertion in this letter that militia was 
alreac^ moving toward the Big Hole was true, but the governor had not 
authorized this. Secretary Mills, as noted earlier, had given the 
command to Major Clark on July 30. Subsequently, Governor Potts called 
them back for service in Missoula and, in the confusion, this company 
of militia did not reach the scene of the Big Hole fight until two days 
after it had ended. 
On August 3, the day after Colonel Gibbon had written his letter 
and was bu^ organizing men in Missoula, Chauncey Barbour expressed his 
views to the governor in a letter concerning the plans being made. He 
wrote, in part: "The whole force, nearly 1^0 men, will move on them 
Saturday, and try and hold them until Howard gets up. The Indians will 
mock them." 
Exactly when the governor decided the militia should take offen­
sive action by aiding Colonel Gibbon is not certain, but the fact that 
the latter had enlisted volunteer help in Missoula already makes the 
question academic. As Gibbon moved down the Bitterroot Vall^, he 
recruited a handful of additional volunteers. But many valley residents 
argued against his plan to attack the Nez Perce on the grounds that the 
Indians had been friendly. Gibbon was plagued with desertions along the 
way. I'Jhen General Howard, who still was crossing the Bitterroot Mountains, 
learned that Gibbon's command now comprised I63 men, he remarked that at 
^^Ibid. 
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least 100 additional soldiers would be needed. 
Because of the delay in issuing the second proclamation, as 
already noted, the companies in Butte and Helena were not under arms 
until August h or In Butte at 7 a.m» that Sunday, August 5, "a 
do 
council of war was held within the hour to swear men in for duty. 
But none of these men saw action during the Big Hole battle* Had 
th^ been organized at the time of the first proclamation, which 
nçrsteriously disappeared, the Big Hole fight might have been far more 
disastrous for the Nez Perce. The events of the battle, which have 
been well documented, are as follows. 
On August 8, the Nez Perce—having crossed Lost Trail Pass at 
the southern end of Bitterroot Vall^ and camped on the banks of Ruby 
Creek in the relatively open, rolling country of the Big Hole basin 
twelve miles west of Wisdom, Montana—stayed up late in the night danc­
ing and playing the "stick game" common to Northwest tribes. Little 
serious concern was given to an attack by whites, so no scouts or 
guards were posted as had been the routine during the flight through 
Idaho Territory» The camp comprised 89 tepees lined approximately 
a half mile along the southern fringe of willows bordering the creek« 
It was by no means a well-chosen, defensive position—such as had been 
the case at White Bird and Clearwater canyons—for directly to the north 
lay a wooded slope, hidden from view by the willows, which afforded an 
easy route for undetected approach ty soldiers. The whereabouts of the 
^^Beal, op. cit., pp. 108-110. 
^^Leeson, op. cit., p. 138. 
^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 206. 
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Indians had been ascertained by a small detachment of soldiers led by 
Lt. James Bradley on August 7.^^ 
When this news reached Gibbon, whose force was laboring over 
Lost Trail pass, he ordered his command forward on foot, leaving 20 
men to bring up the wagons and howitzer (which had been obtained at 
Fort Owen, near Stevensville)» The unmounted force reached the edge 
of the trees, 1,200 yards from the Nez Perce camp, at approximately 
2 a.m. on August 9 without discovery ty the slumbering Indians. The 
whites depleted in the vicinity of the Indian ponies which had been 
picketed on the hillside to graze. The wait for dawn commenced; the 
men cursed softly as they endured the cold.^^ 
At approximately 3:30 a.m. when the first glow of light promised 
warmth from the east, Indian women emerged from the tepees to stoke the 
campfires. About this time an aged Indian, Natalekin, rode from the 
camp to check the horses. As he blundered into the waiting whites, 
four shots dropped him from the mount, and the battle was begun. 
The soldiers rushed the camp, wading through the creek and 
crashing through the willows. Some of the Nez Perce were half awakened 
the shots nearly three-quarters of a mile distant, but most did not 
perceive what was happening until the whites leveled their firearms at 
tepees. 
Colonel Gibbon had given the order, "We don't want any prisoners. 
^^Beal, 0£. cit., p. 110. 
^^Brady, 0£. cit., pp. 165-173» 
Beal, op. cit., p. Il6, 
^^Ibid., p. 111;. 
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The reaction by Yellow Wolf was as follows: 
I grabbed tiçr moccasins and with the others ran out of the 
tepee. I had only nçr war club. . . . Men and women were lying 
flat on the ground listening. I saw one woman . . » I heard 
her call out, "Why not all men get ready and fight? Not run 
awayI" 
I did not know her. IVhen I heard this, it convinced me she 
was right. Minthon, a younger bey than I, was also convinced. 
He gave me his gun. It had but one shell. . . . Î saw a man 
running this way. It was not nearly daylight. He came close 
and said, "Wahchunçnis (Rainbow) is killed!"^9 
As the Indians scattered for cover, the whites took possession 
of the camp. The first soldier killed was Lt. Bradley who had located 
the Nez Perce two days earlier. Tepees not made of hides were set 
ablaze and women and children, many still huddled inside, were shot 
or bludgeoned with rifle butts. One l8-year-old girl who survived had 
her teeth knocked out and later was called In-Koko-Lio (girl with 
broken teeth)^^ An aged Indian, too old to run for cover, was shot 
repeatedly as he sat smoking on a buffalo robe. "He did not feel the 
shots," said Yellow Wolf. "After the battle, he rode horseback from 
t h e r e . A  w o m a n ,  h e r  n e w b o r n  c h i l d ,  a n d  t h e  m i d w i f e  w e r e  f o u n d  l a t e r  
6 
in one tepee; another woman and her two children in another—all dead. 
Chiefs Joseph, %ite Bird and Looking Glass rallied their scat­
tered warriors by shouting commands in different sectors. After a 
series of fierce charges and counter charges by both sides. Gibbon's 
command was forced to retreat. He regrouped on a knoll approximately 
a half mile northwest of the Nez Perce camp and his men dug rifle pits 
59chalmers, o£. cit., p. 129. 
'^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 137. 
^^Chalmers, 0£. cit., p. 13^. ^^Ibid., p, ll|l. 
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with trowel bayonets. Meanwhile, the Indians reoccupied their camp, 
tended to the wounded, buried their dead and packed what belongings 
that remained. 
Wrote Gibbon later; "Few of us will soon forget the wail of 
mingled grief, rage and borrow which came from the camp. . . when the 
Indians returned to it and recognized their slaughtered warriors, women 
and children. 
That afternoon, Indian marksmen kept the whites pinned down with 
an effective fire which mortally wounded one officer and wounded another 
for the second time. The cannon and a supply wagon with 2,000 rounds 
of ammunition arrived about a half mile west of Gibbon's position. The 
Indians promptly captured both. Because the Nez Perce could not oper­
ate the howitzer—which would have been lethal against Gibbon's tightly 
grouped men—they destroyed it by removing the wheels and hammering the 
muzzle out of shape. 
The fighting continued throughout the day—the warriors set fire 
to the grass at one point in hopes of routing the whites, but the wind 
shifted—while the Indian withdrawal commenced. No further attack was 
mounted against the whites during the night or the next morning by the 
rear guard left to harass Gibbon's command and learn if reinforcements 
arrived. From the afternoon of August 10 to the late morning of August 
11, no more than 12 braves, under the leadership of Ollokot, kept the 
soldiers and volunteers in their trenches. General Howard arrived with 
a small detachment at 9 a.m. on August 11, too late to do more than ask 
^^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 21$. 
"^^Brady, 0£. cit., p. 66. 
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Gibbon, who was wounded in the thigh, how he felt.^^ 
Gibbon's casualties were listed at 29 dead, 1|0 wounded. The Nez 
Perce toll is uncertain, but a year after the battle. Chief White Bird 
listed the dead at 87, 53 of whom were non-warriors. But this was 
only a fraction of those who died of wounds during the flight. In later 
years. Chief Joseph set the total figure at 208.^? Most of these Indians 
were killed outright or fatally wounded during the initial hour of fight­
ing. Yellow Wolf, who had taken part in capturing the howitzer and 
keeping the whites pinned in the trenches, claimed that the only "bravery" 
shown the whites was during the morning when "killing women and 
children, crushing new bom babies' heads while in the mothers' arms 
[andJ shooting men who had no guns!" After this, he said, "they lay 
too close in dirtholes to know when we leftl"^^ 
The question is unresolved about which side won the Big Hole 
battle. Because of the severe Nez Perce losses, there is little doubt 
that Gibbon's smaller force won military plaudits in executing a well-
timed, devastating blow with comparatively few casualties. Seven of his 
69 
men were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. The press through­
out the nation saluted Gibbon and the 3^ Montana volunteers—the first 
universal expression of its type about a military leader since the 
opening of the conflict. But, as will be seen, General Howard was 
^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., pp. 216-218. 
^'%eal, op. cit., p. 129« 
Anaconda [Montana] Standard, September 29, 190b. 
^^Chalmers, 0£. cit., p. llt9. 
^^"The Siege Area Trail Guide," Big Hole Battlefield (Department 
of the Interior, National Park Service, 1962), p. 6. 
FIGURE 6 
fndependent Extra 
Big Hole Battle. 
{tloi Hates a Desperate Figjt 
and is Orerpoiereil. 
LOQAN & BRADLEY KILLED 
Gibbon and three Li^tenants 
Wounded. 
** Help ! Help!! Send us all the 
Relief you. We are Cut 
off from Supplies." 
FTK8T PlhPATCH. 
BIG HOLK, August 9; 1877. 
To Governor Potfs -
Had a hard figlit with the Nez Peice», 
killing a uumlit-r and lowing a number of 
officers and men. We need a doctor Hod 
everything. Send us such relief as you 
can, JOHN GIBBON, 
Col, Commanding. 
SKCOND DISPATCH. 
BIG HOLE, August 9, 1877. 
To Governor Potta— 
We are here near the mouth of Big 
Pass, with a large number of wounded in 
want of everything. Food, clothing,med­
icine** and medical attendance, hend oa 
assistance at once. 
JOHN GIBBON, 
Colonel U. 8. A. 
To Governor : i 
We had a hard fight and took the vil- 1 
I âge, but was finally driven back witb^ 
heavy lose. ( aptain Logan and Lieuten- j 
ant Bradley are killed. General Gibbon 
and Lieutenants Cooledge, English and j 
Woodruff are wounded—Knglish 8eri(»U8LY J 
the others slightly. The troops are en- ' 
trenched and the Indmns leaving. ! 
When the {messenger left, Gen. Gibbon ' 
said : I want an escort sufficient to protect 
the wagons which are going ia to relieve 
us. Load the wagons as light as possible 
The Indians cut me off from my supplie#, 
t5IA,'lnjail>AT, AVi 
Joihed Gibbon on the 
nth. 
0ibbon's Camp ànd Gun Re-
" ported Captured 
pK«R LoDGK, 12.->Two coorfM 
dWabt 
FIGURE 7 
Further Particulars of the 
Desperate Fight 
100 INDIANS KILLED. 
Wet Dei^rate Indian Fight 
on Record. 
bsBR LODGE, Auieust 11—9 A. M. 
Wv 0. Edward# *i## fust arrived irrtm 
Hokw brlDging account* of a terrible 
between Gikhom y command and the 
MfZ Perce» on the Big Hole river on Aug-
ée$ 9th. 
GibhonV command, consisting of 182 
men—17 officers and 133 regulars and 32 
; %ttsen voluate«;rB—crossed over troni lings^ 
tlole to hear the Big Hole on Wednesday, 
fetartiog at 11 o^clock on the same night 
i|hey moved down all the troops, with the 
f*cept%on ot a tew left to guaid the trans­
portation a few miles above, close to the 
ittdimicamp, which was made on the Big 
llfMe, about thre« miles below wiicre the 
Bitter Root and Rannack trail crosses. 
At daylight this morning the figtit open­
ed by thn volunteers firing* on and killing 
ao Indian going after horst'8. The charge 
was then made on the camp and hard 
^ghtiag occurred tor the next two hours, 
during which time large numbers of men 
Aod Indiaqg were kiih d. The soldiers 
ibeo ébargep on the l«*dges, but were re 
4Hiised ia the attempt. The Indians then 
fttlempted to cut ti.em off from a high 
wooded point, but ^the soldiers charged 
and driving the Indian admm 
tiom it, held it and at o#ce 
loftified. The Éi^hting contm—f hie## all 
day, and was sliil vkw# 
the courier left al It o%Mok. \^#;e 
lag was desperate on t^fth slë#^ W Mf » 
ffirceof the In^ms in fIghL 
Capf. Logan and Lieut. Bradley w#» kill-
ed. Gen Gibbon, CafiC Williams and ttSL 
CcN»llge, B itflish and Woodrutf weft 
wodil led. Gen. Gibbon only slightly. Brad ) 
l#y wa# the Arstman killed. The meeeen-
ger says tjhat atrt-r they tailed to capture 
the lodges the Indians moved their camp 
off in the direction of Rannack 
All their horses being, captured the 
engèr had to come to French gulch* tfeai 
ly 60 miles, on foot. Another oieslcfigi r 
was sent to Howard, who slioulfl havt« 
reached there to-day. The howl^mmr h«d 
had been left six miles behind and wan 
ordered to l>e moved up at daylight. Dur­
ing the fight they heard it dischar^t^i 
twice and then it was silent. A Imud ft 
Indians s<xm after appeared wirH 
a large band of horses and k 
believed alt the horses of the cumnmixt^ 
the gun, their supplies, reserve, uinmuio 
tion, etc. were captured. 
Gen. Gibbon thohght wtien the courier 
left there he still had 100 effective men and 
believed the Indians had nearly all with 
drawn from hid front. 
The messenger says he shinks 100 In­
dians killed ; that nearly half the conm-
mand, including c.tiiens, were killed or 
wounded. 
(^General Gibbon has ment for niedieines, 
surgeons, supplies, etc. Dr. Miiclieli will 
leave to-day with an esc(»rt. General Gib­
bon particularly asks for ambulance wag 
ons to come under escort, and every avail 
able wagon ^ill go forward trooa here and 
Butte. It is one oi the hardest Indian 
ffghts on record, md Gibbon's Command 
made a most gallant and desperate fight 
against overwhelming numbers 
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condemned as "incapable" for failing to arrive in time to assist. 
But in the cold light of history—recognizing the bravery of both 
sides and heeding the careful analyses of the numerous events by quali­
fied scholars—one question remains unanswered above all others about 
this turning point of the war. The question has been dealt with super­
ficially in several studies, but no general conclusions have been reached» 
The question: %y was Chief Joseph lulled into the false security of 
thinking that it was unnecessary to post scouts or guards around the 
Big Hole encampment? 
Scholars note that he was warned by a medicine man, Pile of Clouds, 
the eve of the battle that "death is on our trail J" He requested the 
chiefs to gather and told them; 
VJhile I slept, ny medicine told me to move on; that death 
was approaching us. Chiefs, I only tell you this for the good 
of our people. If you take ny advice you can avoid death, and 
that advice is to speed through this country. If we do not 
there will be tears in our eyeso"^*^ 
This points to the fact that the chiefs were confronted with the 
problem. The general explanation for the lack of. action is that General 
Howard was still a considerable distance north, Montanans had shown 
considerable friendliness, and there was fun in camp at the time» 
It could be dismissed at this, except for two statements made by 
Chief Joseph and Yellow Wolf in later accounts. Joseph's brief descrip­
tion of the Fort Fizzle affair and the Big Hold battle was as follows: 
Finding that we were outnumbered (by Howard at ClearwaterJ, 
we retreated to Bitter Root Valley. Here another bocfy of 
soldiers came upon us and demanded our surrender, ¥e refused. 
They said, "Tou cannot get by us." We answered, "We are going 
ty you without fighting if you will let us, but we are going by 
"^"^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 205. 
120 
you anyhow." We then made a treaty with these soldiers. We 
agreed not to mol est any one and th^ agreed that we might pass 
through the Bitter Root country in peace. We bought provisions 
and traded stock with white men there. We understood that 
there was to be no war. We intended to go peaceably to the 
buffalo countiy, and leave the question of returning to our 
country to be settled afterward. 
With this understanding we traveled on for four days, and, 
thinking that trouble was all over, we stopped and prepared 
tent-poles to take with us. We started again, and at the end 
of two days we saw three white men passing our camp. Thinking 
that peace had been made, we did not molest them. We could 
have killed, or taken them prisoners, but we did not suspect 
them of being spies, which they were. That night the soldiers 
surrounded our camp.-^ 
The important remark here was, "We then made a treaty with these 
soldiers." Joseph referred to the July 28 negotiations between Captain 
Rawn, Governor Potts and Chief Looking Glass when, it was reported by 
the Missoulian, the Nez Perce offered to surrender their ammunition to 
secure a peaceable passage. More likely, the negotiators reached a 
verbal agreement that there would be no shooting by either side. This 
probably was agreeable to the governor whose purpose was to defend life 
and property and let the military defeat the Indians, It justifies why 
he retired to the rear and made no attempt to stop the desertions of 
volunteers who, apparently, were equally satisfied there was no need 
for fighting. But before going on. Yellow Wolf gave this interpreta­
tion of the events of July 28 after explaining the policy endorsed ty 
all the chiefs that no fighting was to be done in Montana. 
These were instructions from the chiefs [he said]. Strong 
laws, nor were they broken. The chiefs thought the war ended. 
To be no fighting in Montana. But not so, the Montana people. 
They did not regard the peace made with us there at Lolo Pass. 
Because of that lie-treaty we were trapped. Trapped sleeping, 
unarmed.' 
^T-Brac^, op. cit., p. 6$. 
^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. 127. 
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Assuming that a verbal "treaty" had been made, it would explain 
why Rawn did not order his men to fire as the Indians passed above him. 
Or, if he realized that too risky, why he failed to move his main force 
from the breastwork until two hours after the passage. Or, more import­
ant, why he did not move on the Indians the following day when Missoula 
had additional volunteers from Deer Lodge and small communities nearby 
when the Nez Perce had camped only eight miles south of Lolo Canyon. 
As will be seen, such an alleged treaty (never publicly declared 
by Captain Rawn or Governor Potts) also would explain wl^y the latter 
sent a telegram to Helena ordering additional militia which he supposed 
might be heading toward Missoula to "halt." 
The correspondent from the Bozeman Times, in Deer Lodge at the 
time, sent this report to his paper; 
Today fjuly 3l] , upon the call of Gov. Potts for 300 men, 
nine of the sixty of the Cavaliy Company, which had organized 
yesterday, responded. liJhen they got ready to start for the 
west side, a telegram was received from Gov. Potts calling a 
he It, so nobody went. There was quite a stir on the streets 
to-day, and squads of men could be seen on main street dis­
cussing the Indian question. 
More will be said about this incident in regard to the newspaper 
war, but it should help support the hgrpothesis that no offensive action 
was planned by Governor Potts or Captain Rawn for two reasons. First, 
the Secretaiy of War and the President had advised against it and had 
refused to authorize the organization of militia» Second, because of 
the inferior force available to white negotiators on July 28, a verbal 
treaty was entered into with the Nez Perce to avoid an immediate con­
flict which would endanger Bitter Root dwellers. Once this agreement 
^%ozeman Times, August 9, 1877. 
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had been made, the two white negotiators chose to keep it secret because 
of the tremendous pressure on them by newspapers and the people to take 
action. Nevertheless, Captain Rawn and Governor Potts apparently had 
agreed also to honor their obligation to the Nez Perce without losing 
face. 
If this were the case, it is apparent also that Secretary Mills 
had not been informed about the "treaty." Whatever intrigue he was in­
volved in, if any, easily could have brought on a fight because he had 
ordered, without consulting the governor, a company of militia to the 
Big Hole area before any word had been received about Colonel Gibbon's 
plans. 
In the final analysis. Colonel Gibbon probably was responsible 
for breaking the treaty because, after writing his intentions to the 
governor on July 27, he proceeded to Missoula where, between August 2 
and I4, he undoubtedly had opportunity to discuss the entire matter with 
Captain Rawn. What Rawn may have said to him may never be known. But, 
there was nobody with authority in Montana to counter plans made by 
Gibbon. The governor had no voice in military affairs and Captain Rawn 
was outranked. Because of Colonel Gibbon's attitude toward the Nez 
Perce, it is doubtful that he would let a subordinate officer's agree­
ment with those Indians stop a campaign. But is also is possible that 
Captain Rawn said nothing, hoping Colonel Gibbon's command would not 
catch the Nez Perce, as Chauncey Barbour predicted in a letter to the 
governor on August 
Once Colonel Gibbon had obtained 3k volunteers from Missoula, and 
^Phillips, op. cit., p. lij.. 
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started down the Bitterroot Valley to fight, the additional volunteers 
he accumulated at such places as Fort Oifen were a trifling number be­
cause of the general friendly feeling toward the Indians. This was 
not, to be sure, universal. But the thought undoubtedly occurred to 
those settlers that it would be foolish to shed blood. 
The strong opinion against the Nez Perce—which alreacfy was 
beginning to shift, as noted—still was largely centered in Helena, 
Butte and Deer Lodge. The people of Deer Lodge locked themselves in 
the prison as the Nez Perce were moving southward approximately 70 miles 
to the west when, in reality, the Indians presented no threat whatever. 
But because of the plan executed by Colonel Gibbon and because of the 
pressure on the governor to help crush the Indians, he finally sent 
the militia toward Big Hole for offensive action. Of course, those 
men failed to arrive in time. 
The breaking of the alleged treaty had one other facet which 
was summed up by Joseph: 
The Nez Perces never make war on women and children; we 
could have killed a great many women and children while the 
war lasted, but we would feel ashamed to do so cowardly an 
act. ¥e never scalp our enemies, but when General Howard 
came up and joined Gibbon, their Indian scouts dug up our 
dead and scalped them. I have been told that General Howard 
did not order this great shame to be done.7^ 
The scalping incident was confirmed and was "the beginning of 
the most wanton, persistent and insatiable vandalism upon a battlefield 
known in western America," according to Beal."^^ As shown in Chief 
Joseph's statement, the breaking of the peace treaty a surprise 
"^^Brady, o£. cit., p. 66. 
"^^eal, 0£. cit., p. 127. 
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attack on women and children changed the character of the war. Yellow 
Wolf explained that in their rage, the Indians without reason killed a 
prominent Bitterroot citizen who had been taken prisoner after the 
soldiers had been driven to the knoll 
After the Big Hole battle, the Nez Perce pillaged ranches and 
killed several whites. No longer were the Indians disposed to be friendly, 
for th^ had been hurt seriously. Their trail southward was spattered 
with the blood of the wounded. Yet, they were not beaten. The Nez Perce 
were to run, maneuver and fight for 55 more days and another 1,000 miles 
before the military could defeat them. 
^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. lUO, 
CmPTER VI 
THE WAR: PHASE THREE 
MLlderness Escapade 
Perhaps Colonel Gibbon's one major failure in the Big Hole fight 
was in not capturing or scattering the Nez Perce herd of horses when 
he had the opportunity on the morning of August 9, because the fleeing 
Indians were to give General Howard a "merry chase." Howard began the 
pursuit on August 13, 1877, accompanied by ^0 of Gibbon's men. On 
arrival at Bannack, Montana, the next day, the general learned that 
the Nez Perce had murdered four settlers during a raid to secure all 
available horses so that Howard's command would not have fresh mounts. 
p ̂  fit ^ 
Meanwhile, the Deer Lodge volunteers, led by Major^lark, arrived.^ 
The Nez Perce then followed a circuitous route over the Contin­
ental Divide via Bannack Pass. This maneuver was intended to trick 
Howard into thinking the Indians would head into Idaho, but the general 
perceived this, headed straight south for Yellowstone Park, and avoided 
being slowed by mountainous travel. As a matter of fact, the Nez Perce 
disagreed about their intended route. Joseph suggested continuing west 
into the remote Salmon River country of Idaho which, if done, would 
have made a military pursuit as difficult as the one over Lolo Pass. 
Chief Looking Glass apparently persuaded the chiefs to head eastward 
2 
through Yellowstone Park. 
^Beal, op. cit., pp. lh^-lk6. 
Howard, op. cit., p. 22^. 
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Herald Extra. 
n&jLKXA, AVOVHT Iftth. £ 
THE HOSTILES. 
The Burning Homes ofBeave-
head Settlers. 
Several Families Reported 
Massacred. 
PLEASANT VALLEY, August 13—7:30 p. ni. 
—Tbe driver and a passenger just in on, the 
coach from tbe Tworlb report that a messenger 
came in from Horse IVarie when they left 
Loveil's Station this morning, and reported" 
that Pierce bros.' rr. ich vyas burned and tha 
firing was heard iu tbe vicinity It îa twenty 
miles to Lovell's. 
Tbe Deer Lodge coach reports soiue fami­
lies massacred. 
— M ###1 I im — 
Herald Extra. 
J.; ' J • • , 
«kd9|»jmlt. avovst : 
I  '  ,  - l u — I  
The Savages' %ork on Horse 
Prairie. 
Péople Killeàfand Stock 
Stoleni 
I PLKASANT VALLKt, August 14.—POlliOgef I 
fiends the following^ Lovells : 
Scouts from Horse Prairie report « cquaw 
camp of Indians with some warriors and 
stock were at Horse Prairie diggings ; on 13th 
run off 37 head of horses from Pierces corral, 
killing James Smith, Montague, and one man 
whose name is not known. Some five men 
are also missing, and are supposed to be kill-
ed. They also killed 5 Chinamen. The In- ' j 
dians were supposed to pass out through S 
Bloody Dick's gulch, on to Medicine LWge. ;4 
w i#mi H nw 
127 
It was at this time that the impact of news about the Big Hole 
fight and its consequences for both the Indians and whites was being 
felt in Montana and elsewhere. General Sheridan wrote a letter to 
Washington on August 13, praising Colonel Gibbon and stating that he 
"inflicted a severe if not a disastrous punishment on the hostile Nez 
Perces."^ On August 1$, the news of the Nez Perce murders at Bannack 
was published in the Helena Daily Herald, and stated that the people 
in Beaverhead were under arms.^ When the Missoulian learned of this, 
the editor related what had happened at Bannack with what might have 
happened had there been a fight at Fort Fizzle. He wrote that the 
. . . consequences of an attack upon the Indians while th^ 
were on Lo Lo can be readily seen now after the battle of Big 
Hole. Bitter Root valley would have been utterly stamped out. 
. . . Even if the punishment had been greater on them than . 
it was on Big Hole, the result could not have been avoided.5 
The New North-Mest printed an article by S. F. Dunlap, a citizen 
volunteer, stating; "Wliy were they not vigorously pursued by General 
Howard? ... We [the volunteers^ are suffering in the loss of time, 
our hay crop is going to destruction. ... We are spending money for 
scouts, fortifications, etc., and the rest of the country looks and 
mocks at our calamity. 
The Helena Weekly Independent noted further that "after laying 
over a day and two nights at Gibbon's battlefield, Howard only made 72 
. ̂ Letter from Col, John Gibbon to Gen. E. D. Townsend, August 13, 
1877 (ffi-storical Society of Montana, Microfilm 88). 
^Helena Daily Herald, August 1^, 1877. 
^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877. 
^ew North-West, August 17, 1877. 
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miles in the next three days. 
Nevertheless, General Howard had correctly assessed the route of 
the Nez Perce who had moved toward Yellowstone Park, and he intercepted 
them on the evening of August l8 on a broad, rock-strewn plain called 
Camas Meadows, approximately l8 miles east of Beaver Canyon and IiO miles 
west of Yellowstone Park along the Montana-Idaho border. The general 
was well aware of the newspaper criticism that was swelling against him, 
and with a fighting force of probably more than ^00 men (approximately 
350 of his regulars, $0 of Gibbon's command, three or four companies of 
militia, and Indian scouts), it seemed that his long-sought victory was 
at hand. He knew the location of the Nez Perce camp fewer than 20 miles 
ahead on the prairie, and Nez Perce scouts had informed Chief Joseph of 
the predicament now facing his weary people. But, as Bancroft put it, 
"his people seemed made all of endurance.Joseph executed one of the 
most skillful and daring maneuvers in the annals of Indian warfare. 
General Howard split his force, sending Lt. George Bacon and UO 
cavalrymen ahead to block the passes into Yellowstone Park, On the 
evening of August 19, the general camped the major bocfy on Camas Meadows 
in strict military fashion with guards posted and horses and other stock 
tethered nearby. Two or three Nez Perce scouts wandered right to the 
edge of camp at twilight. They were spotted by guards, but nothing was 
done to chase them off because, strange as it may appear, there was 
nothing unusual about this happening,^ Pursuing scouts on horseback 
^Helena Weekly Independent, August 23, 1877• 
^The Works of Hubert H. Bancroft, Vol. XXXI (San Francisco: The 
Histoiy Company Publishers, T890), p. 512. 
^Chalmers, op, cit., p, 1^3. 
FIGURE 9 
Herald Extra, 
Fight of Howafé's Ad­
vance With the Hostiles. 
Lieat. Norwood's (kllant At­
tack. 
The Indians Capture 110 Pao^ 
Animais. 
Lieut. Benson, 7th Infantry, 
Wounded. 
Pnnmt df%IflJiaâs Oernm 
tini##^i%. ̂ • 
[«peoial to>nb jrn^am).] 
HfmABO*8BxFBDlTIOH^AMPOALLAWAT, > 
041CA» jlsADowdi Idiho, August 3D. f 
The bostiles fred into our camp at dawn« 
#^mpedmg tk« pAOk mules and somé horses, 
companies of cavaky followed (hem 
miles, and recovered part of the herd, 
which Wooght oa a severe engagement. Re-
enforcements moved out and the Indians m-
treated. 
Oftt>t, Norwood's company gallantly hdd 
on advanced part, till relieved. One officer 
Ll^t. Benson,Seventh Infantry was wounded^ 
not sevei-ely. One soldier killed and seven 
wounded and several hostiles reported killed. 
Col. Miller with two hundred and thirty 
Infantry overtakes us to-night. Pnrsoit con-
iinttcs to morrow. Lost one hundred and ten 
mules and several scouts' horses. 
GURNBY. 
Herald Extra. 
MEMXA, THIJKSDAY, AUGUST 23,18^7 
NEZ PERCE SQUAW CAMP 
AT HENRY'S LAKE. 
Howard Expects to Strike the 
HostileS:To-Day. 
Return ot some of the Virginia 
Volunteers. 
virginia [City, August 23.—Two scouts 
from Fort Ellis got in here at 6 o'clock this 
morning. /;,They report the squaw camp at 
Henry's Lake, but were breaking camp and 
moving toward the Geyser Basin, when they 
left yesterday.morning. 
Lieut. Leary,y Howard's commissary, \% 
here. He says when he left the front the In­
dians'were fortifyinc^ at a place called the 
Lava Beds, and thinks thit Gen.; Howard 
struck them yesterday. Some of [the men 
that went out from here got in this^moming. 
.Several of them went on with Howard. 
»» — 
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in darkness would be foolharcfy if other Indians were in the vicinity. 
As darkness approached^ four columns of l50 mounted men could 
be seen heading for the camp. Thinking it was Bacon's detachment 
returning, the sentry showed no alarm. 
Meanwhile, the Nez Perce scouts crept into the camp and, with 
great care, began cutting the hobbles and tethers on militaiy livestock. 
But before they had an opportunity to get past the first group of ani­
mals, the sentry issued his challenge, received no response, and fired. 
War whoops followed, and 1$0 Nez Perce rushed the camp."^*^ 
In the confusion—soldiers trying to get their pants, boots and 
rifles arranged in the dark as bullets whizzed—the animals that had 
been loosened were driven off by the Indians» Joseph's plan in the 
attack was to leave Howard without mounts. But as stated later ty 
Suhm-Keen (Sam Tilden), the Nez Perce were dismayed about what th^ 
had captured. "I helped to guard those animals—those mules which 
th^ thought were horses in the dark," he said.^^ Only one soldier 
12 
was killed in the raid'—the bugler who blew "Boots and Saddles»" 
General Howard knew that the Nez Perce would have difficulty 
driving the mules with any great speed, so the following morning he 
sent out a detachment of cavalry, led by Maj. George Sanford, to pursue 
the raiders. An advance guard managed to recover a few straggling 
animals. Joseph had prepared for such an eventuality as a cavalry 
^"^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 228, 
^^Rowena L, and Gordon D, A]corn, "Old Nez Perce Recalls Tragic 
Retreat of 1877," Montana,Magazine of Western History (Winter, 1963), 
p. 69. 
^^Chalmers, o£. cit., p, 1^5. 
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attack, however, by deploying men ahead of the nrnle herd in a "U" shape. 
Sanford's command rode into the trap with three companies. As the 
Indians opened fire, his command was thrown into confusion and retreated. 
Seven soldiers were wounded or killed; two Indians were nicked by bul-
lets.^^ 
The significance of the Camas Meadow raid was not so much the 
loss of life and livestock—which, incidentally, included a number of 
militaiy horses--but that General Howard lost his greatest opportunity 
to defeat the Nez Perce when they had been seriously weakened by the 
Big Hole fight and he had been strengthened by additional men. 
The general did not take to the pursuit again until August 27, 
when General Sherman, who was in Montana, ordered him ahead.Joseph 
alreac^ had gained three days travel. Howard, in traversing Yellowstone 
Park, was subjected once again to the perils of mountainous travel. In 
places, it was necessary to lower wagons down 200-foot cliffs with 
15 ropes. 
Editorial reaction in Montana was not kindly toward the general 
and, as will be seen in the next chapter, strong suggestions were made 
to have him replaced as commander. One of the more temperate editorials 
appeared in the Missoulian: 
The press of Idaho have been fierce in their denunciation of 
Howard's military career in that region; but the papers of this 
Territory have been, with perhaps one exception Fwew North-Westj , 
disposed to treat him with fairness. His campaigning in this 
Territory does not compare favorably with that of Gen. Gibbon. 
^3Beal, o£. cit., pp. 159-160. 
^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 233« 
^^Ibid. 
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. . . Howard's career during the rebellion does not inspire 
the belief that he is a feather-bed warrior, but he certainly 
has not shown a large amount of push here. He can put down 
adverse criticism better with his sabre than he can with his 
pen.^ 
On receiving orders on August 27 to move ahead. General Howard 
exchanged a series of four dispatches with General Sherman, who was 
returning from Yellowstone Park after a pleasure trip. Howard wrote 
that his "command is so much worn by over-fatigue and jaded animals 
that I cannot push it much further. . , , I think I may stop near 
where I am, and in a few days work Ky way back to Fort Boise slowly 
and distribute ny troops before snow falls in the mountains." Sherman 
replied that Howard's men should pursue the Nez Perce to the death and 
suggested that Howard turn his command over to "some young, energetic 
officer. 
So far as is known, this was the only instance in which any such 
suggestion was made to Howard by a high-ranking military officer. The 
decision that Howard be relieved was, of course, left entirely to him. 
Howard replied to Sherman; 
You misunderstood me. I never flag. It was the command, 
including the most energetic young officers, that were worn 
out and weary by a most extraordinary march. You need not 
fear for the campaign. Neither you nor General McDowell can 
doubt irgr pluck and energy.^" 
General Sherman sent back a somewhat apologetic note, tempered, 
however, the reasoning that "men of less age and rank are best for 
Indian warfare. They have more to make." 
^^eekly Missoulian, August 2h, 1877. 
^"^Beal, op. cit., p. l67. 
^®Ibid. 
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The Nez Perce, meanwhile, successfully penetrated the blockade 
of the Park set up Bacon's cavalry without incident and intercepted 
two civilian expeditionso 
The first party, consisting of 10 men and women who were led by 
George Cowan, were surprised at their camp near the Firehole River on 
the morning of August 2k- Frank Carpenter, who later gave an extensive 
newspaper report of what happened, walked forward and shook hands with 
Yellow Wolf who was in charge of the five Nez Perce intruders. Yellow 
Wolf stated later that this gesture saved the tourists from an immediate 
massacre. Carpenter invited the warriors to a breakfast of pancakes 
and secured permission from Yellow Wolf to see Chief Joseph. But when 
Carpenter agreed to the Indian demand of giving them flour, bacon and 
sugar, George Cowan emerged from his tent and objected strongly. He 
made further protests about the manner in which the Nez Perce stared 
19 
at his wife and sisters. 
Meanwhile, some I4O or more warriors passed the camp after view­
ing geysers, and began teasing the tourists who loaded their wagons and 
headed hastily for the camp of Chief Looking Glass who, they hoped, 
would allow them to leave the Park unmolested. Along the trail, however, 
groups of young braves continued to harass the tourists in a spirit of 
cruel fun and the Cowan party, badly frightened, tried to escape. Bullets 
20 
dropped Cowan and Albert Oldham from their saddles. 
Oldham escaped into the bushes, wounded through the jaw. Mrs. 
Cowan rushed to her husband who lay wounded in the thigh. She pleaded 
^9chalmers, op. cit., pp. 169-170. 
^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., pp. 237-238. 
I 3 h  
with the braves that surrounded her prostrate husband, but one stepped 
forward with a revolver and discharged it into his forehead. The 
Helena Daily Herald paid the following tribute to Mrs» Cowan which, 
according to Carpenter later, was well deserved: 
A WOMAN'S COURAGE 
It is only at rare intervals that womanly courage approaches 
in dramatic effect the brave act of Mrs. George F„ Cowan, who 
surprised by painted savages in Wonderland the other day, tried 
to save the life of her husband by offering her own body as a 
shield to his. He was shot with her arras entwined about him, 
and expired in an embrace which she intended should sacrifice 
herself and spare him. As an example of lofty heroism and self-
sacrifice, this act of Mrs. Cowan will hereafter be mentioned 
among the first. It deserves a prominent page in frontier 
history. ̂  
Miraculously, however, George Cowan did not die. This was not 
op 
reported in Helena until September 5. On August 27, the initial 
report by the Helena Daily Herald indicated that nine of the tourists 
23 
in the Park at the time had been murdered. Actually, two were wounded 
in the Cowan scuffle and two were killed later in the other expedition 
led by A. J. Weikert of Helena. This latter group easily could have 
escaped without harm, but they waited until Nez Perce braves discovered 
their camp and shooting erupted as they fled.^^ 
This brutal savagery cannot be dismissed by any means, but it 
is well to understand at this point that the Nez Perce were in full 
rebellion as they had never been before. The Avant Courier commented: 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 29, 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Independent, September 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 27, 1877. 




Telegram from Maj. Benham 
to Gen. Gibbon. 
jSeven Men Killed and one Man 
and two Women Prisoners, 
FOKT ELLIS, August 27. 
To Oen. Gibbon; 
Schofield reports that he was OD the top 
of Mount Wasliburu yesterday aiui the Tn 
«Mans appeared in the Geyser basin on The 
24th and struck the Helena and Radcrs 
bur^ parties,killing seven men and taking 
two women anii one man prisouers. Just 
be lejt Mt. Washburn yesterday 
tfie Indians attacked another 
party killing nine; one escaped. The In 
dians released Mrs ( owan, her sistJ-r and 
biother who reached SchotiiolH.s eanip 
yesterday. The main camp {crossed the 
Yellowstone on the 25th. Warriors went 
back to fight Howard. W hite Bird and 
Looking <Tla8s remained with tlie camp 
and Joseph went with the warriors. They 
say the are going to Wind river, 
and Brown to get supplies. Schotield 
thinks they are ^oîng towards the Lower 
Yellowstone by Clark's Fork. They cross­
ed the river between Washbnrn and the 
lake; Schofield does not sav iust wrtoro^ 
Will send A courir: Sntrgis 
nrxiiA M. 
Herald Extra. 
HEMBIA, MOXI>AY,'AI GUST 37. 
MASSACRES IN THE NA­
TIONAL PARK. 
/The Number of Killed, 
Mrs. Cowan, Sister and 
Brother Taken 
Prisoners 
They are Afterwards 
Released. 
FT. ELLIS, August 27. 1877. 
ïo^General John Gibbon : 
fiieutenant Schofield reports that he was on 
top of Mount Washbtirné yesterday. Indians 
appeared in the Geyser Basin on the 24th 
inst They struck the* Helen a and Radere-
bùrg party, killing seven men and taking two 
women and one man*prisoners. Just ai he 
lèft lîtoiftit Wàshburne yesterday the Indians 
attacked andtÏEer party, killing nine of them. 
One éwaped. 
The Indians released.Mrs. Cowan, her sis­
ter and brother, who reached! Schofield's 
camp yesterday. The main camp crossed the 
Yellowstone on the 25th. The warriors went 
back to fight Howard. White Bird and 
Looking Glass remained, with the camp. 
Joseph went with the warriors. 
They say they are going to Wind river and 
Camp Brown to get supplies. Schofield 
thinks they are goln to the Lower Yellowston 
fia Clark,8 Fork. They crossed the river be­
tween Mt. Washbern and the Lakes. 
Bchofidd does not say just where. Will 
send courier to Sturglss. ^ 
Signed IteNHAM, 
Capt Yth inft* 
FiarjRE 11 
t^'Juàâ Extra. 
«iEi.iorv a % : r DAI AtiiVr r sn. 
THE HELEN A PARTY SUR-
V IVORS. 
Most of them Escape and Ar-r 
rive at the Springs; 
Kanok Foller the Only 
-Ones Still Out. 
Geo. OowaD ïîiilsd in His 
Wile's Arms-
R*;ZKM A tSl 2Ç. 
[•>i frt U.i. TO l iZJ'. 1WKA1D.J 
Pâstçy Just anived. All of the Helexia 
party Lad arrived at Mammoth 3gi-in%$, Î0 ii. 
m., yesterday, exccpt Keiitk and Folicr who 
are Ktijl miasiDg. A. J. Weikari is wounutd 
in the siiuuldcr. sil,vjî/iîy/.tind J. Stuart i:) sido 
andaukks bui not seriously. 
The ludians surrounded laeir camp, six 
mxle? iiLovo Muil Yolcauo. Tiiey took ihcm 
rjxihi-\y by surpri«e. Did not folic iv the mcu 
ai^-er they fled. Kenck was lc.3t ^ccu running 
cluBC to the timber. 
Mrg. Co\V5in's, ]rûâb:;îtù was oiiul irt iier 
Rfpifl He is the only oue or the Kadcrcourg 
party known to Lcix; kiile ? I'he 
Tii'jy have esc11,: arc i i'2)Oi(ed 
Herald Extra. 
RKf ENA, THUKSnAir, ACCIUMT SO. 
The Gyser Party Coming In­
to Virginia City. 
viuginia City, August îiO. 
To \V. K. Eobcrh : 
Your SOD aud August Foller arrived here 
•well. They kuow nothing of the fate of the 
the others. Joe. starts for home on to-mor­
row's coach. W. II. KODGERS. 
figur:̂  12 
Herald Extra. 
«i;Xi>Air, REPTKMBER 
THE HOSTILES' ATTACK 
AT MAMMOTH HOT 
SPRINGS. 
Richard Dietrich Killed, 
Slaughtering Cattle and 
Burning Bridges. 
BOI:EMAN, September 2. 
[bPECIAL DISrATCllES TO THE HERALD.] 
Prof. Dietrich w;;.s killed at llie Mammoth 
Spriugs. Donne's advance guard foiuiil the 
body still warui. 
. ïbe Ktz Perces are still at East Fork kill-
iiig tjeatty's cattle. They hbive burned Baro-




He to with General Howard's 
Command. 
Whereabouts of Howard. 
[8PBCIAL TO THE UfDB]>SMDBNT ] 
BOKKMAN, September 5. 
Two mcomte in $rnm floward's com 
MAN# tbat COWBR !B witli Howard and 
$e doing well a«d will recover. 
He is shot through the thigh and in the 
%ide and wounded ID the bead. 
Howard was fourteen mHes thin side ot 
Yellowstone lake. This news is reliable. 
LAITGHORNË. 
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News of a startling and heart-rending character reached 
us on Monday. Sixteen inoffensive pleasure-seekers were 
reported murdered in the National Park hy hostile Indians. 
. . . Who is the cause of all this suffering? On whom 
does the responsibility rest? The cause of all our present 
troubles with the Nez Perces can be traced back directly to 
the General Government 
Such a statement at a time when "the Territory is again mourn­
ing for her dead" was remarkable for its insight. While Nez Perce 
opinion of the whites had soared to hatred, white opinion of the Nez 
Perce—even in such times as the Park killings—was beginning to be 
one of understanding. Only one Montana paper clung to the notion 
that the Nez Perce were savage killers—that was the Helena Daily 
Herald edited by R. E. Fisk. But even his opinion changed somewhat, 
as will be seen, when the full account of the Cowan party's release 
by the Nez Perce was related by Frank Carpenter; 
lihite Bird lit a pipe, took a few puffs and passed it 
around the circle. Those who smoked it were in favor of 
letting us go. I watched them—oh, how eagerly. Never in 
iqy life did I experience such delight in seeing a person 
smokeI Twice the pipe passed around the circle. Four of 
the chiefs smoked the pipe, and three refused! 
The council dispersed. White Bird informed me that 
nyself and sisters should go home.2° 
Carpenter's account is the only known first-hand report of a 
Nez Perce council in action during the war. Some scholars have con­
tended that the chiefs did not reach important decisions by majority 
rule. In this instance they apparently did and, once the decision was 
reached, it was respected by their people. 
One of the humorous aspects about newspaper coverage of the 
Yellowstone murders—estimated at first between nine and l6 persons— 
^^Avant Courier, August 30, I877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, September 8, 1877. 
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happened when Ben Stone, a cook for Weikert's party, returned to Virginia 
City and read his obituary written a local friend, T. H. Ifhite. 
According to the death notice. Stone was about to be scalped the last 
27 
time anybocfy saw him. 
As the Nez Perce moved eastward in the Park, Col. Samuel Sturgis, 
heading six companies of 360 troops, arrived from Clark Fork for the 
purpose of establishing a blockade of all passes into Montana Territory. 
Scouts informed Chief Joseph of the predicament: to the east was Sturgis, 
to the west, Howard, and to the north, the towering and impassable 
Absaroka Range. The southern border also was blocked by unfriendly 
Bannack Indians who, as noted, had been helping Howard as scouts. 
The New North-West, having learned of Sturgis' movements, con­
fidently predicted that the Nez Perce were being trapped and would be 
brought to defeat; 
In view of the bad effect their success and escape would have 
on other Indians, and in view of the evil they would probably 
hereafter do Montana, this concentration of forces, and the 
determination to destroy them, is in the highest degree grati­
fying. ¥e are largely indebted for it to the presence of 
General Sherman in Montana, who has had the lion in him roused 
ty the defiant progress of the Nez Perces and by personal 
attention to the movement of troops has raised up an arity on 
the four sides of Joseph just when it seemed most probable 
that he was about to escape, scot free, except for the blow 
Gibbon struck him, and laden with booty, into the great open 
country of the hostiles. We wait now hopefully for news that 
the Nez Perces have been struck hard and fatally. They are 
too brave and dangerous a foe to escape, for their escape 
unscathed means still darker days for the border. 
The Nez Perce executed three plans designed to confuse the soldiers. 
"^Helena Daily Herald (undated clipping). 
OP 
Beal, ££. cit., pp. I87-I88. 
^^New North-West, August 31» 1877. 
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First, military scouts traveling between Howard's and Sturgis' lines 
were hunted and killed. This, of course, hampered militaiy intelligence 
and created considerable fear for anyone who approached the general 
vicinity occupied by the Indians. Secondly, the Nez Perce ran their 
ponies in numerous directions so that no well-defined trail could be 
followed as had been the case formerly. The trail they did take was 
superbly camouflaged. Thirdly, Joseph created a feint to the south 
which drew Sturgis' command away from the northern passes. So well 
was this executed that the exact route out of Yellowstone Park taken 
by the Nez Perce remains uncertain. General Howard wrote that the 
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entire performance was an example of consummate generalship. 
The Nez Perce left the Absarokas on September 9 and turned 
northward in the general direction of Billings, Montana. This was the 
country inhabited by the Crow nation, the original destination suggested 
by Looking Glass. Not only did the Nez Perce find the Crows unwilling 
to help them, but these former allies joined Sturgis in the battle that 
was to follow. Because of the pressure put on the Nez Perce "bj 
Sturgis' command—enlarged by reinforcements to more than I4OO cavalry­
men, plus two cannons—the Nez Perce realized they had but one hope 
left. That was to head for Canada as the Sioux had done to escape 
fighting. This change of policy about the destination is believed to 
have ended the role of leadership played by Chief Looking Glass in 
tribal councils, mentioned earlier. He had been instrumental in plan­
ning and negotiating the "peace treaty" with Montanans at Fort Fizzle 
^%oward, o£. cit., p. 225. 
^^Bozeman Times, September 29, 1877. 
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which terminated with the Big Hole attack. He had persuaded his people 
to travel to Crow country where, on arrival, they found themselves 
unwelcorned. 
Moreover, it may be speculated that if the Nez Perce had followed 
Joseph's suggestion of heading westward into the remote and rugged Salmon 
River countiy of Idaho, as noted earlier, instead of traversing Yellow­
stone Park, it is possible that the war would have ended by default. 
General Howard at no time tried to engage the Indians in mountainous 
terrain, for he was at a disadvantage with heavy equipment. One of the 
frequent reasons cited for Howard's slowness throughout the campaign 
was that for every mount he had for his men, the Nez Perce had four or 
five. In order to pursue the Nez Perce into the wilderness of Idaho— 
still the largest in the U. S., excluding Alaska—he would have needed 
substantial supplies and reinforcements which were not readily available 
in western Montana. 
The Nez Perce had demonstrated their ability to live off the land 
during the difficult passage of the Bitterroot Range. Had they remained 
in the wilderness until winter, then migrated to their homelands to the 
north, it is possible that the war would not have been renewed for 
several reasons. First, during the nineteenth century winter campaigns 
were almost out of the question, especially in country as far removed 
as Idaho Territory. Secondly, as alreac^ noted, the real causes of the 
outbreak in June, 1877, were being understood finally, and editorial 
opinion was shifting in favor of the Indians and against the government. 
Third, the Nez Perce not only had showed friendship toward the whites, 
but th^ had gained considerable respect for their conduct as diplomats, 
strategists and fighters, as evidenced in editorials. No doubt negotiation 
1L2 
would have been reopened in the spring of I878 and, in the light of what 
had happened the previous year, a more equitable solution reached for 
both sides. 
Not until September, 1877, did Joseph emerge as "chief," a title 
which meant that he was no longer just the head militaiy general, but 
32 
was the chief executive as well. His people and horses were exhausted. 
General Howard had reported passing along the route many fresh graves 
of persons who died of wounds from the Big Hole fight. A Montana volun­
teer, J. ¥. Redington, who later became Assistant Adjutant General of 
Oregon, reported that the saddest sight he encountered along the trail 
was meeting up with an aged Indian, abandoned to die as was Indian 
custom in such cases, because the old warrior could not endure the pace 
set by his fleeing children. 
He volunteered a wan smile at the sight of a human being 
^wrote Redington] and made a feeble motion with one arm, 
pointing to his forehead. ... I could understand that he 
was inviting me to shoot him . . . and end his misery. Instead 
of accommodating him, I fed him half of the piece of bread I 
had found, which he ate ravenously. He seemed quite disap­
pointed when I made a motion of flapping Ky wings to indicate 
that I must skiddo and be on ray way.33 
Both Indians and whites suffered extensively, and it was because 
of the exhausted and weakened condition of his people that Joseph sought 
to avoid a fight with Sturgis who, having fresh mounts, made a deter­
mined pursuit, while General Howard followed more slowly. 
Near Garçron Creek, a tributary of Yellowstone River which is 
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 19ii. Joseph's role was not one of absolute 
leadership, strictly speaking. As alreacfy noted, important policy 
decisions were reached by voting in council. But it is generally agreed 
that he was the architect of the plans that were adopted. 
^^Glasgow [kontanj Courier, March 27, 1933* 
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approximately 30 miles west of Billings, the Nez Perce raided a road-
house and stole a stagecoach which not only added some sorely needed 
amusement, but helped in hauling equipment over the rolling prairie 
they were traversing. 
When the Nez Perce entered the canyon, flanked on both sides "by 
cliffs, Sturgis' command arrived after having made a forced march of 
60 miles in one dayWhat Sturgis realized that day, September 10, 
was that he had been in pursuit of a detachment of warriors, not the 
main column of Nez Perce, for two weeks. This deception had allowed 
Joseph to  t ravel  near ly  100 mi les wi thout  detect ion.Accord ing to  
an account ty Theodore Goldin, a soldier, the colonel was as exhausted 
as his men and, on the morning of September 10, he decided to quit the 
chase. But as they were resting in camp, a scout came rushing back 
yelling, "Indians! Indians! 
Sturgis attempted to follow the Indians up the defile of Canyon 
Greek and ran into a crossfire from the bluffs. Joseph had detached a 
rear guard under the command of Looking Glass to cover the retreat of 
the main column. For reasons difficult to understand, Sturgis presumed 
he was in a general engagement with the entirety of Joseph's warriors. 
He ordered his iiOO men to dismount—a tactical blunder described later 
by several soldiers—and proceed on foot to rout the sharpshooters. 
As the fighting progressed, Maj. Lewis Merrill requested permission to 
^^Josephy, 0£. c i t . ,  p .  336. 
Brady, 0£, c i t . ,  p .  2lS<. 
^^Howard and McGrath, 0£. c i t . ,  pp.  25^2-257.  
^^Brady, loc. cit. 
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charge headlong through the canyon to catch the main body of Indians, 
but Sturgis, viewing the entire episode from a half mile away, refused 
g O 
the request. 
As sunset neared, "only one warrior, Teeto Hoonod, was doing the 
fighting," according to General Howard. "His horse was hidden, he was 
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behind the rocks holding a line of dismounted soldiers back." 
Colonel Sturgis made no immediate attempt the next day to catch 
the Nez Perce, but his men rounded up some i^OO horses that had been 
abandoned by Joseph in the escape. The report published in the Helena 
Weekly Independent about the battle was as follows: 
Gen. Sturgis had a hard fight with the Nez Perces on the 
13th. There were a good many killed and wounded and several 
hundred head of horses captured. 
His own loss was considerable. 
The Crows brought into the Agency one hundred and fifty Nez 
Perces on the 12th. Several hundred started out at once to 
assist Sturgis. 
This account came from a Captain Benham in Bozeman. It was so 
completely incorrect as to warrant analysis. First, the dates were 
wrong; the fight occurred on September 10. Secondly, the Crows did 
make an attack on the Nez Perce rear guard on September ll;, killing 
three Nez Perce, but there is no evidence to support the claim that 
l50 of the latter ever surrendered. In fact, the Crows were quickly 
chased off and, according to the Benton Record, one of their warriors 
who had been captured was physically beaten, then r eleased.Third, 
^^Beal, o£. cit., pp. 195-196. 
^^Howard, 0£. cit., p. 261i. 
^%elena Weekly Independent, September l6, 1877. 
^^Benton Record, September 21, 1877. 
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FIGHT BETWEEN STUEGIS 
AND THE HOSTILES. 
Many Indians Killed. 
» FSPKOIAL TO THE HERALD.] 
Bo2HiMAN,~Septeint)er Iflf. 
Courier just arrived from the Crow Agency 
with official dispatches^from Gen. Sturgis, 
He says, in substauce : . The Nez Perces 
tiinked him and proceeded down Clark's j 
Fork. lie followed them two days and came j 
upon them on the Yellowstone, about seven 
miles below the mouth of Clark's Fork, and 
fought them all night. 
He reports that he captured several hun­
dred horses and killed a great many Indians ; 
he lost some soldiers. The Crows fought and 
captured 150 horses. The Nez Pcr(^ 
burned AAAdows niill a^d several ranches 
among others, Stones and Rouses. 
P. K. 
Independent Extra 
Sturgis Attacks them and has 
a Hard Fight. 
The Indians in Full Flight and 
the Crows after them. 
[SIM'X'IAL TOTUK INDEPKNDKNT. J 
BOZEMAN, September 15. 
The Nez Perces flanked Sturgis and 
went down Clarke's Fork, burnt three 
houses at Rouse's Point and the McAdow 
saw mill. 
Sturgis pursued them for two days,over­
took them and had a hard fight, lasting 
nearly all day, in which he killed 
and wounded a good many Indians 
and capturin» several hundred head of 
horses. Don't know the extent of Sturgis' 
loss nor the extent of the damage done by 
the fleeing Nt z Perces. They abandon a 
great many he *d ot horses on the line of 
their flight. The Crows are harrassing 
them and stealii g a gond many ot their 
horses. LANG HORNE. 
FURTHER PARTICULARS. 
BOZËMAN, September 15, 1877. 
No Governor B. F. Potts— 
Gen. Sturgis had a bard fight with the 
Nez Perces on the 18th. There were a 
good many killed aud wounded and 
captured sevenl hundred head of hordes. 
His own loss was considerable. 
The Crows brought into the Agency 
one hundred and fifty Nez Peye«8 horse# 
wn the 12th. Several hundred started oui 





lii:£.RNA. MONUA a 17. 
ANOTHER FIGHT WITH 
THE HOSTILES. 
A Groat Many L.idians Killed 
5,nd all of Their Pack 
Animals Captured, 
The River Grows Driving the 
Nez Perces Back en to 
Sturgis' Command. 
I i: !'i. ; 
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iutclUiTcr.cv \ baÛ o o.'--
rurreù Uiu inoinini '-  r ,r  ^ !»h. ' .- i  Canyon 
cree'v, licî .vrcn (jro. i ?.: id t l :c Ne/.  
Perces. baJ L /m rciuforccvl \ .y î îow-
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her of Iiulianti  were kiil '  vi 'ml -j . '  many 
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stomachs. On V.w \ l lL'  nnpiv -, - ' .ere re. '!ciieù. 
. 'HîtU he is oii-i  w ir lo')ti i i i :  renin. Ir  
the two f(; 'e C I 'o•**.. '  . ; i î ' l  :>>i(]i«rs have 
capturcd 1.000 horye-.  T-jrce îin.n.lred Crows 
f r o m  t h e  a g e i i -  y  w e r e  U) j ' j i n  G e n .  8 l n r g i s  on 
the eveiiinii]^ of the 14th, v/licn he would 
again pursue the Ncz Perçus. HowTrd's in­
fantry is up V, i thiu twenty-five niilei- '  of 
>Sturliis.  P.  K 
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Independent Extra 
THÏ INDU» WAR. 
Another Battle With the Nez i 
Perces. ! 
A Large Number of Indians 
Killed and Many Horses ' 
Captured. 
[SPECrAI. TO THE INDEPENDENT.] 
BOZEMAN, September 17. 
Sturgis, assisted by Howard's cavalry 
under Sanford, had a fight on Canyon 
creek on the morning of the 14th. A 
number of Indians were kiHed and many 
corses taken. 
The Crows got away with all the Nez 
Perces pack animals. They report that 
the nver Crows from the Muscleshell have 
headed off the Nez Perces and are driving 
them toward Gen. Sturgis. 
In the two fights the Crows and soldier# 
tiave captured nearly one thousand horses. 
The Crows have about four hundred Ne» 
Perce horses at the Agency. | 
Over three hundred Crows were to ; 
join Gen. Sturgis on the evening of the 14th, 
when he would again pursue the Indians. ^ 
Howard was 25 miles behind him. 
MATTW. ALDERSON. 
I Herald Extra. 
Hf:f.KNA, WOM>AY, SKPTlÔ IBKB iS. 
' LATEST FROM THE ^ 
FRONT. 
j Sturgis 111 Pursuit of the In-
i diaiis. 
j  (  Ki:o.M ori:  own rnxinc-r ]  
'  BO/KM AN, SEPT(;nil)cr IS, 1877. 
!  A dis])atch from Stur^ns. dared M'i^cleslicli  
j Valley, September 15, ?ays he followed the 
I Indians thirty-eight miles oa the rourtceuth. 
'  Captured oOO horse?, making 100 taken by 
him. Found five dead Indians. The IK "'Ian 
horses are completely worn out.  
Four (-ompanit of cavalry and on" battery 
from Howard's comm ind have jointsd Stur­
gis.  The Crows bring scalps and captured 
horses to f!ie Agency daily—the end is near.  
P. K. 
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neither side lost heavily in the Canyon Greek fight. Sturgis lost three 
men killed, 11 wounded» There has been considerable confusion about how 
many Nez Perce casualties resulted, but it is generally agreed that none 
was killed and three were wounded. 
On September 29, the Bozeman Times quoted a report by the Crow 
agent, George Frost, stating that the Crows had captured approximately 
200 Nez Perce pack animals.This may explain the statement made by 
Captain Benham that 1^0 Nez Perce had been captured. 
The significance of the Canyon Creek clash was that Joseph was 
successful in fighting off and again eluding the combined forces, total­
ing approximately 7^0 soldiers, of General Howard and Colonel Sturgis, 
without losing the life of a warrior» Such a feat is nothing less than 
remarkable, especially in view of the fatigued condition of his people. 
Colonel Sturgis, whose men had been left short of rations and 
were exhausted by their two-week chase before the fight, did not renew 
the pursuit until five days after the battle. It appeared that Joseph 
had no opposition for the remaining 2^0-mlle journ^ north to the 
Canadian border. 
The Helena Weekly Independent claimed that Sturgis fought several 
skirmishes with the Nez Perce along the Musselshell River, which runs 
northeastward approximately ^0 miles above Canyon Creek.This report 
is not true. The Nez Perce saw no further action until they reached 
^^Beal, 0£_. cit., p. 197. Chalmers lists 21 Nez Perce killed 
(p. l8l), but this conflicts with reports by Howard and Yellow Wolf. 
^^Bozeman Times, September 29, 1877. 
b^Helena Weekly Independent, September 27, 1877« 
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Cow Island, a fording place of the Missouri River east of Fort Benton, 
on September 23. Sturgis had lingered at his camp on the Musselshell, 
awaiting General Howard, who arrived September 20. A dispatch reached 
them that day stating that Col. Nelson A. Miles, commander of Fort Keogh 
on the Yellowstone River (since named Miles City), had left two days 
previously in pursuit of the Nez Perce with 375 men and two cannons. 
Meanwhile, a dozen soldiers led by Sgt. William Moelchert from 
Fort Benton prepared breastworks at Cow Island landing to protect sup­
plies regularly left there ty river steamers. According to the Missoulian, 
which reprinted a dispatch from Fort Benton, "the Nez Perce crossed at 
Cow Island on the 23d. They attempted to approach the rifle pits in a 
friendly manner, but were ordered off by the detachment in charge of the 
freight."^^ 
What happened was one of the most humorous displays of courage 
offered against an overwhelming number of warriors. Nez Perce scouts 
walked up to Moelchert and asked for supplies. He refused, even when 
offered payment, although he did give them some bacon and hardtack. Not 
satisfied, the chiefs came forward and helped themselves. A soldier 
scribbled a note to the commander at Fort Benton as follows: 
Rifle Pits at Cow Island 
September 23, 1877, 10 A.M. 
Colonel: 
Chief Joseph is here, and says he will surrender for two hundred 
bags of sugar. I told him to surrender without the sugar. He 
took the sugar and will not surrender. What will I do? . 
Michael Fol^^' 
^^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 269. 
^^Weekly Missoulian, October 1877• 
^"^Beal, o£. cit., p. 203. 
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Whatever the reply might have been is not known, but Foley, who 
had acted as interpreter, took Nez Perce women to a supply dump and 
treated them to a feast. The stubborn defenders did not abandon the 
rifle pits, however, and the Indians made no attempt to charge them. 
That evening shots were exchanged, wounding two whites and one Indian, 
when the latter returned to pillage another stockpile. The Wez Perce 
found whiskey and, after a spree, set fire to an estimated 50 tons of 
supplies. 
When the raiders departed the next morning, a detachment of 36 
volunteers and one soldier headed by Maj. Guido Ilges and Lt» E. E. 
Hardin from Fort Benton, caught up with the Nez Perce rear guard. The 
Indians had attacked a wagon train, killing three teamsters. When pre­
cision shooting dropped a citizen from his saddle. Major Ilges retired 
[lO 
his command from the field. 
As seemingly insignificant as the Cow Island encounters may 
appear, the episode is generally regarded as the prelude to disaster. 
The Nez Perce had delayed a day in their flight to Canada, which in 
itself was no problem and had been a considerable help in resting and 
strengthening for the final push to the border, approximately 75 miles 
north. But on September 2k, Chief Looking Glass, who alreai^ had lost 
considerable prestige but who also had performed brilliantly in the rear 
guard action against Sturgis at Canyon Creek, was put in command of the 
column. He proposed a series of slow marches. This plan was vigorously 
^^Oscar 0. Mueller, "The Nez Perce at Cow Island," Montana, the 
Magazine of Western History, Vol. lii. No. 2, Centennial Edition, pp. 
51-52. 
^^Helena Weekly Herald, October 11, 1877 « 
i5i 
disputed by Lean Elk, the leader whom Looking Glass replaced. Lean Elk 
urged a rapid march as had been the policy for 1,200 miles. Joseph 
apparently agreed to the suggestion made by Looking Glass, because he 
admitted later that a feeling of security had set in with the knowledge 
that Howard and Sturgis were far behind. He said he had no idea that 
a "fourth artiçr" (the other three were led by Gibbon, Sturgis, Howard) 
led by Colonel Mies was in pursuit. 
On September 29, Nez Perce scouts killed several buffalo near 
Snake Creek, ten miles above the northern spurs of the Bearpaw Mountains 
and [|.0 miles south of the Canadian boundary. Scholars have contended 
that the Nez Perce thought th^ already had crossed the border, but this 
was not 80.^^ Suhm-Keen, one of the last survivors of the Nez Perce war, 
recently clarified the statement Yellow Wolf that the Indians knew 
they had not crossed the international boundary. He said, quoting Chief 
Looking Glass, "we are at least two suns ahead of the soldiers and only 
two suns from the 'Land of Redcoats,' so we can rest here awhile. 
So a camp was built that afternoon, September 29. 
The Nez Perce had delayed too long, and to compound the error, 
Chief Joseph, who apparently was not worried, failed to order scouts 
to check the progress of the soldiers. If he had. Colonel Miles would 
have been quickly discovered and left far behind in the race for the 
border. Joseph took the responsibility for this most serious tactical 
blunder, admitting that a precious victory was taken from his people 
^%rady, op. cit., p. 67. 
^^Fee, 0£. cit., p. 2^0. This author stated that it was probable 
that the Nez Perce thought th^ had crossed the Canadian border. 
^^Alcorn, o£. cit., p. 70. 
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because there was not sufficient warning to make a final dash north. 
Critics of Joseph's generalship note that every time the Nez Perce suf­
fered severe punishment in battle, the reason was that no scouts had 
been posted. During the Clearwater battle this was understandable be­
cause the tribes were still scattered and were attempting to unite 
when Howard attacked. Strong evidence suggests that the Nez Perce 
thought they were at peace with the whites until Colonel Gibbon awoke 
them one morning at Big Hole with a fusillade. The Nez Perce were 
doubly certain to keep an almost ceaseless vigil thereafter, making it 
nearly impossible for either Howard or Sturgis or both to form any 
traps." R. E. Fisk, editor of the Helena Daily Herald, had made re­
peated predictions that an Indian flight across the open countly of 
Montana would be quickly halted by soldiers. Time after time the Nez 
Perce had evaded well-designed and well-executed moves by the military. 
That the "Elusive Joseph" was brought to bay finally was as much a 
surprise to editors as had been his successful evasion. 
The Surrender 
According to John Finerty, correspondent for the Chicago Times, 
Colonel Miles made forced marches for three consecutive days before 
reaching the Bear Paw Range east of the Nez Perce position on September 
29. Scouts located the Indian trail. At 8 a.m. the following day, 
Miles' command approached the Nez Perce camp and was discovered while 
still several miles distant by Indian buffalo hunters. When the colonel 
reached a bluff two miles from the camp, he contemplated his next move. 
^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. 207. 
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Miles, having served in the Aritçr of the Potomac throughout 
its bloodiest campaigns, and having witnesses the heaviest 
slaughter at the Death Angle of Spottsylavania, [wrote Finerty] 
is not a man who cares much about exposing his officers and 
men to death if an object is to be attained.54 
Miles ordered his cavalrymen into battle formation and began an 
immediate assault. A few Nez Perce had mounted and were beginning to 
flee from camp, but the majority, who had been busy striking their 
shelters, milled in confusion attempting to gather belongings and catch 
scattered ponies. Realizing there would not be time to load and start 
moving the caravan, Joseph ordered his people into a defensive posture. 
Miles' attack—which he described later as one of great power-
was approximately a mile from the Indians and moving at a brisk trot 
when Capt. Owen Hale was heard to exclaim, "% God, have I got to go 
out and get killed in such cold weather. 
Minutes later, on entering the depression formed ty the Snake 
Creek drainage, orders were bugled for the charge. Suddenly militaiy 
horses were running without ridersj one of the first to tumble was 
Captain Hale. The Indians were now delivering voiles of well-aimed 
fire and the charge was slowing as the first soldiers reached the 
57 southwest corner of the camp. 
Joseph and a group of other warriors who were trying to recover 
horses on the bank of Snake Creek opposite the camp were cut off from 
their people as the first wave of cavalry struck. Joseph, unarmed, rode 
^^Finerty, og. cit., p. 232. 
^%eal, 0£. cit., p. 2l5-
^%oward and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 271. 
^7 
Beal, loc. cit. 
headlong through a line of soldiers and reached camp safely, although 
his horse was wounded and his clothes were ripped in several places by 
bullets.^® 
Several other warriors, including Yellow Wolf, continued round­
ing up their horses and encountered Cheyenne and Sioux Indians who had 
joined Miles' command. According to Yellow Wolf, a Cheyenne chief 
halted and assured him that his people would not fire on the Nez Perce. 
But later, the narrator said, he saw the Cheyenne kill several Nez 
Perce women who were some distance from the camp.^^ 
The fighting in the camp was furious but short lived, and the 
soldiers retreated eastward to an escarpment. Twenty per cent of the 
soldiers who had been engaged were killed or wounded.The Nez Perce 
had unquestionably won the first round despite the surprise and being 
outnumbered two to one, but they suffered heavily, too. Although the 
number of dead and wounded are not known. Yellow Bull reported that 
three chiefs—Pile of Clouds, Ollokot and Toohoolhoolsuit—were killed 
in the first day of fighting.What disabled Joseph's people at this 
point was the loss of the major portion of their ponies. 
To avoid another blood bath. Miles changed his tactics and began 
a siege that was to last four more days. Meanwhile, the Indians dug 
trenches—the first time they had been compelled to do so during the 
war—using cooking utensils for shovels. That night it snowed and both 
^^Brady, 0£. cit., pp. 67-68. 
^^Chalmers, 0£. cit., pp. 2214-225. 
'^^'inerty, o£. c i t . ,  p .  233.  
Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 273» 
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sides, especially the wounded, still lying scattered, suffered terribly. 
Said Yellow ¥olf in recounting that tragic night: 
A young warrior, wounded, lay on a buffalo robe dying without 
complaint. Children crying with cold. No fire. There could be 
no light. Everywhere the clying, the death wail. heart 
became fire. I joined the warriors digging rifle pits. All the 
rest of night we worked. Just before dawn, I went down among 
the shelter pits. . . . Wrapped in a blanket, a still form lay 
on the buffalo robe. The young warrior was dead. . . . 
Morning came, bringing the battle anew. Bullets from every­
where! A big gun throwing bursting shells. From rifle pits, 
warriors returned shot for shot. Wild and storny, the cold wind 
was thick with snow. Air filled with smoke of powder. Flash of 
guns through it all. As the hidden sun traveled upward, the war 
did not weaken. , 
I felt the coming end. All for which we had suffered lost! 
The "big gun" was a 12-pound Napoleon howitzer, brought up with 
other supplies the morning of October 1. It changed the tide of the 
battle,according to some observers, but its accuracy was notably poor 
and the only persons killed in the Nez Perce trenches ty it were a woman 
and child.Its effectiveness was primarily psychological. 
It has been ascertained by numerous interviews that the first 
white flag shown on October 1 was by the soldiers and not the Nez Perce, 
as widely reported.From his position in the rifle pits to the north 
of camp. Yellow Wolf said he thought the soldiers did this because th^r 
wanted time to eat.^^ But Colonel Miles wished a parl^, and after 
several other displays of white flags, a cease fire was ordered. Miles 
and Joseph met about half way between their respective breastworks and 
^^Chalmers, og. cit., p. 227. 
^^Finerty, o£. cit., p. 233• 
^^Beal, o£. cj^., p. 217. 
^^Ibid., p. 220. 
^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. 228. 
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the terms of a surrender were presented to the latter. Joseph wished 
to retain half of his firearms for hunting, but this was refused, and 
Colonel Miles took the chief prisoner, breaking the truce he had 
arranged. Meanwhile, he sent Lt. Lovell Jerome to "reconnoiter" the 
Nez Perce camp to determine their strength. The Helena Weekly Indepen­
dent reported this as follows: 
Daring the truce Chief Joseph remained in Miles' tent and 
Miles sent some whites into the Indian camp to explore, one 
of whom was Lt. Jerome, of the 21 Cavaliy. The Indians held 
him, when he attempted to leave, as a hostage for the return 
of Joseph. 
In the meantime, on the afternoon of the 1st of October, 
the fight was renewed and continued during the night and all 
day of the 2d. An exchange was then,effected—Lt. Jerome for 
Chief Joseph, and the fight went on. 
Actually, the fighting had reached a stalemate and, according 
to Finerty, the correspondent, not a great deal happened after the 
exchange.Miles issued a report, printed in Montana papers, that it 
"would cost many lives" to take the Indians by assault. "I may wear 
them out and eventually compel them to give up. They fight with more 
desperation than arçr Indians I ever met. 
It was about this time that a news dispatch was sent to Washington 
and then reprinted in the New York Tribune with an erroneous headline. 
It was, in part, as follows: 
GENERAL MILES'S VICTORY 
The War Department has received a dispatch confirming of 
General Miles's fight with the Nez Perces, o . . It is not 
Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 278. 
^^Helena Weekly Independent, October 11, 1877. 
"^^Finerty, og. cit., p. 23k. 
^Weekly Missoulian, October 19, I877. 
1̂ 7 
considered certain here that General Miles has sufficient force 
to keep the Indians at bay until reinforcements can reach him; 
but if he has, it is thought the Indians cannot defend their 
position unless cold weather forces the troops to seek their 
Winter cantonments.71 
Joseph, meanwhile, waited in vain for assistance from Chief Sit­
ting Bull of the Sioux nation whose main camp was just north on the 
Canadian line. Joseph had sent six warriors to find Sitting Bull, but 
they were killed on the way."^^ It is generally believed by scholars 
that Chief Sitting Bull refused to move south and attack Miles when word 
73 
finally reached him from a group of ItO Nez Perce escapees on October 6. 
One of the escapees, Suhm-Keen, said that Sitting Bull not only welcomed 
the bedraggled band of Nez Perce and treated them well, but, after hear­
ing what had happened, started south with warriors. Enroute he encoun­
tered Chief White Bird and another band of escapees who were on foot. 
According to Suhm-Keen, "when Sitting Bull saw their sad plight, he 
dismounted and stood there and wailed in sympathy for their lost cause. 
The reason that Chief Joseph could not hold his position longer 
was that on the evening of October h, General Howard arrived with his 
command. Strangely enough, no approximations of the number of soldiers 
who were on the battlefield the next cold and snowy morning has been 
given, but it is probable that the figure was more than 600. Owing to 
the number of deaths in the Nez Perce camp and those who had escaped, 
Joseph probably had fewer than 1^0 warriors in camp on October 1;. Chief 
T^New York Tribune, October 9, 1877. 
7%eal, op. cit., p. 219. 
"^^Ibid. He claims that Sitting Bull moved north to avoid a fight 
with the soldiers. 
^Alcorn, o£. cit., p. 71. 
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Looking Glass had been killed the previous day as he stepped from a 
rifle pit to see if it were true that Sitting Bull was approaching. 
yd 
The column in the distance turned out to be a herd of bison. 
According to Chief Joseph, on the evening of October U a white 
truce team invited him to a council with Miles and Howard. Joseph had 
a low regard for Miles ever since the colonel broke the truce on October 
1 by arresting him, and there is evidence that the chief was tied and 
tossed in a blanket during his captivity.?^ (Lieutenant Jerome, who 
was the hostage in the Indian camp at the same time, was treated well, 
and food that had been sent by soldiers was delivered). General Howard's 
opinion of Colonel Miles was not the highest, either. When the first 
report was received that Miles was starting his pursuit of the Nez Perce, 
an officer in Howard's command, Maj. Lewis Merrill, remarked that Miles 
77 
was "something of a glory chaser like Custer." Howard agreed. 
Thus, in a sense. Chief Joseph was glad that Howard was available 
as a negotiator. Regarding the first council, he said: "We could now 
talk understanding^^' General Miles said to me in plain words, 'If you 
will come out and give up your arms, I will spare your lives and send 
you back to the reservation. 
On the morning of October firing continued. A cannon ball 
"^^Beal, op. cit., p. 219. 
^^Chalmers, o£. cit., p. 231. 
"^"^Beal, op. cit., p. 201. 
"^^Brady, 0£. cit., p. 69. There is confusion about the exact 
times of the final councils. Scholars indicate that the whites made 
no contact with the Nez Perce until the afternoon of October 5» But 
all agree that it was Howard who arranged the first parley in order 
to reach terms for an honorable surrender. 
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exploded in the part of camp where the women and children had been 
7' 
sheltered, "burying six of them when a trench caved in. Four survived. 
That afternoon a truce team composed of Nez Perce interpreters 
from Howard's command went to the besieged Indian camp to convince the 
Nez Perce that Colonel Miles would keep his word about surrender terms. 
Chief >Jhite Bird expressed fears that he and the other chiefs would be 
executed once their arms were turned over. The interpreters argued 
against this, stating that "those generals said to tell you, '¥e will 
have no more fighting. Your chiefs and some of your warriors are not 
seeing the truth. ... We will have no more warJ' 
This was not a demand for unconditional surrender; it was more 
of an armistice so far as the fighting was concerned. It was an honor­
able way for the Nez Perce, unbeaten militarily, to accept the promise 
of Colonel Miles and return peacefully to their reservation in Idaho. 
But Joseph knew that to surrender his weapons was to put his people at 
the mercy of the whites who had broken other promises. 
Chief Joseph rode forward that d^ to where General Howard and 
Colonel Miles stood waiting on the snow-swept prairie. The chief dis­
mounted, walked up to General Howard and handed him his rifle. Howard 
motioned him toward Colonel Miles. An officer present recorded the 
following words by Joseph: 
Tell General Howard I know his heart. What he told me 
before I have in nçr heart. I am tired of fighting. Our chiefs 
are killed. Looking Glass is dead. The old men are all killed. 
It is the young men who say yes or no. He -who led the young 
men is dead. It is cold and we have no blankets. The little 
^^Chalmers, o£. cit., p. 233. 
SOlbid., p. 23S. 
l60 
children are freezing to death» îfy people, some of them, have 
run away to the hills and have no blankets, no food; no one 
knows where they are, perhaps freezing to death. I want time 
to look for Bçr children and see how many of them I can find. 
Maybe I shall find them among the dead. Hear me, my chiefs, 
1 am tiredJ my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now 
stands, I will fight no more forever. 
Colonel Miles replied: "No more battles and blood. From this 
sun, we will have a good time on both sides, your band and mine."®^ 
Joseph returned then to his people. 
According to J. J. Healy, a correspondent, "Joseph was walking 
round about his people talking to the wounded and occasionally addres­
sing the warriors by signs and seemed quite unconcerned about his 
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defeat." 
But Colonel Miles was quite jubilant over the outcome and he sent 
a dispatch to Gen. A. H. Terry, commander of the Department of Dakota, 
which made no mention of General Howard at all. His victory announce­
ment appeared in the New York Tribune as follows: 
Dear General: ¥e have had our unusual success. We made a very 
direct and rapid march across the country, and after a severe 
engagement, and being kept under fire for three days, the 
hostile camp of Nez Perces under Chief Joseph, surrendered at 
2 o'clock to-day. , , ,"3 
The question was whether the promise made ty Colonel Miles would 
be honored. Chief White Bird decided that it would not, and that night 
he escaped to Canada with a small group of followers. White Bird was 
correct. During the following two years, I878-I879, the Nez Perce were 
shuttled to camps throughout the mid-West, At Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
®^Beal, 0£, cit., p. 229. 
8? 
Benton Record, October 12, 1877. 
^%ew York Tribune, October 11, 1877, 
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half the band contracted malaria and approximately 100 died. 
Apparently Colonel Miles' surrender terms were given little heed 
by "higher authorities." When General Sherman returned to Washington, 
D. C., from Montana, a reporter interviewed him and rendered the follow­
ing explanations 
It is learned that the Administration is at a loss to determine 
what disposition shall be made of Chief Joseph and his band, 
now that they have been caught. General Sherman says that 
Joseph fought in a Christian manner, not taking scalps or 
mutilating the dead, and that he is not in favor of putting 
him to death. He is, however, opposed to releasing Joseph 
and allowing him to return to Oregon, The chief knows too 
much of that country, and may again become troublesome. 
Thus, another agreement of honor with a valiant people was broken. 
Chief Joseph's summary of this breach of agreement was as follows s 
I could not bear to see ny wounded men and women suffer any 
longer5 we had lost enough alreat^. General Miles had promised 
that we might return to our country with what stock we had left. 
I thought we could start again. I believed General Miles, or 
I never would have surrendered. I have heard that he has been 
censured for making the promise to return us to Lapwai. He 
could not have made any other terms with me at that time. I 
would have held him in check until ay friends (sitting Bull] 
came to nçr assistance, and then neither of the generals nor _. 
their soldiers would have ever left Bear Paw Mountains alive. 
A total of iil8 Nez Perce men, women and children surrendered to 
the generals. But escapes continued, and it has been estimated that 
between 1^0-233 Indians found refuge in Canada.How many escaped 
before the surrender and how many after it remains uncertain. 
In the Bear Paw battle. Nez Perce losses have been estimated 
^^halmers, op. cit., p. 2hl» 
^^New York Tribune, October 23, 1877. 
S^Bracfy, op. cit., pp. 69-70. 
^^Beal, o£, cit., pp. 230-231. 
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between l8 and 23 killed and 1^0 to U6 wounded.®® Miles listed his 
casualties at 23 dead, wounded.®^ Nearly all the soldiers and the 
majority of Indians who suffered wounds, fatal or otherwise, received 
them during the first hour of fighting on September 30 during the charge 
of the camp. 
The New York Tribune commented editorially that "in general the 
public has shut its eyes to the disgraceful character of our dealing 
with the Indians. Perhaps we may now be stung into temporary wakeful­
ness."^^ 
®®Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., pp. 283-28L. 
®%eal, o£. cit., p. 233. 
^%few York Tribune, October 23, 1877. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE NEWSPAPER WAR 
Scholars make mention of the criticisms heaped on various govern­
mental and military organizations and their respective leaders during 
the Nez Perce campaign by journals throughout the nation, but no compre­
hensive study has been done to date about this. Particularly interesting 
is that the editors became infuriated with each other on maqy of the 
issues; so much so, in fact, that in Montana Phase III of the war was 
a sidelight to the editorial battles which arose over Phase II and 
continued until well after the Nez Perce had surrendered. 
This review will be devoted primarily to Montana papers, for it 
was not until the Indians crossed into Montana that the editorial voices 
of newspapers—-other than those in Idaho—began booming. 
For the sake of clarity, the "newspaper war" will be divided into 
five aspects with sub-titles as follows: "Fort Fizzle Reaction," "The 
Volunteers," "Potts' Reputation," "Howard's Reputation," and "Swing of 
Opinion." These divisions are somewhat arbitrary and it is important 
to stress that each was intertwined with the others to form a most 
complex web which, in places, defies clear description. For this reason, 
it is essential to have an intimate understanding of the war itself— 
an understanding many editors then did not have. 
Fort Fizzle Reaction 
The first newspaper report of the Fort Fizzle debacle, when the 
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Nez Perce circ-amvented the breastworks on Lolo canyon, was published in 
the New North-West the following day, as follows: 
Startling News From West Montana 
The Indians in the Rear of Rawn's Command 
Escape of the Hostiles 
They Pass Within Gunshot of Rawn 
Missoula, M.T., July 28, 1; p.m.—The Indians this afternoon threw 
a force below Capt. Rawn's position on the Lo-Lo, and fear a 
severe battle will be the result. . . . 
A courier from Missoula arrived at 11;30 a.m. A letter from 
Governor Potts sayss Joseph and his band passed Capt. Rawn's 
entrenchment yesterday late in the afternoon and although th^ 
passed within gunshot not a gun was fired at them.ï 
This account was run in the Helena Daily Herald the next day and 
the editor, R. E. Fisk, stated that Helena was "bewildered" over the 
2 
news. No better word could be chosen, for both the New North-West and 
the Herald became indignant over the editorial explanations by the 
Weekly Missoulian on August 3> cited earlier. The week following, 
Ghaunc^ Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, responded to these charges 
as follows: 
One of the errors that is being constantly reiterated to 
the discredit of Capt. Rawn is that the Indians coming out of 
Lo Lo passed within gunshot of his camp. . . „ Col. Jenkins of 
Philipsburg, who was in camp all the time of the passage, an 
intelligent man of wide military experience, says he did not 
see that Rawn could do anything but what he did do—hold the 
camp; and J. B. Wilcox, Esq., a Deer Lodger of sound judgment 
... has reached the same conclusion. Those who still insist 
that Capt. Rawn is a coward, are respectfully referred to the 
battle of the Big Hole.3 
The charge of cowardice was a most complex one, as evidenced in 
an editorial in the Herald as followss 
%ew North-West, July 29, 1877. 
^Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877. 
^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877» 
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The salaamls of the Mlssoullan, together with the apologies 
and. explanations proffered in behalf of the Governor, appear 
to the average reader a trifle ludicrous in the light of the 
Executive dispatch making a scape-goat of Rawn^ and of the 
cowardice charge against the Missoula and Deer Lodge volunteers 
implied in his war call of the 31st.% 
It should be apparent that the explanations given to newspapers 
apart from Missoula by the governor and Barbour had failed to clarify 
the actions taken by Captain Rawn during the Fort Fizzle passage. As 
noted earlier, it is probable that a "peace treaty" had been made with 
the Nez Perce on July 28„ Captain Rawn and the governor were apparently 
in disagreement about this policy| the latter was extremely anxious to 
avoid a suicidal fight that would endanger homesteads in the Bitterroot 
Valley, so he retired from the field, as did some 100 volunteers. This 
move so weakened Rawn's defense that he had little choice but to comply 
with the secret agreement reached with the Nez Perce» It is certain, 
however, that neither Governor Potts nor Captain Rawn made argr public 
explanation about what had transpired during the negotiations with the 
Indians. The reason seems to be that both realized that emotions were 
at such a pitch about an "Indian invasion" that ary announcement about 
a peace agreement with Chief Looking Glass would have angered Montanans 
in general and newspaper editors in particular. 
The only inference about the possibility that a peace pact had 
been made appeared in the Heralds 
One conference had been held and another set for the next day. 
Could it be possible that while this conference was going on, 
the Indians were successfully evading the troops, or had the 
conference settled upon the conclusion that the fugitives should 
be allowed safe transit without the ceremony of being interned.^ 
^Helena Daily Herald, August 6, 1877. 
^Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877. 
166 
Meanwhile, editorial criticism spread across the Territory. The 
two weeklies in Bozeman (the Avant Courier and the Bozeman Times) became 
embroiled over a local meeting called the "Montana Conference—The Indian 
Question."^ The Rocky Mountain Husbandman, a farm journal in Diamond 
City, Montana, came to the conclusion that Captain Rawn and his men were 
drunk, which the Missoulian brushed off by stating that some "wag" evi­
dently experimented on the editor to see how much nonsense he could 
hold.? 
Another somewhat amusing account, which originated with the 
Missoulian and was subsequently printed in other Montana papers, was 
brought to light. Apparently "three fighting parsons" had taken up arms 
during the Fort Fizzle affair and volunteered their services in defend­
ing the Bitterroot bridge east of Lolo canyon» The stoiy noted that 
O 
"Rev. Russel came all the way from Deer Lodge with his war paint on." 
The newspaper war, however, was anything but a light-hearted 
matter and, as the weeks passed, it grew in intensity. Two factions 
formed. The New North-West and the other paper owned by Mills, the Butte 
Miner, joined forces against the Missoulian. The latter gained some 
sympathy from the Herald, not so much because they were in agreement on 
the issues at stake, but more because they had a common eneny—Mills. 
The Miner claimed that their editorial foe, the Missoulian, had joined 
forces with the Herald. But Barbour refuted this: 
^Avant Courier, August l6, I877. 
"̂ Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877. 
^Weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877° 
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The Butte Miner says that the Herald and Missoulian have 
resolved themselves into a mutual admiration society. We 
do not admire the Herald—we read it. Right or wrong, it 
shows ability, force and elegant diction. We know of but 
one end the Miner is fit to subserve.^ 
One of the curious aspects of this "alignment" was that a major 
contender, Mills, was unusually quiet during the initial weeks of the 
controversy. Then on September 7, he opened fire by citing an editorial 
which appeared in the Missoulian on July 13—which has already been 
noted in a previous chapter—and concludeds 
In less than a month the Missoulian has reaped of the tares 
it has sown. Joseph's band of Nez Perces—a band which we 
believe was outrageously swindled and mistreated in Idaho 
under the same diabolical policy of dishonesty and plunder 
advocated by the Missoulian—-appeared in force on the Lo Lo 
trail demanding exit to the buffalo country. . . . Then the 
Missoulian cried lustily for "helpJ" ... The Indians professed 
peaceable intentions toward the people of Bitter Root and they 
in turn were seemingly satisfied to let them go, the volunteers 
were ordered to return. 
. . .  A s  p u b l i s h e r  o f  a  p u b l i c  j o u r n a l  w e  w e r e  m o r t i f i e d  t o  
see the Missoulian pile upon its mountain of sin the final, 
contemptible and degrading reproach of ingratitude, and in 
rebuking that have given it opportunity to squirt its venom 
at us for denouncing its villainous advocacy of robbery. . . . 
His intimation that we have disparaged any people of Missoula, 
except in identifying them with him as "a press and people," 
is to the best of our recollection totally untrue; and in view 
of personal declarations to us that the Missoulian does not 
represent the sentiments of that people we very cheerfully on 
their behalf retract the offensive remark associating them. 
Mr. Barbour has made friends in this county. He has been 
entirely successful in alienating them. . . . For some petty 
or malicious purpose, incomprehensible save on the theory that 
Joseph scared him out of his seven senses and left his reason 
a wreck on the shores of Lo Lo, he refuses and rebels against 
decent treatment of the Deer Lodge county volunteers and adheres 
to his dishonest plan of swindling Indians—the practice of 
which has been the prime cause of nearly all Indian troubles 
and which within a few weeks has left scores of yet unsodded 
graves in our fair land.ïO 
%eekly Missoulian, September 7, 1877. 
^%ew North-West, September 7, 1877. 
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Barbour's reply was a classic; 
FRIENDSHIP AND RESPECT 
The modest man who runs the Northwest has persuaded himself 
that, when he has a cutaneous eruption, the people of Deer 
Lodge county ought to scratch. ... It is possible that the 
people of Deer Lodge county have lost respect for their organ; 
that thqy have become weary with maintaining magisterial vanity 
and overbearing dogmatism; that they have tired of the splenetic 
nature that is continually fermenting jealousies and depriving 
the most populous county of the Territoiy of its proper right 
of political influence. . . . We challenge any living being to 
produce a line from this paper derogatory to the Deer Lodge 
volunteers. Mr. Mills has not been able to do this. He stands 
before the world a falsifier and perverter of holy truth. He 
gets mad. He gibbers nonsense. He leaves the Deer Lodge 
volunteers to their fate, and the gratuitous insults of Miss­
oula people unretracted, and howls a screed against diabolism 
of those who rob Indians. He takes the noble red man to his 
perturbed bosom.H 
Secretaiy Mills was no longer on the sidelines of the newspaper 
war. Whçr he chose to stay out of the thick of it so long is a matter 
of speculation, but it should be noted from Barbour's embittered reply 
that the Deer Lodge volunteers were very much involved in the dispute. 
That was the command which Secretaiy Mills organized without authority 
on July 20, as already noted. This fact was never brought out in edi­
torial columns, but Mills was to be assailed for his triple role as 
"editor," "Secretary," and "Adjutant General," 
The Missoulian began referring to Mills as "Corporal,Barbour 
left Missoula during the week of September 21 on a "three-week pilgrimage" 
to Philipsburg, Deer Lodge, Butte and Helena to rally support for his 
cause. 
The Herald, meanwhile, decided to expand on the matter of Mills' 
^^Weekly Missoulian, September llj., 1877, 
^̂ Weekly Missoulian, September 21, 1877» 
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rank. Fisk wrote that. 
Corporal Mills is the way the Missoulian prints it» Correct, 
we believe, so far as any rank attained, or title conferred, 'by-
reason of amy service performed. « . , By the grace of our 
glorious Commander-in-Chief of Militia—by whom is meant His 
Excellency the Governor of Montana—Mills was lifted at one 
swoop from Corporal to Adjutant-General.^3 
It would appear that the fighting had reached a deadlock, but the 
Bozeman Times threw its weight with the Missoulian in a most interesting 
appraisal of the newspaper war itself: 
A controversy has been going on for some time in the New 
Northwest and Missoulian, between their two editors. Mills and 
Barbour, growing out of the recent invasion of Missoula county, 
etc, M-th the issues the people of Eastern Montana have no 
interest, but to a looker-on the battle affords some interest. 
. . . ¥e are equally friendly to both. Candor, however, com­
pels us to say that Barbour is developing considerable ability 
as a writer and editor, and is showing himself to be a full 
match, at least, for Adjutant-General Mills 
The editor then made some caustic remarks about Mills' rank and 
concluded, ^'¥e shall insist that Mills be still called 'Captain,' [of 
the Home GuardJ and that he shall not be reduced from his rank to Corporal, 
or elevated to a 'General.' In the latter capacity he recently failed." 
It would appear that the editorial tide was against Mills. A most 
unexpected editorial appeared in the Avant Courier, a paper that had 
recently opposed its competitor, the Bozeman Times, as noted, supporting 
the criticism against Mills. But the Courier stated that the criticism 
had been carried too far, and that "men of such experience in editorial 
work as on the Herald, Times, and Missoulian should have learned ere this 
1 
that 'people who live in glass houses should not throw stones.'" 
l^Helena Daily Herald, September 2I4, 1877. 
^^Bozeman Times, September 22, 1877. 
^%vant Courier, November 1, 1877. 
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Ghauncey Barbour, who was in Helena after visiting Deer Lodge, 
sent the following dispatch concerning the reputation of Mills who, 
just prior to the Fort Fizzle affair, has been a close associate and 
friend; 
The impression has gained ground, even in his own baliwick, 
that the Deer Lodge apostle of gush is a mortal man and vul­
nerable. The impression has gained ground that the querulous 
disposition and inflated vanity of this man has ever stood in 
the way of progress of the place where he has located. . . 
To summarize the editorial positions taken after the Fort Fizzle 
affair, on the one side was the New North-West and the Butte Miner. 
Strongly opposed to them were the Missoulian and the Bozeman Times. 
Somewhat favoring the latter camp were the Helena Herald and the Avant 
Courier. Unquestionably the individual to suffer the greatest personal 
criticism in the press war was Mills. 
The Volunteers 
The authorization of Montana militia has been reviewed in depth 
alreacfy. As noted, the two proclamations issued devolved on Captain 
Rawn's request just prior to the negotiations with the Nez Perce at 
Fort Fizzle on July 28, 1877. Again the question of whether a peace 
treaty was formulated at that time comes up. When the governor issued 
the second proclamation on July 31, he sent a dispatch from Deer Lodge 
to Helena stating that the militia should proceed quickly to the Bitter-
root Valley, Shortly afterward, he sent a second dispatch to the com­
mander of the Helena militia. Captain Fuller, requesting him to "suspend 
further movements until further orders.Potts explained that he 
l^Weekly Missoulian, October 5, 1877* 
Helena Daily Herald, July 31, 1877. 
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•wished to consult the War Department before taking what -was earlier 
termed "offensive" action against the Indians. Fisk, who had the lo'west 
regard for the governor of any editor in the Territory, put the blame 
for the confusion on the War Department, stating that the government 
"fears volunteers more than Indians."^® The Mssoulian, two days later, 
praised the willingness of volunteers—particularly those from Philips-
burg—to respond in a time of need. Barbour explained further, however, 
that at no time were there more than 2l6 defenders at Fort Fizzle. 
Barbour failed to mention anything about the Deer Lodge company 
of militia, and Mills became angered. Mills wrote: "We fail to find 
one word of thanks for the men of this county who went to their 
[Missoula's] assistance and paid every penny of expenses of ordinary 
travelers and purchasers. That is not what they or their friends had 
20 
a right to expect." As it had done earlier, the Butte Miner supported 
Mills on this issue and assaulted the Missoulian and the people of 
21 
Missoula for their lack of hospitality toward the militia, Barbour 
replied that same week: 
The Butte Miner reiterates its slander on Missoula people 
that th^ were after Butte pockets instead of help, and mentions 
two instances where men were charged hotel and stable bills. . 
. . The Miner regards the irruption [sic] of Nez Perces into 
the Territory as exclusively a Missoula county fight. If 
Missoula had taken that narrow view, it would have fortified 
in its stone blocks.22 
^%elena Daily Herald, August 1, 1877» 
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877. 
^%ew North-West, August 10, 1877. 
^^Butte Miner, August llj., 1877. 
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877. 
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That Barbour did not refute the charges regarding the payment 
of hotel and stable bills suggests that volunteers were obliged to 
meet their own financial expenditures in resisting the Indians, 
According to a bond drawn up by Capt. G» P» Iflggins of Missoula, 
and discovered recently in a file of letters to Governor Potts, the 
people of Missoula were issued Springfield muzzle-loading rifles 
(of Civil War vintage), a bayonet, 20 rounds of fixed (paper wrapped) 
ammunition, and a screw driver—all for $30, The signator was re­
quired to return his weapon and unused ammunition when the crisis had 
passed.Thus, it was an expensive proposition for a volunteer to 
volunteer. 
Moreover, the Springfield muskets—which required 20 to 30 
seconds to reload—were inferior in fire power to the repeating 
D&nchester rifles which many Nez Perce carried,Winchester 
lever-action repeaters (Models 1866, 1873) were capable of being 
loaded with ll| rounds and fired with rapidity. 
There is little doubt that a number of white ranchers also 
had Winchesters. But the majority of townspeople did not. Mills 
sent three telegrams from Deer Lodge on July 28 in a frantic attempt 
to secure breech loaders. The first was as follows : 
^^Bond by Co P. Higgins, July 12, I877, Personal Correspond­
ence to Gov. B, F, Potts (Manuscript Case 978.6, N k9 P, Historical 
Society of Montana). 
^^Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. Ih6, 
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Deer Lodge 
July 28, 1877 
8:37 a.m. 
To Ben R. Dittes 
Helena, M,T<. 
No news—ascertain iimiediately how inary breech loaders can 
be purchased and price. One hundred more men than guns reacfy 
to move. If hostiles evade Missoula will cut them off. 
25 
Jaso H, Mills, Sec. 
The reply by Dittes, who was acting commander in Helena while 
the governor was in Missoula, was penciled at the bottom of this tele­
gram and states: "No breechloaders for sale here—Power tho will have 
twelve Winchesters Tuesday (July 31), can't give price yet." 
The second telegram to Dittes from Mills, filed two hours later, 
changed the request from breech loaders to needle guns, which were a 
forerunner of the Winchester repeating rifles. The telegram statess 
"Call in every needle gun in or about Helena and forward them and all 
the guns you can—Call on people to give up private guns." 
Apparently Dittes sent back another negative reply, for Mills 
sent a third telegram the next hour, 11:10 a.m., stating, "Have prin-
27 
cipal citizens organize committee to secure guns be prompt." 
These telegrams are important for two reasons. First, they 
indicate the military weakness of Montana militia, which may have had 
influence on the decision not to fight at Fort Fizzle, Secondly, they 
indicate the unusual role a newspaper editor played during the Nez 
^^Telegram from James H. Mills to Ben R. Dittes, July 28, 1877° 
Microfilm, "Indian Excitement," Montana State University Library. The 





In addition to being poorly equipped^ there is évidence suggest­
ing that the volunteers were ineffectual fighters. Sutherland wrote in 
the New York Heralds 
To add to the bitterness of seeing the people and department 
commanders almost indifferent to our success, bands of armed 
men, styling themselves volunteers, have every now and then 
come in a cloud of dust to our assistance, and when assigned 
some position in the line not to their liking or promised that 
within two days we should overtake the Indians and they should 
have a chance to fight, they would play us the Arab trick of 
folding their tents and silently stealing away» Undoubtedly 
there were some intell^ent and courageous men among these 
gangs—gangs which we [Howard's command] sampled from three 
Territories--but taken as a boc^, the frontiersmen volunteer 
of to-day is an undoubted fraud, having almost as little pluck 
or principle and as meagre in conception of discipline as a 
backwoods school master»^ 
Bravery was a frequent topic in the newspaper war, for there were 
suggestions of cowardice in news accounts several timeso Even in the 
Big Hole battle, which was regarded as a heroic onslaught by soldiers 
and volunteers, the Helena Daily Herald reported that "several of the 
men commenced to run, when the old veteran (Jolonel Gibbon} cried out, 
'Don't run, men, or I will stay right here alone.' The men halted at 
once, lessened their pace, and fell back in an orderly manner. 
The Missoulian used the matter of bravery to assail the New North­
west and the Butte Miner, both of which were critical about the conduct 
at Fort Fizzle. Barbour wrote: "The volunteers in the Big Hole fight 
are now styled the brave Montana volunteers [all 3k who participated 
were from Missoula and Bitterroot ValleyJ. What would they have been 
9R 
New York Herald, September 10, 1877. 
^%elena Daily Herald, August 23, 1877» 
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if they had ran?"^^ 
The Batte Miner replied: but we refer to the oolumng of 
the Miner to prove that we have given credit ty speaking of the men who 
participated so gallantly in the Big Hole battle as the brave Bitter 
Rooters 
The Bozeinan Times, meanwhile, commented editorially that there 
was friction between Montana militia and General Howard before the Big 
Hole battle* The editorial stated: 
An order of Gen. Howard's disgusted the Deer Lodge volunteers^ 
as it is reportedp and they returned home. They were ordered to 
march in the rear or retire altogether» For this order the Deer 
Lodge volunteers and the people of Beaverhead county denounce 
Gen. Howard.32 
Two days later^ however^ a letter to the editor of the Helena Daily 
Heralds signed by 13 Deer Lodge volunteersrefuted the charges made 
about General Howard's orders. It was stated that the volunteers became 
separated from Howard's command tgr mistake. The letter praised the 
generalg noting: "In our intercourse with Gen. Howard, we found him 
kind, courteous and gentlemanly. We regret that any reports should have 
been circulated to the contrary and trust that this statement may have 
the effect of preventing any such in the future. 
Editorial brickbats continued to be hurled over the issue of the 
volunteers during September, 1877° Mills reviewed the Fort Fizzle affair 
again and stated? "Then the Missoullan cried lustily for 'help!' No 
3'Weekly Missoulian, August 21)., 1877. 
^^Butte Miner, August 28, 1877. 
^^Bozeman Times, August 28, 1877° 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 25, I877. 
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voice so loud as the Missoulian; no reliance so steadfast in the 'brave 
miners* of Deer Lodge county» Barbour's policy had come home to him 
with a vengeance. He bellowed and blubbered and gnawed the file like 
a glutton,""' To make matters worsej, this editorial appeared while 
General Sherman was visiting Missoula on his tour of Montana, Fisk, 
editor of the Helena Daily Herald^ rallied to the defense of Missoula 
and heaped insults on Millss 
The offending of the General is contained , o in these 
words; "The Territory is so large and the ranches so scattered 
that I am not astonished that the people did not assemble as 
volunteers to fight the Nez Perces»" 
Mills dashes back at Sherman, and sayss 
"The General assumes what is not a facto The people did 
assemble as volunteers to fight the Nez Perces. . , » If 
General Sherman has expressed astonishment that the War Depart­
ment refused to authorize or subsist these volunteers who had 
assembled from the sparsely settled Territory he describes# he 
would have given utterance to the sentiment the situation 
demanded." 
Now that's a squelcher on Shermano It finishes up the whole 
batch of military incompetents and upstarts—from Captain to 
General-in-Chiefo Hurrah for Millsl Harrah for Montana's 
Adjutant General of MilitiaS 
Actually Mills was correct in his assessment^ as has been noted 
about the volunteers responding to the governor's proclamations^ What 
is important about this editorial^ other than the fact it was a fight 
between the most powerful editors in the Teridtoiyj was that the mili­
tary was now involved in the volunteer question. 
In October, the d^ that the Nez Perce surrendered, the Mlssoulian 
ran two poems on the front pages as followss 
-^^New North-West., September 7? 187?„ 
^̂ Helena Daily Herald, September 10̂  1877. 
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BIG HOLE 
Col. Gibbon to Gov. Potts. 
We've had a hard fight 
and I'm soriy to say 
They've whipped us out quite 
And the devil's to pay. 
I wait at Big Hole 
For an answer from you, 
And confess, on iqy soul, 
I don't know what to do. 
Gov. Potts to Col. Gibbon. 
Licked again? Tour command 
Nearly turned inside out? 
Did Chief Joseph take a hand, 
Or was Howard about? 
Tour dispatch, trusty soul, 
I answer the minute: 
If you're near a big hole, , 
Tou'd better crawl in it.^ 
As is evident, the command which surprised the Nez Perce the 
fateful morning of August 9 were no longer regarded as brave victors. 
Despite the fact that the Indians were seriously crippled. Colonel 
Gibbon and his men had failed to strike a mortal blow to the slumbering 
enençr. One of the final discussions of the volunteer question was by 
the Missoulian, which summarized the situation: "There has been much 
talk about cowardice and inefficiency in this whole Nez Perce business, 
both as to the military and citizen volunteers. We have always been 
prepared to admit that no great number of men could be got together 
without finding some who would show the white feather. . . . The 
editorial concludes that the critics did not take a rational view toward 
^Weekly Missoulian, October 5, 1877. 
37lbid. 
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Howard or the citizens and that the merit due them was not given. 
As adjutant general. Mills bore much of the brunt of the general 
criticism. But so did Governor Potts, who was comander in chief of 
the militia. 
Potts'Reputation 
Proceedings to impeach Governor Potts in May, I877, failed, as 
noted, but Fisk seemingly refused to acknowledge the decision made by 
President Hayes. He assailed the Indianapolis Journal in July for voic­
ing approval of the President's plans to make a political tour.^® Beyond 
aqy question, Fisk was the most outspoken Montana editor against both 
the federal and territorial administrations. Owing to the fact that the 
governor was in a delicate position after the impeachment proceedings, 
the Nez Perce war that followed a month later was more than just a 
difficult task for him. His reputation was at stake. 
The Missoulian, giving a first-hand account of the Fort Fizzle 
affair, explained that the governor was "heart sick" on arrival in 
Missoula because the War Department had refused authorization to raise 
a volunteer force. It was stated further that the governor "did not 
feel that we were in duty bound to punish the enemies of the government 
further than to see that life and property in our midst was protected. 
In another editorial the same day, August 3» it was stated that 
Governor Potts had counseled moderation. Praise was given to both the 
governor and Captain Rawn for not allowing a fight that would have left 
38Helena Daily Herald, July 12, 1877. 
39weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877. 
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"the fairest portions of this county . pillaged » 
The first editorial response about this came from the Herald on 
August 7» claiming that the governor's conduct was deplorable. Fisk 
stateds 
The General-in-Chief 
We endorse without stint the Missoulian"s estimate of our 
Governor during the impending danger, vizs "He could be of more 
service in the rear . * The exhaustive services he had per­
formed "in the rear," the panic which had pervaded his ponderous 
person; his proclamations, defiant alike of the progress of 
events and the rules of grammar, issued when needless and re­
voked when required, his pitiful, tremulous appeal for Gibbonj 
his indignation at Rawn for not achieving impossibilities; his 
assumptions and disclaimers of authority; his weakness of his 
hopes and his fears; his fitfulness of purpose; his ignorance 
of his own mind; his forwarding of unnamed supplies to the 
front; his conduct of the omitted "flank attack," and his 
departure—"after dinner"; all these, if chronicled in a style 
befitting so stately a theme, will become a classic in military 
criticism. 
The same day this editorial was published, the Butte Miner noted 
that the general response to the governor's call for militia had been 
poor and that in "Bozeman the people are organized . „ „ but they do 
not favor the plan for a campaign at the expense of the Territory."^2 
Reaction was strong to Fisk's charges against the governor. In 
Deer Lodge a public session was conducted and a resolution passed, 
endorsing the actions taken by Governor Potts during the Fort Fizzle 
affair. The Missoulian stated that the Herald "cannot be satisfied 
with anything that Gov, Potts does."^^ Four days later, August 21, 
^Qlbid. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 7, 1877° 
^^Butte Miner, August 7, 1877. 
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877. 
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the Butte Miner joined in support of the governor and, in the unusually 
lengtty editorial, criticized Fisk roundly: 
We have been led to these reflections by a newspaper war that 
has for some time been going on in the Herald, or rather a news­
paper attack, for it cannot be dignified with the name of war, 
since it is limited to virulent and repeated attacks on the part 
of the assailant, while the Governor's position prevents him 
from making any reply. . <, <, When the Indians were coming over 
Lo Iio trail the Governor called out the militia of two counties, 
knowing very well that his hands were tied by the lack of all 
authority to bind either the United States or Montana for the 
subsistence of troops in the field. But how else could he have 
proceeded? , . . for it [the Herald ] not only blames him {Governor 
PottsJ for not sending volunteers to the Big Hole, what he wished 
to do and might have done but for the rabid opposition of the 
Herald, but it charges him with all the calamities that have 
befallen our soldiers and citizens in consequence of the Big Hole 
fight, calamities that arose from a defence [sicj so brave and 
heroic on the part of the Indians that as warriors and men they 
have won our respect and admiration, however anxious we may be 
to see them exterminated as murderers and savages, 
¥e are quite willing to admit that the efforts of the Governor 
to oppose the march of the Nez Perce Indians through Montana did 
not lead to any satisfactory result, but their failure was due 
to a combination of perplexing circumstances that might well 
have puzzled a cooler and more experienced Indian fighter«bb 
Then came one of the most unusual events of the newspaper war. 
General Sherman had just arrived in Helena and the Herald welcomed him 
with two full columns of editorial praise. But also run on the editor­
ial page was a charge by Fisk that the governor had censored the Herald. 
How this was done, if it was done, is uncertain, but the editorial was 
satirically written: 
GIVE THâNKS 
The cordial thanks of the Capital City of Montana are due 
and are hereby tendered to His Excellency the Governor of Montana, 
for the strategy which seems to signalize his mastery and man­
agement of his personal and official "organ" on the occasion of 
the visit here of the General of the Amy, A more malicious and 
vindictive Bourbon print has not in times past and recent eaked 
^^Butte Miner, August 21, 1877, 
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out of existence from the crums and "cold vittals" shook from 
the public table. The files of the paper are sure witnesses 
of a depravity never before eqiialled in the number and frequency 
of aggravated assaults upon the constituted civil and military 
authorities of the nation. Its columns have only at intervals 
ceased to teem with alternate denunciations and ridicule of 
Sheridan, Teriy, Crook, Gibbon, Howard, and other grand soldiers, 
and if the General-in-chief has himself more recently escaped 
its venomous assaults, it is owing probably to the restraining 
hand now uplifted in warning gesture for the time being to 
desist. We therefore thank, and thank again^ the head of civil 
government in Montana for the gratifying service done this 
community and the Territory in muzzling, for a temporary period 
at least, the rabid demonstrations of his personal and official 
organ.42 
Other Montana newspapers tended to ignore this issue altogether, 
except in one instance where the Butte Miner reprinted the editorial and 
reiterated its stand favoring Governor PottsThe Miner summarized 
its stand in a very short editorial on August 28, stating that "the 
Helena Herald never loses an opportunity of carping at Governor Potts 
The Herald fired back, regarding the issue of censorship: 
DECLINED, WITH THANKS 
The Butte Miner—"one of ny (Mills\ papers, both weekly"— 
courts our notice. Excuse us, if you please, on the subject of 
your master. ¥e cannot stop to bandy words with a weakling which 
adopts second-hand the stereotyped platitudes of the other twin 
ENew North-West] . We have seen the same old duds passed around rom one Cheap uohn print to another, which compulsory printing 
subsidies pays for liberally at so mich a line. Our Butte 
contemporary had better settle its controversy with the Missoulian 
(regarding Fort Fizzl^, about which we have no opinion, and 
address the balance of its time and occupy the rest of its space 
to lecturing Howard.^" 
The matter of Potts' reputation received some national attention 
nh7 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 22, 1877» 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 23, 1877» 
^^Butte Miner, August 28, 1877° 
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 23, 1877« 
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when the Chicago Tribune published comments made by leading military 
officers who were angered about the militia in Montana» But for the 
most part, the war against the governor's conduct and reputation was 
waged by one editor, Fisk, He was denounced by his contemporaries, 
as indicated, and the governor became one of the most popular terri­
torial administrators in Montana, He held office for 13 years» 
Howard*5 Reputation 
Several controversies concerning General Howard received atten­
tion from newspapers outside of Montana Territory» Scholars have 
mentioned frequently the confusing dispute that was caused by an 
article which appeared in the Chicago Tribune regarding the surrender 
of Chief Joseph, It will be remembered that the chief handed his 
rifle to Howard, but Howard indicated to him that the surrender should 
be made to Colonel Mlles» "When newspaper accounts failed to mention 
anything at all about General Howard's part in the surrender, his 
li9 
officers felt cheated and a bitter controversy arose» 
The criticism of the general during the early phase of the war 
by Idaho and Oregon papers was, for the most part, disregarded by 
editors. Before the campaign moved from Idaho, the New York Tribune 
commented that "Gen» Howard seems to be doing good execution in the 
Indian country* 
Editorial opinion in Montana was to become sharply divided. The 
first to hurl insults was Mills, who reviewed the Idaho fighting and 
^%eal, 0£« cito, pp. 232-233• 
^%ew York Tribune, July 9, 1877. 
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stated that Howard let "the handful of Indians walk around him and drive 
his 'trap' into rifle pits.Howard's ambulatory pace became another 
issuBj, as did the report from Lewiston^ IdahOj, on July 10 by the general 
claiming that "he would pursue the Indians and kill them if it was 
possibleJ and that he would take no prisoners»" 
On July 16g the following report appeared in the Heralds 
Washington^ July iL—There is a report that Howard's inefficiency 
has led the administration to consider the advisability of 
superseding him by the appointment of Crook in command of the 
Department of the Columbiao A cabinet officer, this evening, 
said his lips were sealed upon the subject» It is possible that 
Howard may be superseded tomorrowo^3 
When Howard's command arrived in Montana Territory^ the Mlssoulian 
carried an account explaining the reasons for the apparent slownesso 
Sutherland paid tribute to the general for getting his command across 
Lolo pass in the time they did»^^ When Howard's command began moving 
down the Bitterroot Valley toward the Big Hole^ he sent a letter regard­
ing newspaper criticism to Governor Potts which was widely published. 
He wrotep in parts 
Bitter Root Valley g Montana 
Augo l877' = ' " 9  P o m ®  
To Gov. Pottss 
o o c. I notice "bj the local papers that I am set down as 
entrenching on Snake river; that the battle in which the Indians 
were beaten „ » » is discredited, and the columns of the papers 
are billed with personal abuseo The effect of this treatment 
is to create distrust on the part of your people, with whom I 
want the heartiest cooperation . , „ The anxieties of loved ones 
^iNew North-West, July 13, 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July Ih, 1877. 
^^Helena Daily Herald, July 16, 1877. 
^^Weekly Mlssoulian, August 10, 1877. 
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at home are great enough alreacfy without having them aggravated 
by stories of inefficiency and slowness that are known to us 
so palpably false as hardly to need contradiction. 
0. 0. Howard 
Brig. Gen. Commanding^ 
The majority of Montana editors agreed with the general's comments. 
But the two papers under Mills, the New North-West and the Butte Miner;» 
stood firm in their protests. Mills^ who had been critical the previous 
month, stated in his editorial of August 2it; 
We have been loath to criticize and have refrained from 
criticism of his campaign. . . . Yet with all these things the 
expression is forced unwillingly but deliberately from us that 
his caiîçjaign has been a miserable failure^, gives no promise of 
success, and that in our belief there will be no efficient 
service by his command until he is superseded by an officer 
qualified for Indian service. 
The Hew North-West quoted a story from the Chicago Tribune of August 2$ 
which stated "there is no intention of retiring Gen. Howard from coamand, 
as the Secretary of War thinks he is doing the utmost possible with the 
^7 
few troops he has." 
A curious incident occurred shortly after this article appeared. 
The Bozeman Times, which had probably been in contact with General 
Sherman who was just returning from Yellowstone Park, released the 
following news in an editorials "We learn^ from good authority^ that 
Gen. Howard has been superseded in the command of the troops . . . now 
somewhere in the National Park, by the appointment of Lieut. Col. Gilbert, 
who has gone to take command. 
^^Avant Courier, August l6, 1877. 
^^ew North-West, August 2kg 1877° 
tn 
New North-West, August 31, 1877» 
^^ozeman Times, September 6, 1877. 
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How s'ach an erroneous aeeount got into print is difficult to 
imagine, but it should be noted that just previously General Sherman 
had exchanged four dispatches with General Howard suggesting that he 
step dowi from command."' 
But the editorial critics in Montana and elsewhere were censured 
about their attitude toward Howardo The Hew York Times ran an editorial, 
reprinted in the Missoulian^ which satirically stateds 
General Howard hag commanded the troops that are operating 
against the Nez Perces Indians. His failure to outmarch, with 
his hea^vy Infantry, the savage horsemen, has finally opened 
the eyes of the public. "With his handful of men he has not 
yet exterminated the Indians, although he has been in the field 
almost as long . . . as the gallant Custer had been when his 
force was annihilated by the Sioux. People in this part of the 
country can form a much better judgment as to how an Indian 
campaign should be conducted than can old arïiy officers in the 
field. All General Howard had to do is to surround the Nez 
Perces, and to kill or capture the whole ef them. That he did 
not do so within the first twenty minutes after he began his 
campaign is a convincing proof that he is utterly unfit to 
hold any command. . . .5o 
When General Howard later returned to his home in Portland, Oegon, 
a large crowd turned out to welcome him and the city fathers made speeches 
which reviewed both the events of the war and the criticisms of the press. 
A number of resolutions were adopted which characterized the newspaper 
criticism as %njust and 'wicked." The last of these stated that "we 
regret the contemptuous attacks of his maligners as deserçdng only of 
public rebuke to be followed by an eternal silence. 
General Howard--whc had fought in six major battles of the Civil 
S^See p. 132. 
^^eekly Mlssoulian, October 5, I877. 
^IPortland [Oregon] Daily Bee, November 11, 1877. 
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War, had lost his right arm when wounded twice at the Battle of Fair 
Oaks, and who had for a short time on July 1, 1863, commanded the 
entirety of the Union forces at Gettysburg—was never relieved of 
command. In I878, he fought a decisive war against the Bannack Indians« 
Scholars in general view Howard's campaign against the Nez Perce as 
mediocre. But because of the 1,300 miles of difficult terrain his 
command traversed and because the Nez Perce had proved themselves as 
ranking among the finest warriors on the continent, it is doubtful 
that any commander who might have replaced Howard would have done 
better. Colonel Sturgis, it -will be remembered, failed completely 
despite the fact he had fresh men and horses. Above all else, General 
Howard was very much liked and greatly respected by the troops under 
him. 
Swing of Opinion 
It would be an oversimplification to regard the opinions of 
whites—generally reflected in newspaper editorials—toward the Nez 
Perce as swinging from bad to good. But in the most broad terms, that 
is what happened. The turning point in what has been described as a 
tide of opinion came just after the Fort Fizzle affair, August 2-3» 
1877, when the newspaper war in Montana was beginning over the conduct 
during that event. Most striking in this survey of Montana newspapers 
is the lack of criticism against the Nez Perce during the editorial 
battles about the volunteers. Governor Potts and General Howard. The 
flood of opinion against the Nez Perce before the Fort Fizzle affair 
has been reviewed at length already, as has the turning point of that 
tide. As noted, the Missoulian of August 3 was among the first to show 
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outward respect for the Nez Perce. This was followed a remarkable 
editorial in the Butte Miner on August 7 which, in reviewing the Fort 
Fizzle events, said that "the Gallatin people will most likely think 
fs9 
with the Bitter Rooters—that it is best to let them go in peace." 
The Bozeman Times followed by noting that the Indians had "marched 
leisurely right through the settlements of Missoula, boastful and inso­
lent, but had killed no one so far as learned. 
The change of opinion did not come easily. One of the few editors 
in Montana to express continued contempt for those Indians was Fisk who 
had been the first to denounce the Nez Perce when the war erupted. He 
wrote, on August l8, "that the Indians were by no means as prudent in 
any respect as th^ were credited" during the Big Hole battle because 
th^ had failed to post scouts and they had left their horses far enough 
aw^ from camp to be easily captured. 
This assessment was correct, assuming that no peace pact had been 
made at Fort Fizzle, Oddly enough, Fisk had been the only editor who 
made mention of the fact that such a peace pact might have taken place. 
On August 20, Fisk remarked editorially that "if it were possible 
(for the Nez PerceJ to find a train loaded with whiskey it might serve a 
good purpose in detaining the raiders and putting them hors du combat. 
Two days later, Mills took a much different viewpoint. He wrote: 
^%utte Miner, August 7g I877, 
^^Bozeman Times, August 9, 1877» 
^%elena Daily Herald, August 18, 1877. 
65Helena Daily Herald, August 20, I877. 
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These Nez Perces have achieved renown for interpid [sicj courage 
and indomitable purpose^, that goes as far as aught in the world 
can do to atone their butcheries^ and ranks them among the first 
warriors in the world, while he who leads them should be called 
Moses instead of Joseph, Their warfare since th^ entered 
Montana has been almost universally marked so far by the highest 
characteristics recognized by civilized nations, the only devia­
tion being killing the wounded or isolated parties. Th^ perpe­
trated no imrders in Missoula county, and their slight pillaging 
was less than that of the stragglers of a civilized army in the 
eneuçr's country; while succeeding the battle of Big Hole, they 
committed no outrages upon those they killed, but crossed their 
hands and wrapped them decently in their garments or blankets. 
. . . Let us give the Nez Perces their dues. Their valor hides 
maqy a fault, and wrong in the outset may not have been wholly 
theirs. . . 
The Missoulian then quoted a lengthy statement by Ex-Senator 
Nesmith, superintendent of Indian Affairs from 1857-=59, which was pub­
lished in the New York Sun and explained the causes of the outbreak. 
In part, he stated: 
I can not better acquaint you with the history of their 
wrongs than to refer you to a report which I, as a member of 
a joint Congressional committee to investigate the condition 
of Indian tribes, made to the U. S. Senate in 1865. In regard 
to the charge made in that report against "Governor Caleb Lyons 
of Lyonsdale," it is but proper to state that he was promptly 
removed from office upon the strength of nçr charges. But 
instead of depositing the public funds [annuities for the 
Indians] in the U. S. depository in San Francisco, as the law 
and regularity directed him, he started East with the money, 
some forty odd thousand dollars, in a belt around his person. 
On the morning of his arrival in Washington his empty belt was 
cut open and found lying upon the floor of the sleeping car, 
and ffl.s Excellency raised the hue and cry that he had been 
robbed. 
The robbery device was a thin and transparent one which 
no sensible man believed, but the Nez Perce were robbed of 
forty odd thousand dollars of their annuities in a Washington 
sleeping car, and "Gov. Caleb Lyons of Lyonsdale" had a bill 
pending before the last Congress for relief. 
The Bozeman Times, on hearing of the surrender at Bear Paw, 
^%ew North-West, August 21;, 1877. 
^̂ Weekly Missoulian, September ll;, 1877» 
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stated that although the killings ty the Nez Perce could not be condoned, 
. . .  i t  m u s t  b e  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  b e e n  f o r c e d  i n t o  
rebellion by the action of the government and its thieving 
agents and favorites who were permitted to plunder and encroach 
upon them a long series of years| all of which will be investi­
gated ty Congress and published to the world. 
The New York Times summed up this matter by stating that the Nez 
Perce war *'on our part, was in its origin and motive nothing short of a 
gigantic blunder and a crime.Shortly afterward, the Nation paid 
tribute to Joseph's generalship and "the manly and unflinching bravery 
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of his warriors." 
But no words had more profound effect than those spoken ty the 
President in a summation of the recent Indian wars. The tesct of the 
address was reprinted in full in the Avant Courier^ and contained the 
following remarks: 
Many if not most of our Indian wars have had their origin 
in broken promises and acts of injustice upon our part, and 
the advance of the Indians in civilization has been slow 
because the treatment thqy received did not permit it to 
foster and be more general. ... 
The faithful performance of our promises is the first 
condition of a good understanding with the Indians.7^ 
^^Bozeman Times, October 11, 1877. 
%̂ew York Times, October 15, 1877. 
7°The Nation, October 18, 1877. 
^̂ Avant Courier, December 20, 1877. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CCNCLUSIQMS 
To evaluate the rights and wrongs of such a complex series of 
events in a few word?? is extremely difficult. 
A wealth of information has yet to be uncovered about the Nez 
Perce, the newspapers and the war of 1877 • One area in particular lacks 
sufficient documentation—Idaho newspaper coverage regarding the treaties, 
councils and early fighting of the war» 
Another area of importance which deserves attention is the series 
of interviews conducted by Duncan McDonald with the Nez Perce after the 
war. His reports were published in full in the New North-West of Deer 
Xodge, Montana, in I878. 
Three general questions formed the basis for the majority of 
research done in this study: 
1. Who was responsible for the war? 
2. What influence did the newspapers have on this and the events 
that followed? 
3. What events did follow^ and what was the general reaction to 
them? 
Surprisingly^ the first question was largely answered during the 
war. An assumption at the outset was that little rational thought would 
have been done concerning the Indians because of high emotions and the 
lack of information about the causes of the war. It is to the credit of 
editors, statesmen and soldiers (in that order) that the blame was fixed 
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and accepted once the facts were made known» Those facts were exposed 
by newsmen in Washington who interviewed Indian commissioners, on the 
one hand, and by pioneer editors in Montana who, having met face to face 
with the Nez Perce at Fort Fizzle, admitted openly that these were not 
"savage" Indians. 
Those who are not fully acquainted with the treaties, broken 
promises and corruption that resulted from government policy during the 
22 years before the outbreak, invariably point to the massacre in cen­
tral Idaho as the cause and justification for the war. While these acts 
by Nez Perce braves were deplorable, it must be realized that theirs was 
a reaction, a rebellion, a revolt against tyranny. How many Nez Perce 
were murdered after the mining invasion of i860 by miners and settlers 
has not been determined exactly, but scholars have estimated the figure 
at 22, as noted. So far as is known, not once during those 22 years 
before hostilities did the Indians break aty commitments or seek revenge 
for the wrongs done to them. They did ask for justice concerning mur­
ders by whites, but this was denied. 
The second question regarding newspaper influence on the outbreak 
has not been fully answered in this stucfy. Without a thorough investi­
gation of the Idaho press, it could not be. But the studies done by 
Merrill Seal and Nancy Donner, as noted, suggest strongly that the papers 
of that Territory in general, and the Lewiston Teller in particular, 
contributed to the decision made by the military to force the non-treaty 
Nez Perce to move to the Lapwai Reservation in June, 1877. 
One of the assumptions made when the initial research was being 
conducted for this study was that Montana newspapers contributed to that 
decision, also. This was incorrect. Unlike the settlers of Idaho, the 
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Montana populace had become fond of those Indians who passed through 
their settlements on the annual treks to buffalo country. And, simi­
larly, the Nez Perce liked the Montanans. Trade relations were 
excellent, for the Nez Perce had highly bred horses that were in demand^ 
and the whites had maty things the Indians wanted. As a rule, the Nez 
Perce were an unusually handsome people., evidenced by photographs of 
them, and the people in the Bitterroot Valley were not above inviting 
individuals into their homes or giving them medical attention» 
When the news of the Idaho massacre reached Montana, the alarm 
displayed by pioneer editors was not a great deal different, for the 
most part, from that in New York or San Francisco. But when it was 
learned that the Indians were headed for the Montana border, alarm 
turned to fear, which is understandable. 
It was at this point that the Montana press markedly influenced 
events. It has been noted in editorials that settlers in the Territory 
generally were apathetic toward the entire matter. Editors^ however 
were not. With the appointment of James H, Mills as adjutant general 
of Kilitia, the volunteer movement became passionate. It has been sug­
gested that he was involved in an intrigue concerning the call for 
volunteers ly the governor. The evidence is neither conclusive nor 
very well substantiated. But Mills did: (l) organize the entire 
militia of the Territory (in one instance before he received authori­
zation) while the governor was in Missoula; (2) make arrangements to 
arm and equip those men; (3) send a dispatch to Colonel Gibbon at Fort 
Shaw asking for help. 
The Fort Fizzle affair is generally regarded ty scholars' as 
relatively unimportant, probably because no battle was fought there. 
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It has been contended for a long while that Joseph's maneuver around 
the breastworks in Lolo canyon was a skillful and daring and most 
unexpected move that threw the soldiers into confusion. This seems 
unlikely, however, for there is considerable evidence that the whites 
were prepared both for a direct attack and evasive action by the Nez 
Perce. 
Chief Joseph and Yellow Wolf both claimed that a verbal agreement 
or "peace treaty" was made during the negotiations on July 28, I877. 
Apparently this guarantee would allow the Indians free passage if th^ 
honored their word not to fight in Montana» Considerable circumstantial 
evidence, gleaned from newspaper accounts, supports the Nez Perce peace 
claim. First, the governor, who was the chief negotiator, repeatedly 
expressed his desire to avoid a fight that undoubtedly would be lost to 
an Indian force that was superior in numbers, equipment and fighting 
experience. The governor expressed his reasons for avoiding hostilities 
to editors afterward. He also publicly praised Captain Rawn for with­
holding fire. Second, the Nez Perce were anxious to avoid a fight^ if 
possible. Third, in their maneuver around the breastworks, th^ exposed 
women and children to the rifles of the whites. Fourth, hats were waved 
in friendly gestures by the Indians as they passed the entrenchments. 
Fifth, the governor and the majority of volunteers alrea<^ had retired 
from Fort Fizzle during the time of the passage. Sixth, no attempt was 
made to follow up the Indians who moved slowly and camped nearby. A 
small detachment that did, after two hours, take their trail, was greeted 
in a friendly manner ty the chiefs. Seventh, the governor ordered the 
Helena-Butte-Deer Lodge militia heading toward Missoula to halt. Eighth, 
the Nez Perce moved some 1^0 miles through Montana at a leisurely pace 
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when it would have been entirely possible for the governor to have 
raised a force of 1,000, or perhaps 2,000 men from Helena, Butte, Deer 
lodge, Missoula, Bozeman and other communities to take the field. He 
was not authorized by the military to do this, however, and it is 
apparent that the Nez Perce presented no threat that would compel him 
to do so. Ninth, the relations of the Nez Perce with the Bitterroot 
settlers were cordial. Tenth, when Colonel Gibbon made his surprise 
attack at the Big Hole, he was able to approach a camp that was erected 
in a place easily subject to attack from the mountainside. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the Nez Perce thought th%r were at war with 
Montanans, for scouts were not even posted. Eleventh, the governor 
released no volunteers to participate in the fighting until Colonel 
Gibbon had taken the initiative and recruited 3h volunteers in Missoula 
and elsewhere. 
This is the circumstantial evidence already documented which 
supports the claims by two chiefs that a peace pact had been made at 
Fort Fizzle. It may be asked why the governor did not announce the pact. 
The reasons here are speculative, but important. First, it was apparent 
that the Bitterroot volunteers were satisfied that the Nez Perce were 
friendly, and following their retirement from the breastworks, there 
was little reason to announce that there would be no fighting. Second, 
this was the governor's first major role of leadership in Montana since 
the impeachment proceedings the previous month. In the principal cities 
of the Territory emotions were highly pitched for war, especially in 
view of the belligerent attitude toward the Nez Perce that seemed to 
dominate the columns of Montana newspapers at the time. Third, the 
editors had denounced the lack of support the military concerning 
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volunteers and were adamant against allowing the Nez Perce to wander 
through their Territory. It can be easily imagined what would have 
happened if the governor, as commander in chief of the militia, announced 
he had made a peace agreement with the Nez Perce. In Missoula, where 
the situation was understood, it would have been accepted, but in Helena, 
Butte, Deer Lodge and other large towns there would have arisen a cry, 
^'Lynch him.^ 
Chauncey Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, was the first news­
paperman in Montana to show regard for the Nez Perce. This took consi­
derable courage, and he was damned for it at first. But the swing of 
editorial opinion became general and, much to his credit, the first 
editor to issue an unqualified statement that the Nez Perce were just 
and correct in principle and honorable and brave in conduct was, 
surprisingly, James H. Mills. Regardless of his position as adjutant 
general, he acted on principle, too, when the facts were presented to 
him. 
The final major question, regarding the events that followed and 
the general reaction to them, has been documented as well as possible 
already. 
Of particular note, however, was the complex and heated series 
of controversies which erupted between several Montana editors over the 
conduct of the military and militia. Termed "the newspaper war" in this 
stu(^, one of the most interesting aspects about it was that the Nez 
Perce—still being pursued by General Howard—were not especially involved 
in the criticism. In fact, it was dui-ing the newspaper war that editors 
issued statements of praise about the Indians. 
Although it is a generalization, it might be noted as a guide for 
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further research that the majority of newspaper controversies which 
arose were based on misunderstandings. This was true of the action 
taken by Governor Potts at Fort Fizzle. His most vocal editorial 
assailant, R. E. Fisk, editor of the Helena Daily Herald, capitalized 
on the affair because of former animosities. Other editors rebuked 
Fisk for his denouncements of the governor, but none of them clarified 
exactly what had happened at Fort Fizzle. 
Much of the criticism of General Howard was also the result of 
misunderstanding. He was denounced for "ordering" the Deer Lodge 
volunteers to "retire" from the field just before the Big Hole battle. 
The facts were finally brought to light when several of the Deer Lodge 
volunteers wrote a letter which appeared in the New North-West explain­
ing the situation. General Howard did not order the volunteers from 
the field. They had mistaken his line of march and became separated. 
Moreover, the volunteers expressed great respect for the general in 
their letter and asked that all denunciations of him cease. But on 
several occasions, false and defamatory reports appeared as confirmed 
news that General Howard was about to be or was replaced as commander 
in the field. 
Possibly the only editor who carried the newspaper war to extremes, 
however, was Fisk. Although he stayed silent about General Howard for 
the most part, his editorials concerning the governor. Mills, Fort Fizzle, 
the volunteers, the President and the Nez Perce were unusually critical. 
So far as could be gathered, his opinions changed little once his mind 
was made up. Fisk led the impeachment fight against the governor and 
lost. It was entirely evident from his editorials during the Nez Perce 
war that resentment grew between the editor and Governor Potts. 
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Apparently it was no great shock to other Montana editors that the 
governor censored Fisk when General Sherman visited Helena, 
The majority of editors, however, seemed very flexible in forming 
and then changing their opinions as facts became known. It has been 
noted, for instance, that the Nez Perce killed innocent persons while 
in Montana. But none of these killings occurred until after the Big 
Hole battle, during which Nez Perce women and children had been slaught­
ered in large numbers. It was the one time, so far as is known, that 
the Nez Perce as a group showed hatred for the whites. But when editors 
learned of the killings in Yellowstone Park, they asked with sadness, 
who is responsible for all the suffering? And th^ answered the ques­
tion, as it has been answered here, that the suffering arose from an 
oppressive government policy that refused to respect the human rights 
of an otherwise friendly people. 
APPENDn 
APPENDK 
"RESPQMSIBILITY FCR THE IDAHO MR" 
An article titled "Responsibility for the Idaho War"^ 
appeared in The Nation, a weekly periodical, on August 2, I877, 
and is quoted in full for three reasons: 
First, it was published one week before the Big Hole 
battle—a time of high emotion and considerable confusion 
about the Nez Perce war; 
Second, the information given and the opinions offered 
prove conclusively that a great deal was understood about the 
causes of the war during the early half of the campaign. This 
article marks one phase of the turning point of editorial 
opinion. After August, 1877, the Nez Perce no longer were 
generally regarded as brutal savages; 
Third, the penetrating insight of this article--which 
has not since been published in scholarly works—affirms the 
findings of this study. It was reprinted widely by the Montana 
press in late August, 1877. 
The article carried no by-line and the author is unknown. 
^The Nation, Vol. XXV (August 2, 1877), pp. 69-70. 
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How far the Indian insurrection on the Pacific slope is for 
the present suppressed is not decided, but it were well, while 
its lesson is fresh, to realize that the Nez-Perces are not to 
blame for the expensive and sanguinaiy campaign, unless being 
goaded into a brief madness by the direct and endless oppression 
of our Federal authorities be blameworthy, mat is remarkable 
about their case is that the tribe had been faithful and peace­
able since it was met by Lewis and Clark in l805; that official 
frauds in its management—so often a just ground for complaint 
—have not been alleged; but that the neglect and bad faith of 
the general Government, continued for a quarter of a century, 
not in petty matters and by individuals, requiring detection 
and proof, but on a grand scale ty the United States itself, 
and set forth in its own printed publications. 
It is too late now to revise the policy of regarding Indians 
as political communities having a right to the lands within the 
boundaries of which th^ were found. The rule has been uniform 
from the earliest discovery of North America, under the royal 
Government, the colonies, the States, the confederacy, and the 
present Union, to make treaties with their several tribes and 
nations. Our Supreme Court has recognized their title by 
occupancy, and when by treaty they have yielded to the United 
States for certain considerations the main body of their lands, 
there has been a solemn guaranty to them of the residue. In 
many parts of the country the Indian title has been extinguished 
before the whites have been legally permitted to settle upon or 
obtain any rights in the land. This precaution, absolutely 
necessary to prevent collision, was wholly neglected in refer­
ence to the district now partly in Oregon but chiefly in Idaho 
occupied formerly and still by the Nez-Perces, though there was 
an express provision in the acts of Congress establishing the 
Territories of Oregon and Idaho, that the land occupied Tgr 
Indian tribes should not without their consent be included in 
the limits or jurisdiction of those Territories, but should be 
expected out of their boundaries. Section 1839 of the Revised 
Statutes recognizes similar rights of person and property in 
tribes embraced within the limits of a State, as well as a 
Territory, unless the tribe shall consent to be so embraced. 
The first treaty with the Nez-Perces was made June 11, 1855, 
after a considerable number of whites had settled on the lands 
acknowledged to be within their bounds. It provided that no 
white man should be permitted, either before or after its 
ratification, to reside upon the tract reserved, but in the 
meantime it should be lawful for the Indians to reside on any 
lands, either within or outside of that tract, not in the 
actual claim and occupation of citizens. The whole of the 
Wallowa Valley, the contest for which was the immediate cause 
of the present insurrection, was distinctly included in the 
reservation, and, unless it had been so, the elder chief Joseph 
and his band, who claimed and occupied it, would haver have 
been induced to agree to the treaty. Even with this stipula­
tion, their signatures were procured with great difficulty and 
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over-persuasion. These facts are not matters of inference, but 
were formally reported by the Commission which in 1873 investi­
gated all the subjects in controversy. The bands of the tribe 
owned separate tracts of territory, with the full right of 
treating severally respecting them, there being no organized 
nation, and the loose confederacy not recognizing ar^ head 
chief. An English-speaking chief of a mere band, A-sha-lote, 
generally called La-wyer, was appointed head chief by the U. S. 
Commissioners as a convenient part of their programme, but had 
no original or accept authority as such. 
This treaty was not ratified until April, 1859, without any-
apparent reason for the delay but the mere neglect of the 
Senate, and during these four years there had raged throughout 
the region an extensive Indian war, in which the Nez Perces had 
proved the only stay and bulwark of the Government. They es­
corted the Governor of Oregon through hostile hordes, rescued 
Col. Steptoe and his whole command after his defeat on May 17, 
1858, and in the campaign of that year joined Col, Wright with 
a mounted company raised by themselves, which rendered invalu­
able aid, for which and for many horses furnished they were 
not paid. They resisted all attempts of the Mormons, who 
established a station on the Salmon River expressly to alienate 
them from the Government, and by their fidelity and courage 
saved the infant settlements. When, after ungrateful delay, 
the ratification was at last proclaimed, and Congress added 
to neglect absolute dishonesty, "by withholding appropriations 
to carry out the contract made, the tribe yet remained faithful 
and patient. Numerous emissaries from the Confederate States 
in rebellion vainly came to them with arras and money, repres­
enting with strong argument that the United States Government 
was broken up, and urged as proof of the statement the non­
payment of the annuities and other sums guaranteed. While th^ 
received no help in establishing themselves on the reservation, 
to which most of them obediently repaired, they continued to 
assist the Federal authorities in their hour of trial, though 
the latter markedly, and in eveiy possible mode, violated their 
agreements. Gold was discovered in i860, and fifteen thousand 
white men poured into the very land set apart exclusively for 
the Indian home, not only committing numberless individual 
outrages but also violating the treaty with such system that 
a town of 1,200 white inhabitants was laid out in the centre 
of the reservation without the consent of the tribe and against 
the protest of its agent. 
In 1862 the proposition was made by Congress to settle these 
evils by a new treaty, the debates showing it to be fully under­
stood that the Indians had faithfully observed all the obligations 
on their part, while the Government had wholly disregarded its 
own. The idea of beginning to fulfill these honorably was not, 
however, entertained. Accordingly, in June, 1863, Joseph and 
his band, Eagle-from-the-Light, Big Thunder, and other chiefs 
who did not recognize the supposititious head-chief Lawyer came, 
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in obedience to summons, to a council, and encamped on the west 
bank of the Lapwai, while the Lawyer faction remained on the 
east bank. The main point of the treaty proposed by the Com­
missioners was to reduce the reservation to about one-tenth of 
its actual limits, leaving out of the new boundaries the whole 
of the Wallowa Valley. To this Joseph and his party utterly 
and expressly refused agreement, defying any authority in any 
other part of the tribe to dispose of the land not only poss­
essed by him before the treaty of 1855, but also guaranteed by 
it, and retired from the council. The tribe thus become formally 
divided about equally into "treaties" and "non-treaties," the 
latter never recognizing any treaty later than that of 1855, 
and never accepting any consideration. 
About the year I87I Joseph died, bequeathing his beloved 
valley to his band and his son. Young Joseph, as his successor 
in the chieftaincy. The above facts are all admitted by the 
Commission of 1873» The legal position, then, was that the 
bands occupying the territoiy proposed to be ceded in I863 had 
a right to consider, and did consider, the old treaty to be 
inoperative because of the acknowledged failure of the United 
States to comply with its terms, but whether or not it ceased 
to be valid they retained the land before owned by them and 
reserved in it. Also, having a perfect right to refuse agree­
ment to the new treaty, they did so refuse. The title to the 
Wallowa Valley, therefore, remained vested in Joseph's band. 
The Commissioners, however, proceeded to conclude the new 
treaty with the ramp of the council, which, though requiring 
persuasion to deal at all with the Government that had before 
shown itself so grossly deceitful, was induced to consent by 
the simple arrangement of including the existing possessions 
of its members in the new reservation. The birthplace of 
Lawyer and the homes of his adherents being preserved to them, 
they were willing to accept even the doubtful security of the 
United States for nearly half a million of dollars as a consi­
deration for the sale of a tract of land in which they had 
little interest and no title. The transaction may be likened 
to a supposed purchase in our colonial times by the parent 
government from the Pennsylvanians of the charter and lands 
of the New York colony, against its earnest protest, with the 
provision that the latter should migrate from its home on the 
Hudson for some grudged refuge among treacherous enemies—to 
be driven by force in case of refusal, and the purchase-money 
all paid to the undisturbed Quakers. The Lawyer party could 
afford to be "friendly" on these terms, but in fact made little 
by their unworthy bargain, for the Government has been consis­
tently perfidious even to them. This new treaty, which, being 
unjust and incomplete, should never have received the approbation 
of the Senate, was not ratified for four years more, so that 
while annuities and other payments under the old were not paid, 
those just promised did not begin, and when there was a pretence 
of fulfilling pledges, it was done with such delay and irregu­
larity as to be nearly useless. The Territory of Idaho having 
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been established, laws were enacted in direct disregard of the 
Intercourse Act, and approved by the Governor, who was sc­
off icio the local superintendent of Indian affairs, thereby-
confusing the aboriginal mind and inducing fear that the "great 
father" had a "forked tongue." The allotments of land, with 
certificate of title, pledged by the treaty have never yet 
been given, and cannot be, because the surveys were made, 
against the protest of the agent, in such a perfunctory style 
as to leave no inner metes and bounds with monuments and records 
so as to adjust the lines of farms. Intermixed with the con­
fused and uncertain lines of the tribal fields are the farms 
and improvements of white settlers. As, notwithstanding the 
treaty, the Land Office had decided these claims to be legally 
held the whites, they naturally refuse to go off until paid 
for them, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs thereupon has 
repeatedly asked Congress in vain for an appropriation to 
remove this intolerable nuisance. There was small inducement 
for Joseph to listen to ohe voice of the charmer and abandon 
his vested rights for the new reservation. 
As if there were not enough misunderstanding already 
occasioned ly treaties and their violation, two contradictory 
executive orders were issued. The first was dated June l6, 
1873, setting aside a tract, including the disputed Wallowa 
Valley, exclusively for the "roaming" or "non-treaty" Nez-Perces, 
thereby acknowledging the justice of their claim to it, if not 
the validity of their title, and they were formally told by the 
local agent, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, 
that they should remain undisturbed in possession of this tract, 
and that the white settlers, then about one hundred men, should 
be removed. This order and promise were induced by the report 
of the Commission of the preceding month, which came to the 
following conclusion; "If any respect is to be paid to the laws 
and customs of the Indians, then the treaty of I863 is not bind­
ing upon this band. If so, then Wallowa Valley is still part 
of the Nez-Perce reservation. If this is the case, the Government 
is in equity bound to pay white settlers for their improvements 
and for the trouble, inconvenience and expense of removing from 
there." The Secretary of the Interior directed appraisements 
to be made of these improvements, which amounted to the large 
sum of $67,860, and probably frightened Congress so that no motion 
was introduced to make the appropriations. It was not realized 
that persistent national wrong is a debt at compound interest, 
and that the payment of this equitable obligation in I87I1—though 
it would have have been incurred if right and reason had earlier 
prevailed—would have saved a much larger sum, as well as many 
lives, in 1877» As no provision was made for the settlers, the 
executive order above mentioned was, perhaps necessarily, revoked 
another dated June 10, 1875» which restored the land to public 
domain for sale, and it has since been surv^ed, forming a part 
of Baker County, Oregon, Perfidy and tergiversation could no 
further go, Joseph and his band became hopeless of earthly 
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justice and ready victims to the new prophet who preached of 
divine interposition. The settlers of course remained, and 
also of course there has been for years a hostility sometimes 
resulting in collision between them and the Indians (each party 
regarding the other as trespassers), one of whom was last year 
murdered, and his brother this summer exploded the mine of 
insurrection by killing the murderer. This desperate rising 
of a free, warlike, and uncivilized people against insupport­
able wrong done by its professed guardian has been the natural 
and necessary result of Congressional neglect in the ratifica­
tion of a treaty until circumstances had wholly changed, and 
in refusing appropriations and legislation necessary to fulfill 
the solemn obligations of Government. It has been prophesied 
with reiterated warning in successive printed reports of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and his agents, upon the atten­
tion of Congress and its appropriate committees| so that the 
responsibility is more definitely fixed in this instance than 
can often be the case in Indian disputes, when the question 
may be complicated by the errors or misconduct of officers 
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to clarify what was the first official U, S. contact with the Nez 
Perce, 
Fee, Chester Ac Chief Joseph. New York: Wilson-Erickson, Inc., 1936. 
An illuminating stucfyi much is presented about Chief Joseph's 
personal life and dealings with the federal government before and 
during the war. 
Finerty, John F. War-Path and Bivouac. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1961, 
The author, a war correspondent for the Chicago Times, includes 
a chapter on the Bear Paw battle which he witnessed. The book was 
compiled as a memoir in I89O. 
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Haines, Francis» The Nez Perces. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1955. ~ 
Nez Perce society and culture in addition to the events of the 
war are related in an interesting manner in this scholarly review» 
Howard, Helen A,, and Dan L. McQrath. War Chief Joseph. Caldwell, 
Idaho; The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1958. 
Although some minor historical facts are not consistent with the 
findings of other scholars, this book is particularly valuable in 
its review of the Nez Perce because considerable study was devoted 
to the pre-war treaties. 
Howard, 0. 0. Nez Perce Joseph, Boston: Lee and Shepard Publishers, 
l88l. 
Because the author played an instrumental role in the Nez Perce 
campaign, his memoirs—published four years after Joseph's surrender 
—afford insight into military thinking at the time. General Howard 
held the Nez Perce in high esteem. 
Josephçy, Alvin M. The Patriot Chiefs. New York: The Viking Press, 
1961. 
Assailed by the late Montana historian, Oscar 0. Mueller, as 
being inaccurate, this review of the Nez Perce war comtdts several 
historical errors regarding the fighting at White Bird Canyon, Big 
Hole basin and Cow Island. 
Knight, Oliver. Following the Indian Wars. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, I960. 
A recount of the experiences of several newspaper correspondents 
during several Indian wars, this book includes a brief explanation 
of the problems encountered in the coverage of the Nez Perce cam­
paign. 
Leeson, M. A, (éd.). Mstory of Montana, 1739-1885. Chicago: Warner, 
Beers & Company, lbti5. 
Among the most extensive studies of its kind, this early work 
includes considerable biographical data on several pioneer editors, 
McWhorter, L. 7. Hear Me, My Chiefs! Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton 
Printers, Ltd., 195?T 
Possibly the most complete stucfy extant on the Nez Perce battles, 
this volume is profusely illustrated and presents an interpretive 
account of both white and Indian descriptions of the war. 
Yellow Wolf: His Own Story. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton 
Printers, Ltd., I9I1O. 
Based on extensive interviews with Yellow Wolf who, in the 
presence of other tribesmen, related the Nez Perce viewpoints of 
the war, this stucfy reveals much of the reasoning and strategy of 
those people in times of crisis. 
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Miles, Nelson A„ Personal Recollections and Observations of General 
Nelson A. Miles. New York: The Werner Co,, 1697° 
Although the author participated only in the final battle with 
the Nez Perce, he was responsible for their defeat and his memoirs 
indicate a high personal regard for Joseph's people» 
Udall, Stewart L» The Quiet Crisiso New York, Chicago and San Francisco? 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963o 
This study ty the Secretary of the Interior equates the Indian 
problems of the past with those of the present, noting governmental 
mismanagement in trying to find solutions* 
Wellman, Paul I. The Indian Wars of the West » New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 195b. 
Included in this compilation of several Indian wars is a factual 
resume of the Nez Perce campaign. 
B. SPECIALIZED BOOKS 
Chaffee, Eugene B. (ed„)„ "Nez Perce War Letters to Governor Mason 
Brayman," State Historical Society of Idaho Reports, 12th~l5th, 
1929-1936. Twelfth Biennial Report. Boise, 1930. 
This stucfy, interspersed with comment by the editor, comprises 
a large collection of letters and telegrams sent between l87b and 
1877 by military personnel, settlers and government officials. 
Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana. Vols. Ill, V, IX. 
Helenas Independent Publishing Company, 190^. 
These works in ten volumes comprise series of documents, news 
accounts and historical sketches on sundry topics, including the 
Nez Perce. 
Kappler, Charles J. (ed„). Indian Affairs Lawg and Treaties. U. S. 
Senate Reports, Vol. II, Washington? Government Printing Office, 
190li. 
The complete texts of treaties contracted between the U. S. and 
the Nez Perce are contained In this volume, 
Phillips, Paul C, (ed,). The Battle of the Big Hole, Sources of North­
west History No. 8, Missoulas State University of Montana, 1929. 
A compilation of personal correspondence by editors and military 
personnel, this work adds a dimension to understanding white leader­
ship not found in government reports, 
(éd.), "The Oregon Missions as Shown in the Walker Letters, 
1539-1851," Frontier Omnibus. Missoula: Montana State University 
Press, 1962, 
This series of letters between missionaries gives Insight into 
the problems they faced with several Northwestern Indian nations, 
including the Nez Perce. 
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Phinney, Archie. Nez Perce Texts. New Yorks Columbia University Press, 
193L. ' ~ 
An anthropological treatise on the Nez Perce language, this study 
is based on personal interviews and establishes a linguistic rela­
tionship with tribes situated in Pacific coastal regions. 
Rothermich, A. E, (ed.). "Early Days at Fort Missoula," Frontier 
Omnibus. Missoulas Montana State University Press, 1962. ~ 
In 1929 Captain Rothermich^ commander of Fort Missoula^, discovered 
a wealth of correspondence relating to the Nez Perce war. 
Spinden, Herbert J. The Nez Perce Indians. American Anthropological 
Association, Vol. II, Part 3. Lancaster, Pa.s The New Era Printing 
Compare, 1908, 
This authoritative anthropological paper was based in large 
measure on information gathered during an expedition sponsored ty 
Harvard University in 190? and gives invaluable background for an 
understanding of Nez Perce culture. 
Stout, Tom (ed.). Montana, Vol. I. Chicago and New Torks The American 
Historical Society, 1921. 
This extensive work totaling three volumes gives an understand­
ing of the Nez Perce war in relation to the history of Montana 
Territory, 
Teit, James H. The Middle Columbia Salish. University of Washington 
Publications in Anthropology. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1928. 
Primarily a study of the Indians west of the Nez Perce, this 
discourse indicates something of tribal relationships which linked 
Salish and Shahaptin-speaking Indians. 
The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft. Vol. XXXI. San Francisco: The 
History Company Publishers, I890. 
The works by this scholar contain a selection of topics 
pertaining to the early West, including a chapter reviewing the 
Nez Perce. 
C, PERIODICALS 
Alcorn, Rowena L. and Gordon D, "Old Nez Perce Recalls Tragic Retreat 
of 1877," Montanas the Magazine of Western History. Vol. 13. No. 1, 
Winter, 1963j pp. 66-7L. 
Personal recount of the retreat by Suhm-Keen, 9$, who was the 
nephew of Chief Joseph. He was ten years old during the campaign. 
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Burns, R. Ignatius» The Jesuits, the Northern Indians, and Nez 
Perce War of 1877» Pacific'Northwest Quarterly, Vol» U2o Seattle? 
University of Washington, 1951° 
This study of Jesuit missionaries brings to light problems 
encountered in keeping the non-warring Nez Perce neutral during 
the campaign of 1877. 
Mueller, Oscar 0. "The Nez Perce at Cow Island," Montana, the Maga­
zine of Western History, Vol» lU, No» 2, Centennial Edition, 
April, 196b, pp. 50-53» 
This noted Montana historian wrote an interpretive account of 
the skirmish near Fort Benton, Montana, 
The Nations A Weekly Journal, Vol» XXV, July 1-December 31, 1877» 
A weekly publication, this journal was devoted to timely national 
and international problems and devoted several articles to the Nez 
Perce question. One outstanding article is quoted in full in the 
Appendix. 
Thompson, Erwin N. "Narcissa Whitman," Montana, the Magazine of Western 
History, Vol. 13, No» 1|., Autumn, 1963, pp» l5-?7» 
This is the remarkable story of Dr. and Mrs» Marcus Whitman who 
brought medicine and the Gospel to the Nez Perce and were later 
massacred by renegrade Cayuse Indians. 
D. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES 
Donner, Nancy N. T. "History of Journalism in Idaho Territory, 1862-
1890." Unpublished Master's thesis, Montana State University, 
Missoula, 1963. 
Portions of this thesis relate newspaper coverage and editorials 
with the early events of the Nez Perce uprising. 
Housman, Robert L. "Early Montana Territorial Journalism as a Reflec­
tion of the American Frontier in the New Northwest»" Unpublished 
Doctor's dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia, 193b» 
This dissertation explores the development of pioneer journalism 
in Montana through the period of the Nez Perce crisis» 
"Trail Guide of the Big Hole Battlefield," Department of the Interior, 
National Park Service, 1962» 
Designed to aid visitors who tour the battlefield, this pamphlet 
is invaluable in understanding how one of the most important fights 
of the Nez Perce war was waged. 
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Eo NEWSPAPERS 
Anaconda ^Montana^ Standard, September 29» 190^* 
Avant Courier j^ozeman, Montan^, June 21-December 20, 1877° 
Benton ^Montana] Record, September 21 and October 12, 1877° 
Bozeman [Montana] Times, August 2~0ctober 26, 1877» 
Butte ^Montan^ Miner, June 26-Septeraber 2^, 1877° 
Cincinnati [ohio] Weekly Star, July 5, 1877 ° 
Daily Oregonlan [Portland, Oregon]^ February 28^ 1877<, 
Glasgow {Montana} Courier, March 27^ 1933° 
Helena [Montana, Dally and Weekly"j Herald, May 22-September 12, 1877° 
Helena [Montana, Daily and Weekly | Independent, July 22-October 11, 1877° 
Lewlston [idahc^ Teller, June 13, 27 and July I6, 1877, 
New North-West [ceer Lodge, Montana], May It-September 7, I877. 
New York Herald, September 10, 1877 ° 
New York Times, October 1^, 1877» 
New York Tribune, June l8-0ctober 9, 1877° 
[salen^ Oregon Statesman, April 28, 1877. 
Poplar [Montana^ Standard, March 20, 19i;lo 
Portland [oregonj Daily Bee, November 11, 1877° 
Walla Walla [Washington) Statesman, March 2l|, 1877° 
[walla Walla] Washington Statesman, June 21, 1862* 
Weekly Missoulian [Missoula, Montana], June l-Oetober 19, I877. 
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F, MISCELLANEOJS SOURCES 
AGO Letters, Records of the War Department (Government Documents, 
Historical Society of Montana), July-August, 1877° 
Higgins, G. P. "Bond, July 12, 1877." (Personal Correspondence to 
Gov. B, F. Potts, Historical Society of Montana)» 
Mills, James H. Letter and Telegrams to Ben R. Dittes (Montana State 
University Library, Missoula), July 10-August 5? 1877» 
